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Introduction: Opening Governance 
– Change, Continuity and Conceptual 
Ambiguity
Rosie McGee and Duncan Edwards*
Abstract Open government and open data are new areas of research, 
advocacy and activism that have entered the governance field alongside the 
more established areas of transparency and accountability. This article reviews 
recent scholarship in these areas, pinpointing contributions to more open, 
transparent, accountable and responsive governance via improved practice, 
projects and programmes. The authors set the rest of the articles from this 
IDS Bulletin in the context of the ideas, relationships, processes, behaviours, 
policy frameworks and aid funding practices of the last five years, and critically 
discuss questions and weaknesses that limit the effectiveness and impact of 
this work. Identifying conceptual ambiguity as a key problem, they offer a 
series of definitions to help overcome the technical and political difficulties 
this causes. They also identify hype and euphemism, and offer a series of 
conclusions to help restore meaning and ideological content to work on open 
government and open data in transparent and accountable governance.
1 Introduction
In the field of  governance, the sub-field of  transparency and 
accountability has evolved and grown apace since its beginnings at 
the dawn of  the twenty-first century. It has multiplied and spread in 
terms of  geographical reach, thematic specialisation, methodological 
experimentation, budget size and complexity. Open government and 
open data have moved to centre-stage, as newer, distinct but related 
areas of  research, advocacy, activism and aid programming, involving 
both governmental and non-governmental actors not only in aid-
recipient countries but also beyond the frame of  development aid.
In 2010 the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) led a review of  the 
Impact and Effectiveness of  Transparency and Accountability Initiatives 
focused on transparency and accountability (T&A) work to date in the 
world of  development aid (McGee and Gaventa 2010). The intervening 
five years have been busy ones for transparency and accountability, open 
government and open data actors of  all kinds in most countries around 
the world. The Open Government Partnership (OGP), an international 
platform aiming to support champions of  open government working 
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to make their governments more accountable and responsive,1 was 
launched in 2011 by eight countries and has since expanded to 69. 
Development aid funding to these areas has continued to grow.2 Key 
philanthropic and public donors in the T&A field have designed and 
launched dozens of  relatively long-term, complex multi-stakeholder 
initiatives providing support and facilitating learning for the promotion 
of  citizen engagement and open, responsive, accountable governance. 
In one such programme, the £26 million initiative Making All Voices 
Count (MAVC),3 IDS leads a large and ambitious Research, Evidence 
and Learning component as part of  a fund management consortium 
with Hivos (the consortium leader) and Ushahidi.
Five years on from that Review of  the Impact and Effectiveness of  
T&A Initiatives, we present this issue of  the IDS Bulletin on ‘Opening 
Governance’. It brings together eight contributions written by 
researchers and practitioners in 15 countries, five of  them focusing 
on research supported by Making All Voices Count. Approaching the 
contemporary challenges of  achieving transparency, accountability and 
openness from a wide range of  subject positions and professional and 
disciplinary angles, these articles collectively give a sense of  what has 
changed in this fast-moving field, and what has not. As such, this IDS 
Bulletin is an invitation to all stakeholders to take stock and reflect.
Having worked for many years in the fields of  information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) and innovation for international 
development (Edwards) and governance, transparency and 
accountability (McGee), we have assembled this IDS Bulletin from the 
particular vantage point we have occupied since June 2013, leading the 
Research, Evidence and Learning component of  Making All Voices 
Count. This position means playing a role as founder-members of  a 
fund management consortium that constitutes a microcosm of  the 
diverse actors and perspectives operating in the realm of  tech-for-T&A; 
continuous exposure to a maelstrom of  ideas and projects pitched to 
the consortium by prospective grantees; and engagement with a range 
of  donors who each bring their particular emphasis to the programme’s 
nature and direction. As such, MAVC might be considered, on many 
levels, an ‘essentially contested space’,4 wherein the meanings that drive 
action are under continuous and negotiated construction.
In this introduction to this IDS Bulletin, we aim firstly to review the most 
relevant scholarship from the past five years, pinpointing its potential and 
actual contribution to the cause of  more open, transparent, accountable 
and responsive governance via improved practice, projects and 
programmes. Secondly, we introduce specific examples of  recent practice 
and research presented in the articles comprising this IDS Bulletin, 
setting them in the context of  the fluid backdrop of  ideas, relationships, 
processes, behaviours, policy frameworks and aid funding practices from 
2010–15, of  which Making All Voices Count forms part. Finally, drawing 
on both our review of  scholarship and the contributing authors’ content, 
we attempt to draw some conclusions about the still-burning questions 
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and the still-salient weaknesses that continue to limit the effectiveness 
and impact of  work in the field. We do so with a view to accelerating the 
resolution of  those questions and weaknesses and thereby contributing to 
improvement in effectiveness and impact.
2 Looking back…
Conducted in 2010 at the height of  the boom of  this sub-field of  aid 
and development work, the Review of  Impact and Effectiveness of  
T&A Initiatives uncovered the prevalence of  untested assumptions and 
weak theories of  change in projects, programmes and strategies. It is 
worth citing at length:
Why are theories of  change needed? At the most basic level, the lack 
of  a theory of  change can inhibit the effectiveness of  an initiative 
by causing a lack of  direction and focus; but also can make impact 
assessment or progress-tracking elusive or impossible. In particular, it 
can make it difficult to analyse retrospectively the existence or nature 
of  connections between the ex post situation and the inputs made by 
the intervention (McGee and Gaventa 2010: 18).
The underlying problems at the roots of  most T&A initiatives examined 
were conceptual vagueness and poorly articulated normatively-inspired 
‘mixes’:
[T]he evidence on the effectiveness and impact of  TAIs is 
characterised by confusion on both theoretical and empirical planes. 
This seems to be due not to weak capacity for distinguishing, for 
instance, intermediate from final outcomes; but to weak incentives 
and precedents for spelling them out (ibid.: 36).
In parallel to the IDS review of  T&A initiatives, a review was conducted 
of  the ‘new technologies’ that had begun to emerge in the field (Avila et 
al. 2010). It concluded that ‘there is a dangerous potential to diminish 
technology for transparency and accountability as an approach without 
greater rigor’ (ibid.: 20). Even while highlighting ways in which technologies 
could enhance activities in the field, the researchers issued several warnings:
Despite early successes, […] many efforts still lack credibility and 
could be counterproductive. Some projects are launched without 
sufficient knowledge or expertise to design an effective methodology 
or conceive of  and execute a feasible strategy. Terms and labels such 
as ‘demanding accountability’ or ‘exposing corruption’ tend to be 
very loosely thrown about.
Technology for transparency and accountability tools do not 
necessarily have to be sophisticated to succeed, but they need to be 
designed intelligently and with an eye towards local context. […]
Technology for transparency and accountability efforts must 
be careful to avoid exacerbating societal inequalities by 
disproportionately empowering elites (ibid.: 20–3).
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Since 2010 some encouraging indications have emerged that the more 
sobering findings of  the IDS Review about untested assumptions and 
weak theories of  change in the T&A field have had positive influences 
on subsequent funding decisions, research agendas and practice.5 In 
the same period, two other significant developments have taken place. 
Firstly, within the T&A field, what could be viewed in 2010 as a trickle 
of  ‘new technologies’ for T&A has turned into a flood, substantially 
reconfiguring methods, practices and understandings of  T&A work. 
Secondly, in a separate but closely related field, T&A’s younger relatives 
‘open government’ and ‘open data’ have burst onto the scene of  
governance and T&A aid programmes, an offshoot of  the broader 
movement to articulate the notion of  ‘open development’, spearheaded 
by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) from 2008 
onwards (Smith et al. 2008; Smith and Reilly 2013).
Both our 2010 findings about T&A initiatives and Avila et al.’s about 
‘new technologies’ for T&A suggest that, among other things, both areas 
suffer from the phenomenon of  ‘buzzwords and fuzzwords’. Cornwall 
and Brock (2015) coined this term for words in today’s development 
lexicon that are deliberately imprecise and confusing, often in a 
euphemistic sense, and that ‘combine general agreement on the abstract 
notion that they represent with endless disagreement about what they 
might mean in practice’ (Cornwall 2010: 2). As open government and 
open data have moved towards centre-stage, this malady has soared to 
epidemic proportions, with all that this implies (Brennan 2015). And 
malady it is: Cornwall and Eade (2010) tell us that the phenomenon 
of  buzzwords and fuzzwords tends to create false impressions of  
universal meaning and commitment, close the non-initiates out of  the 
conversation, numb the critical faculties, shroud concepts in euphemism 
and disguise their normative origins. Add to these ills the issue of  
unclear theories of  change, and this sector has a twofold problem 
of  conceptual ambiguity. On the one hand, conceptual ambiguity 
clouds the conception of  initiatives so that it is hard to demonstrate 
their impact, and on the other conceptual ambiguity generates a false 
sense that we are all pulling together in one common, unproblematic 
endeavour.
Countering the conceptual ambiguity, various strands of  critical 
reflection have emerged among a small number of  scholars and 
practitioners. Some are sympathetic to the view that openness ushers 
in countless new possibilities and serendipity, but are motivated by the 
need to get better at demonstrating impact. Some are suspicious of  so 
much ‘openness’ rhetoric and want to disentangle the wishful thinking 
from the actual practice so as to clear the way for a more politicised and 
explicitly normative treatment of  open data, open government or more 
open models of  governance.6 Others, engaged in recent critical aid 
debates, are alive to the role that the international aid machinery may 
have played in forcing complex aspirations into simplified assumptions 
and linear, project-shaped models, and apply the broader aid critiques 
to the T&A field.7
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Bringing to bear their empirically- and historically-informed 
perspectives – which often pre-date the wave of  tech optimism that 
currently engulfs the field and obscures judgement – the critics 
unpack the meanings of  transparency, accountability, open data, open 
government and open governance, and their actual – rather than 
euphemistically assumed – relationships to each other. Some strands of  
this growing critique started in the T&A arena and extended into the 
open government/open data arena over time; some started in the open 
data, open government, or open development arenas or the tech-for-
T&A movement but cover similar ground to critiques of  T&A work; but 
whatever the direction, the longer-standing T&A-focused critiques have 
much in common with the newer ‘openness’-focused ones.
These critical debates have begun to lay bare how imprecise and 
overblown the expectations are in the transparency, accountability and 
openness ‘buzzfield’, and the problems this poses. Below we review the 
critical debates more or less chronologically, rather than by trying to 
disentangle the threads of  a necessarily interwoven and overlapping set 
of  positions.
As early as 2008 ‘Open ICT4D’ had emerged as a hypothesis and 
an exploration of  the implications of  incorporating openness into 
ICT4D practice (Smith et al. 2008). The same researchers, based at 
IRDC in Canada, moved on to a fine-grained specification of  ‘open 
development’, framing the tendency as a paradigmatic challenge to 
development as we knew it, rather than the introduction of  technologies 
and widgets designed to lever open existing development, aid or 
governance activities or debates (Smith and Reilly 2013).
Their messages resonated with some open data advocates. Gurstein 
(2011) reflects from within the open data movement on whether open 
data is about enabling effective data use for everyone, or in fact all 
about ‘empowering the empowered’. Pointing out that ‘the most likely 
immediate beneficiaries of  open data are those with the most resources 
to make effective use of  the data’, he unmasks both ‘empowerment’ and 
‘open data’ as buzzwords, with a normative resonance that tends to brook 
no questioning or resistance. He is at pains to state that his position is:
[…] not to argue against ‘open data’ which in fact is a very significant 
advance and support to broad–based democratic action and 
empowerment. Rather it is to argue that in the absence of  specific 
efforts to ensure the widest possible availability of  the prerequisites 
for ‘effective use’ the outcome of  ‘open data’ may be quite the 
opposite to that which is anticipated (and presumably desired) by its 
strongest proponents (ibid. 2011).
Soon after, Yu and Robinson (2012) problematise ‘the new ambiguity 
of  open government’ and ‘open government data’ with reference to the 
technical, bureaucratic and policy context of  the USA in the 2000s. 
They note that even one of  its foremost proponents feels with hindsight 
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that the concept of  open government would have been better framed 
as two related but distinct issues: government transparency on the one 
hand, and public sector innovation on the other (ibid.: 204).8 Davies and 
Bawa (2012) tease out the meaning of  the compound ‘open government 
data’, setting it in the historic context of  evolving and diverse ‘visions 
of  openness’, and highlighting how ‘open government data’ is riddled 
with perils as well as ripe with promise. Bates (2012) drives home the 
ideological undertones beneath Davies and Bawa’s warnings, naming 
the risk that ‘open data movements [get] co-opted as part of  a neo-
liberal project of  state deregulation rather than acting in the interests of  
social progress and democratic futures’ (Davies and Bawa 2012). The 
meaning, risks and claimed outcomes of  open government data are 
further critiqued by Heusser, who recognises not only the constraints on 
the effectiveness of  open government data initiatives, but that at best their 
outcomes and impacts are contributions made alongside other factors and 
actors, rather than achievements that can be singly attributed to any 
particular open government data initiative (Heusser 2012).
Responding to Yu and Robinson, Peixoto (2013) argues that ‘open 
data’, as a form of  transparency, does not lead to public accountability 
anywhere near as often or as systematically as the prevailing rhetoric 
suggests. Without what he calls the ‘publicity’ and ‘political agency’ 
conditions being satisfied, it will not do so. He defines the publicity 
condition as ‘the extent to which disclosed information actually reaches 
and resonates with its intended audiences’ (ibid.: 204) and the political 
agency condition as ‘mechanisms through which citizens can sanction 
or reward public officials’ (ibid.: 206).9 Seen thus, open data is not 
equivalent to open government, and does not in and of  itself  open 
up governance. Peixoto argues that the conceptual ambiguity which 
characterises the open data field is both a weakness and a strength:
[…] a single policy [in this case, open data initiatives] is often 
designed and implemented by actors pursuing multiple goals intended 
to produce different effects. Thus, while these policies may represent 
government officials’ opportunistic pretense for accountability, they 
may also be supported by democratically minded reformers who view 
open data – and the current enthusiasm around it – as an opportunity 
to advocate for greater accountability reforms. The dismissal of  these 
initiatives as examples of  authoritarian manipulation therefore risks 
undermining reformers’ efforts for change (ibid.: 213).
Carothers and Brechenmacher, writing in 2014, dissect the relationships 
between accountability, transparency, participation and inclusion:
Accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion represent 
vital embodiments of  the opening to politics that occurred in 
development work in the 1990s. They bridge three distinct 
practitioner communities that emerged from this new direction – 
those focusing on governance, on democracy, and on human rights.
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But consensus remains elusive. Democracy and human rights 
practitioners generally embrace an explicitly political understanding 
of  the four concepts and fear technocratic or purely instrumentalist 
approaches. Governance specialists often follow a narrower 
approach, applying the core principles primarily to the quest for 
greater public sector effectiveness (2014: 1).
Despite the aura of  a ‘unified agenda’ which enfolds these four 
approaches, they argue that aid agencies pursue the conceptual bundle 
while actually putting very different emphases on its four constituents. 
For instance:
[…] enthusiastic proponents of  the growing transnational movement 
for accountability and transparency view these issues as a potentially 
transformative advance of  the governance agenda and one that 
naturally connects to burgeoning efforts to harness new Internet 
and communication technologies for development ends. Other 
practitioners have a long-standing commitment to participatory 
development and/or socioeconomic inclusion – two domains 
of  assistance that pre-date the more recent rush of  attention to 
accountability and transparency and that have undergone various 
permutations over the past decades (ibid.: 12).
The result, according to Carothers and Brechenmacher, is a field full of  
distortions: shallow practice, inconclusive debates about the place of  each 
of  the four principles, uncertainty about their instrumental value and their 
transformative impact, and resistance on the ‘recipient side’ – developing 
country government actors who embrace the concepts rhetorically but lack 
the political will to ever translate them into substantive political reform 
(ibid.). Their findings are reinforced by de Gramont whose key message 
is that domestic and external reformers’ attempts to improve governance 
‘must move beyond a search for single-focus “magic bullet” solutions 
toward an integrated approach that recognizes multiple interrelated drivers 
of  governance change’ (2014: 1).
Most of  the critical literature referred to above focuses on the 
relationships between just two or three areas of  the ‘buzzfield’ – open 
data/open government, or open government data/tech-for-T&A, or 
openness/transparency. A new contribution by Fox to the critical debate 
in 2014 had a broader range but a more specific objective: it applied 
historic insights on the social and political dynamics of  transparency 
and accountability more broadly to a close re-reading of  the available 
evidence of  impact (Fox 2014). The evidence Fox reviews comes 
from mainly non-tech-enabled T&A initiatives and efforts by citizens 
to open up governance by engaging with budgets and policies over 
the previous decade, a mixture of  the diverse emphases highlighted 
by Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014), and a combination of  
strategies and tactics, ranging from the provision of  open information 
through transparency advocacy to collective action for accountability. 
A fundamental distinction emerges between ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ 
8 | McGee and Edwards Introduction: Opening Governance – Change, Continuity and Conceptual Ambiguity
Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’
approaches to the promotion of  citizen voice to contribute to improved 
public sector performance. Tactical approaches are ‘bounded, localized 
and information-led’; strategic approaches in contrast ‘bolster enabling 
environments for collective action, scale up citizen engagement beyond 
the local arena and attempt to bolster governmental capacity to respond 
to voice’. Fox’s re-reading of  the evidence shows that while ‘the tactical 
approach has led to mixed results […] strategic approaches are more 
promising’ (2014: 35). In particular:
[…] information alone often turns out to be insufficient. More 
innovation, experimentation and comparative analysis will help to 
determine what kinds of  information are most actionable for pro-
accountability stakeholders, as well as the channels for dissemination 
that can motivate collective action, empower allies and weaken 
vested interests […]
In the specific case of  ICT‐led accountability initiatives, Fox notes that 
these are increasingly ‘framed in terms of  “closing the feedback loop” 
– in other words, getting institutions to listen to citizen voice. Yet in 
practice, this institutional response capacity often remains elusive and 
feedback loops rarely close’ (ibid.: 35). To attain higher impact in social 
accountability initiatives, Fox concludes, it is necessary to identify and 
enhance synergies between what he calls ‘voice’ (citizen voice), ‘teeth’ 
(governmental capacity to respond to voice) and ‘bite’ (impact, in the 
form of  government responsiveness).
In a further careful review of  cases of  ICT-enabled citizen voice where 
evidence of  institutional response was available, Peixoto and Fox 
(2015)10 take this analysis further. As well as pinpointing many factors 
of  initiative design and socio-political and institutional context that 
affect the likelihood of  ICT-enabled citizen voice leading to government 
responsiveness,11 two of  their findings stand out in relation to earlier 
debates summarised above. Firstly,
[…] both public disclosure of  feedback and public collective action 
may be crucial for generating the civic muscle necessary to hold both 
senior policymakers and frontline service providers accountable. 
In other words, civic engagement, in addition to information, […] 
drives downwards accountability, from state to society (ibid.: 22) 
(emphasis in original).
Secondly, while institutional response is found to be determined by both 
willingness and capacity,
[…] the empirical evidence available so far about the degree to 
which voice can trigger teeth indicates that service delivery user 
feedback has so far been most relevant where it increases the capacity 
of  policymakers and senior managers to respond. It appears that 
dedicated ICT-enabled voice platforms – with a few exceptions – 
have yet to influence their willingness. Where senior managers are 
already committed to learning from feedback and using it to bolster 
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their capacity to encourage their agencies to respond, ICT can make 
a big difference. In that sense, ICT can make a technical contribution 
to a policy problem that to some degree has already been 
addressed. The question remains, how can ICT-enabled voice 
platforms become more effective at changing the incentives 
that influence whether or not agencies are willing to respond to 
citizens? (ibid.: 23–4).
Collectively, these sources go a long way to offering clarity in respect 
of  certain basics which might, on first glance or to the non-initiated, 
appear to be semantics – or pedantics. In relation to ‘openness’, 
‘open government’ is different from ‘open data’; ‘open government 
data’ might be data that makes government as a whole more open, 
or government data that is readily accessible and reusable, with quite 
different implications; and the ambiguity surrounding these three 
interrelated concepts is such that ‘[t]oday, a regime can call itself  
“open” if  it builds the right kind of  website – even if  it does not become 
more accountable or transparent’ (Yu and Robinson 2012: 59). In 
relation to more traditional spheres of  T&A but also relevant to ‘open’ 
initiatives, transparency does not automatically lead to accountability; 
information will not generate state accountability to society without the 
pressure added by public collective action; and citizen voice enabled 
by ICT platforms may achieve institutional responsiveness where the 
problem is weak capacity to respond, but will not when the underlying 
problem is a lack of  political will.
These finely textured and dispassionate recent analyses of  the conceptual 
apparatus of  transparency, accountability and openness, and of  the 
practical effects and impacts of  conceptual fuzziness, generate evidence-
based clarity and insights. Used well, they can provide the foundations 
of  more viable theories of  change and compatible theories of  action 
for activities conducted in the name of  open data, open government 
and open government data. They can help to dispel the fuzz that 
has obscured the differences between the product- and artefact-
focused endeavours (‘open data’, ‘open government data’ and largely 
‘open government’), and the more process- and relationship-focused 
endeavours that aim to transform governance systems and behaviours 
by opening them up to a wider range of  participants contesting and 
reconfiguring power dynamics. As potential antidotes to conceptual 
fuzziness and recalibrators of  expectations among scholars and 
practitioners of  accountability and governance, they are much-needed.
So are their messages permeating the discourses and aspirations that 
underpin global-level policy initiatives related to open data, open 
government and the opening up of  governance? And have they begun 
to filter through into clearer, more realistic programming and project 
design at the micro-level, and from there to enhanced impact? In what 
follows, we look critically at the range of  contemporary examples of  
policy initiatives, programming and practice discussed in the contents of  
this IDS Bulletin, in the light of  this current state of  knowledge.
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3 Looking at what’s in front of us…
The first two articles in this IDS Bulletin make fresh contributions to 
clarity of  concept and design. Peixoto and Fox (this IDS Bulletin) review 
prominent, ‘unusually comprehensive’ and rich empirical data on 
23 ICT platforms for citizen voice to improve public service delivery, 
almost all dating from the previous five years. More than half  (12 out 
of  23) of  the initiatives rest on the ‘implicit market model’ based on 
individual demand (citizen voice) for good-quality services producing 
its own supply. These 12 achieved ‘low government responsiveness’, 
which according to Peixoto and Fox’s classification means a response 
rate lower than 20 per cent. Their findings show that pushing on an 
open door opens it further: the successful tech-for-TAIs succeed because 
they enhance the effectiveness or impact of  something already going on 
(political will that is already there, or service providers who are already 
acknowledging their own accountability). Tech-for-TAIs in themselves, 
as currently being designed and implemented, do not appear to achieve 
accountability impact – they do not unlock locked doors or open closed 
ones. The study testifies to the persistence of  poorly articulated theories 
of  change that fail to specify realistic causal pathways at the outset. It 
gives clear pointers as to how to design theories of  change and action 
to have a chance of  achieving high government responsiveness. If  the 
designers and implementers of  future tech-for-T&A initiatives do not 
utilise them, it will not be because the evidence is not there, which raises 
the need to look more broadly than the (simplistic, linear) assumption 
that evidence, once made available, gets translated into action.
In many of  the initiatives Peixoto and Fox review, the ‘problem’ is treated 
as technological and informational, not as political, institutional or cultural. 
In this they are similar to the eight recent tech-enabled initiatives for 
enhancing the sustainability of  rural water supply12 reviewed by Welle et 
al. (this IDS Bulletin). In the study they write about, Welle et al. specified and 
tested for three dimensions of  success using a Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis approach: successful ICT reporting, successful ICT report 
processing, and successful service improvements through water scheme 
repairs. Only three out of  eight initiatives analysed were successful in all 
three dimensions so counted as successful overall.13 In many of  the cases 
analysed, the technologies, if  taken up, obstructed the smooth workings of  
socioculturally embedded ways of  resolving water supply problems – so 
they were often not taken up. Like Peixoto and Fox, Welle et al. show, firstly, 
that tech initiatives which push on open doors succeed but ones which 
push on closed or locked doors don’t; it is not the technology that leads to 
the accountability impact but the agency, organisational, institutional and 
cultural aspects of  the context. Secondly, the approach of  crowd-sourcing,14 
prominent in many of  these initiatives, tends to bring in information on 
functionality, which in itself  does not affect transparency, accountability or 
the sustainability of  rural water supply. Crowd-sourced initiatives are often 
not taken up, i.e. people (crowds) do not actually report anywhere near as 
often as it is assumed will happen, for a range of  reasons, some of  which 
are clearly evidenced – for example fear of  identification as trouble-maker, 
or a lack of  expectation or trust that it will lead to anything.
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These two painstaking analyses that enhance conceptual clarity and 
extend our knowledge of  what makes tech-for-TAIs work, are followed 
by a cluster of  articles about voice, listening and responsiveness in diverse 
processes of  opening governance. Loureiro et al. (this IDS Bulletin) review 
four instances of  what they call state–citizen ‘concertation’ over extension 
of  access to basic services in four African countries. Irrespective of  the 
context, change goal or strategy, all four cases hinge on new openings 
within the respective polity which create new conditions for social or 
citizen-led accountability claims to gain purchase – similar to the notion 
of  political opportunities in the social movements literature (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001). They trace the political actions, relationships and 
dynamics that opened up chinks for citizens to re-shape at least the social 
distribution aspect of  governance, if  not the very fabric of  governance 
itself. Doing so illuminates the important difference between the open 
quality of  products or artefacts – for instance, data, or a government web 
portal – and the opening up of  governance processes to new voices, actors 
and influences. From Loureiro et al.’s historical perspective, it is clear that 
openings close in the absence of  efforts to keep them open, especially if  
circumstances turn unfavourable.
Situated within the fraught politics of  service provision in post-
apartheid South Africa, Mills’ research (this IDS Bulletin) unpacks citizen 
perspectives on a state that champions ‘open government’ on the 
international stage. It serves as a reminder of  the distance that separates 
the realities of  poor and marginalised people from global-level policy 
initiatives, discourses and commitments, even those that purport to 
integrate marginalised perspectives and redress marginalisation. Such 
is the distance that residents of  Khayelitsha, a semi-formal socially and 
economically marginalised township in Cape Town, appear almost naive 
in their belief  that ‘because the government had been democratically 
elected, its leaders had a mandate to listen to civil society, and its 
members’. Recognising the potential that ‘“[o]pen governance” could 
serve as a powerful counterpoint to the form of  “closed governance” 
that was modelled during apartheid’, Mills points out that this would 
‘require the state to put the principles it subscribes to as a member of  
the OGP [Open Government Partnership] into practice in places like 
Khayelitsha’. Read from a viewpoint sympathetic to the government, 
the article shows how much easier it is for government to ‘talk the talk’ 
globally through committing itself  to opening up environmental data 
and establishing an anti-corruption complaints hotline, than to ‘walk the 
talk’ domestically through holding itself  even minimally answerable to 
the marginalised majority of  citizens. Read from another perspective, 
especially the concluding comments on the CSOs’ letter of  complaint to 
the South African government, the article attests to government ‘open-
wash’, seen by some South African activists to occur with the complicity, 
or at least the complacency of  the Open Government Partnership.
Neuman (this IDS Bulletin) reports on a study of  how far access to 
information is, de facto, gender-equitable. Her focus follows on from 
the recognition of  access to information as a key enabling condition 
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in any viable theory of  change for accountability and a core aspect 
of  more accessible and open governance (McGee and Gaventa 2010; 
Calland 2010). Her findings indicate the need to address inequities in 
the ‘lower-order’ aims of  the theory of  change if  the ‘higher-order’ aims 
of  state accountability to citizens – of  both sexes – are to be achievable. 
Neuman’s research is a compelling contribution to the wider move 
to establish greater clarity about what actually happens in the tucks 
and interstices of  pro-accountability theories of  change. In this case 
it transpires that well into the twenty-first century, systematic bias still 
excludes women disproportionately from realising the basic ‘enabling’ 
right to information, and that OGP processes have so far apparently 
failed to address this. The article and the study it reports on is also a 
reminder that wherever divides, inequities and biases exist, opening up 
products, processes and spaces without introducing measures to counter these 
biases – whether digital divides, urban bias or male bias – will reproduce 
and reinforce them.
Many of  the prevalent theories of  change at work in the T&A and 
open government space include assumptions as to the degree to which 
citizens’ voices are mediated and represented and the means by which 
this happens. Notwithstanding the critical literature on the concept and 
origins of  ‘civil society’ particularly in aid-dependent countries (Lewis 
2002; Chandhoke 2007; Howell and Lind 2009; von Lieres and Piper 
2014), the architects and implementers of  TAIs often take it that civil 
society organisations (CSOs) will play the crucial role of  representing 
the views of  different sections of  society. But what about contexts where 
there is a schism between CSOs and the citizens they are assumed to 
represent? Otieno et al. (this IDS Bulletin) describe the emergence in 
Kenya of  Bunge La Mwananchi (the Peoples’ Parliament). Bunge La 
Mwananchi grew out of  poor and marginalised people’s frustration with 
a professionalised civil society, which they felt did not represent them 
but instrumentalised them to further its own agendas. But bunge, like the 
‘civil societies’ in the critiques of  Lewis (2002), Chandhoke (2007) and 
others, suffers from divisions within, and its energy ebbs and flows as 
issues surface, get confronted and move on. The Kenyan government 
rushed to join the OGP in 2011–12 as an early and enthusiastic entrant. 
Its Action Plans have strongly emphasised open data and e-government 
systems while the government was mired in political and financial 
corruption scandals. As the spaces being opened up in governance 
do not offer equal openings to all, spaces like bunge are being created 
autonomously by citizens. As ever with autonomously created spaces, 
the dangers are of  the co-option of  the movement or its key members, 
and of  bunge members being listened to only by each other, never by 
government actors.
Our final two contributions look at the muddier and darker sides of  
technology as applied to T&A and openness. In Wilson and de Lanerolle’s 
exploration (this IDS Bulletin) of  the processes by which the designers 
and implementers of  TAIs choose technology tools, they find that many 
of  these actors, by their own account, struggle to make successful tool 
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choices. Many do not do sufficient research to understand the intended 
users of  the technology they choose, and fail to consider the breadth 
of  technology choices available to them. They find that ‘in many cases, 
tools are chosen with only limited testing of  their appropriateness for the 
intended users in the intended contexts, despite widespread recognition 
among practitioners, funders and researchers that such an approach is 
prone to significant efficiency and sustainability risks’ (page 114, this IDS 
Bulletin). What, then, is driving these apparently perverse practices? It 
would seem that those designing and making technology choices within 
TAIs not only suffer from the ‘buzzwords and fuzzwords’ syndrome, but 
are also blind to the tacit contextual knowledge of  their intended users. 
This tacit knowledge might be critical not only for successful selection 
of  appropriate technologies but also for setting aside euphemism and 
applying critical faculties to ascertain whether the initiative is looking to 
address the right problem, or indeed, whether there is a problem at all, 
or just a technology solution in search of  a problem. When designers 
use themselves as user ‘proxies’ for testing a technology, is this due to 
lack of  funding to test it properly, or failure to appreciate that their own 
positionality and knowledge may differ from those of  the people who 
most stand to benefit from enhancements in government openness or 
accountability? Does any responsibility lie with the funders supporting 
these initiatives? Is practice being distorted by tech fetishism on donors’ 
parts, or an obsession with innovation for openness?
In earlier work, one of  our contributors, Jonathan Fox, pointed out that 
‘[o]ne person’s transparency is another’s surveillance. One person’s 
accountability is another’s persecution. Where one stands on these 
issues depends on where one sits’ (2007: 663). The capability and 
capacity to utilise the new opportunities for opening up governance 
presented by new technologies quite definitely depends on where one 
sits. In many cases the financial and technological capacity of  the state 
(or other powerful actors behind the state) to surveil and persecute 
citizens is far greater than those of  citizens attempting to use technology 
to hold the state to account. Treré (this IDS Bulletin) challenges the 
pervasive tech-optimistic bias underlying many TAIs, which attribute 
to technologies inherently democratic and emancipatory qualities. 
He does so by exploring how the Mexican government – co-Chair of  
the Open Government Partnership 2013–15 – used technologies to 
undermine its citizens’ attempts to challenge and hold it accountable 
for its actions. The picture that emerges is of  a government with one 
hand on the OGP table flourishing newly-opened data, and the other in 
the shadows below the table, brandishing robots to control and repress 
citizens. Treré argues that, ‘citizens have to struggle against increasingly 
sophisticated techniques of  control and repression that successfully 
exploit the very mechanisms that many consider to be emancipatory 
technologies’ (page 136, this IDS Bulletin). While technologies may offer 
new opportunities for citizens to interrogate government data and 
information and to mobilise to demand accountability, let it not be 
forgotten that technologies can also be used to suppress accountability 
demands and violate human rights.
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4 … and looking forward
The conceptual ambiguity that was shown in 2010 to be plaguing this 
field is alive and well. It can be detected even in the bosom of  the Open 
Government Partnership,15 although in some corners of  the OGP its 
existence and problematic nature is acknowledged (see, for example, 
Table 1 Definitions
Open[ing] Governance
Governance broadly speaking is the relationship 
between citizens and their governments and the 
processes in which they interact. Open[ing] governance 
means [working towards] governance relationships 
and processes that are transparent, accountable and 
participatory, and which allow the perspectives, needs 
and rights of all citizens to be addressed, including those 
most marginalised by power relations (authors’ own 
elaboration) 
Transparency
Transparency ‘means that information is freely available 
and directly accessible to those who will be affected by 
decisions and that enough information is provided in 
easily understandable forms and media’ (Suk Kim et al. 
2005)
Accountability
‘[A] perpetual struggle when power is delegated by the 
many to the few in the interests of governability’ (Goetz 
and Jenkins 2005: 1–2). ‘It implies an institutionalised 
(i.e. regular, established, accepted) relationship between 
different actors. It may be formal or informal.’ (T/AI, 
www.transparency-initiative.org/about/definitions)
Open Data
‘Open data is data that can be freely used, re-used 
and redistributed by anyone – subject only, at most, to 
the requirement to attribute and share-alike’ (Open 
Knowledge Foundation, http://opendatahandbook.org/
guide/en/what-is-open-data/)
Open Government Data
‘Open government data is open data produced or 
commissioned by government or government controlled 
entities’ (OKF, opengovernmentdata.org) 
Open Government
Open Government, although the term is often used 
loosely to denote the digitalisation of government 
information and services, refers to government 
institutions and mechanisms characterised by:
 l ‘Transparency: the public understands the workings of 
their government;
 l Citizen engagement: the public can influence the 
workings of their government by engaging in 
governmental policy processes and service delivery 
programs; and
 l Accountability: the public can hold the government to 
account for its policy and service delivery performance’.
(Global Integrity, www.globalintegrity.org/2012/05/
working-definition-opengov/) 
Source Authors’ own.
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Khan and Foti 2015).16 It causes technical problems because it hinders 
attempts to demonstrate impact; and political problems because it 
clouds the political and ideological differences between projects as 
different as open data and open governance. So what is to be done?
First, what do we do about ‘these words [that] appear to convey one 
thing, but are in practice used to mean something quite different, or 
indeed have no real meaning at all’ (Eade 2010: viii)? One thing we can 
do in this article is promulgate received and respected definitions and 
usage of  each, in the hope that others will follow these and thus reduce 
the ‘fuzz’. Table 1 does so, drawing on the classics in the published 
literature and the authoritative organisational and online sources.
And what do we do about buzz? By stoking the debates and promoting 
the evidence on these obstacles and differences in this article, we hope 
to have made a small contribution to rekindling momentum in T&A 
impact debates, and to restoring meaning and ideological content. In 
particular, we hope to rescue the transformative potential of  the project 
of  opening up governance relationships and processes to instil fairer 
power dynamics among and between citizens and their states. In this 
buzzfield awash with the flood of  aid dollars and the mud of  hype and 
euphemism, it is this project that has been most at risk of  conceptual 
dilution and elision.
In relation to T&A impact debates, on the basis of  the secondary 
evidence reviewed in this article and the contributions to this IDS Bulletin, 
we can point to some clear conclusions.
 l Political will is generally a necessary but insufficient condition for 
governance processes and relationships to become more open, and is 
certainly a necessary but insufficient condition for tech-based approaches 
to open them up. In short, where there is a will, tech-for-T&A may 
be able to provide a way; where there isn’t a will, it won’t.
 l Opening governance relationships and processes is a much more 
complex and demanding task than opening government-related 
products, artefacts and services.
 l Data, once opened, will probably stay in the public domain forever, 
whereas openings in governance tend to close – one of  the tricky 
peculiarities of  achieving, demonstrating and sustaining impact in 
governance programmes. Technologies, which might have interacted 
with other factors to lever governance spaces open, can contribute 
to holding them open. But they will not achieve this by themselves 
in the absence of  conducive sociocultural, organisational and 
political factors including of  a critical mass of  committed citizens, 
and reformers in government, along with the right enabling and 
incentivising factors.
 l There is now more compelling evidence than ever before about 
how to design a T&A initiative, tech-based or not, in a way that 
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maximises the chances of  achieving government responsiveness. 
Some of  the evidence that has existed for some years has not made it 
into contemporary practice. This points to a gap between generators 
and users of  evidence, which needs to be closed by the various 
learning-focused actors in the sub-field, including ourselves in our 
roles as the Research, Evidence and Learning team of  Making All 
Voices Count. That is, it becomes a responsibility of  researchers in 
the field to ensure the evidence they produce or process is ‘open’ 
(freely available and accessible) to the practitioners who design and 
implement the initiatives.
 l The gap between recent evidence and contemporary practice also 
begs questions about the responsibilities and accountabilities of  other 
actors in this field. Practitioners need to stop responding to tech hype 
and technology evangelism and start looking for robust evidence and 
careful analysis on which to ground their work. Funding agencies 
need to critically consider the disjuncture between the funding 
modalities they favour, and what we now know about what works. 
Aid modalities tend to favour relatively short-term, linear, discrete, 
tech-savvy interventions, ‘tactical’ rather than ‘strategic’ to use Fox’s 
terms, oriented towards quick and attributable results. What we now 
know work better are relatively complex, strategic, multi-stranded, 
politically-savvy long-term processes, whose impacts might be about 
stopping the situation from getting considerably worse, rather than 
about ‘fixing it’ (Fox 2014).
On the question of  restoring meaning and ideological content, it is 
clear that governance is a contested concept and refers to an essentially 
contested arena. The strategic value of  ‘umbrella concepts’ is that 
even in an essentially contested area, they bring a lot of  actors together 
behind a cause. The strategic value of  ‘consensual hurrah-words’ 
(Chandhoke 2007) is that they mobilise unimaginable energy and 
passion. Over the past 15 years many and diverse actors have aligned 
themselves behind some ostensibly common causes related to openness, 
and the resulting movement attests to how this has focused energies 
and catalysed action. But while there are undoubtedly benefits from 
mobilising a wide range of  actors, what happens when the actors start 
to recognise their diversity, sense that they are not pulling together 
but in parallel or even against each other, suffer disillusionment, lose 
interest, and abandon the common project, or even undermine it?
The ambiguity around the ‘open’ in governance today might be helpful 
in that its very breadth brings into the fold actors who would otherwise be 
unlikely adherents, and they end up committing themselves beyond what 
they initially envisaged. But if  the fuzzier idea of  ‘open government’ or 
the low-hanging allure of  ‘open data’ displace the Herculean task of  clear 
transparency, hard accountability (Fox 2007) and fairer distribution of  
power as what this is all about, then what started as an inspired movement 
of  governance visionaries may end up merely putting a more open face 
on an unjust and unaccountable status quo.
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Notes
* We gratefully acknowledge feedback from John Gaventa and 
Brendan Halloran. Their insights, encouragements and signposts 
to other relevant work were particularly helpful for sharpening 
our conclusions. As co-editors we gratefully acknowledge financial 
support from the Research, Evidence and Learning Component 
of  Making All Voices Count for the production of  this issue of  the 
IDS Bulletin and for funding the research on which McGee and 
Edwards, Welle et al., Loureiro et al., Otieno et al., Neuman, and 
Wilson and de Lanerolle are based.
1 www.opengovpartnership.org/.
2 Transparency/Accountability Initiative, pers. comm., November 
2015. It is unclear whether the growth has been entirely due to new 
funds, or could be due to funds formerly disbursed under a different 
label being re-categorised as ‘T&A’. It probably indicates growing 
commitment and interest in either case.
3 See www.makingallvoicescount.org/.
4 We borrow here from Gallie’s notion of  an ‘essentially contested 
concept’, according to which a concept around which there is unity 
at the level of  notions and ideals can nevertheless be enacted through 
a multiplicity of  ‘instantiations’ or realisations (Gallie 1956).
5 To mention but two examples, the commissioning of  accountability-
focused realist research such as Westhorp et al. (2014); and the design 
and launch of  Making All Voices Count itself, as an operational 
accountability programme with a focus on technologies and a 
substantial integrated research component.
6 As Leal (summarised by Cornwall in Cornwall and Eade 2010: 14) 
proposes needs to happen in relation to the concept and practice of  
participation.
7 For instance, the Big Push Forward (http://bigpushforward.net/);  
‘Doing Development Differently’ (http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.
com/) and the ‘Thinking and Working Politically’ community of  
practice (www.dlprog.org/research/thinking-and-working-politically-
community-of-practice.php).
8 The foremost proponent referred to is Beth Noveck, who launched 
and led the first Obama government’s Open Government Initiative 
as the US Deputy Chief  Technology Officer for Open Government.
9 It is worth noting the considerable distance between this definition 
of  political agency and others which emphasise collective action or 
critical citizen engagement with processes of  institutions of  governance 
undertaken from autonomous or invited spaces of  citizen organising.
10 Not to be confused with Peixoto and Fox (this IDS Bulletin). The 
source referred to here is the full-length research report on which the 
Peixoto and Fox article in this IDS Bulletin is based.
11 In this their work complements an earlier, smaller-n, qualitative study 
by McGee and Carlitz (2013) that explores assumptions and realities 
about the take-up of  tech-for-T&A initiatives – that is, about whether 
and when technological innovations get taken up by citizens and used 
to give citizens voice to start with.
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12 Sustainability in the context of  rural water supply refers to keeping 
water supply systems functional and adequately maintained to ensure 
uninterrupted supply. It is a core theme in the water and sanitation 
sector, due to the frequency with which rural water points fall into a 
state of  disrepair.
13 The eight were not selected because they were successful but 
according to pragmatic criteria to do mainly with researchability.
14 Crowd-sourcing is ‘the activity of  outsourcing a task to a “crowd”, which 
is generally a distributed group of  often unknown participants. Rather 
than attempting to solve a problem through a company or organization, 
the low transaction costs of  ICTs allow one to distribute the task for 
low costs and take advantage of  the knowledge and creativity of  
interested individuals’ (Smith and Reilly 2013: 27). Many technological 
innovations, in T&A and other fields, therefore work by sourcing inputs 
(often data or information, and in the T&A context often reports of  
things that are not working as they should) from an assumed ‘crowd’.
15 Both the agenda and proceedings of  the recent OGP Summit in 
Mexico in October used interchangeably the concepts of  open 
government, open data, open government data and, increasingly, 
open governance. The agenda for the Mexico 2015 OGP Summit 
held 28–9 October 2015 can be viewed at http://ogpsummit.org/
agenda.html.
16 A report published by the OGP’s Independent Reporting Mechanism 
(Khan and Foti 2015) acknowledges firmly that open data is only 
part of  the OGP picture and the need to mainstream open data with 
open decision-making and public accountability and to go beyond 
the low-hanging fruit is emphasised (ibid.: II).
References
Avila, R.; Feigenblatt, H.; Heacock, R. and Heller, N. (2010) Global 
Mapping of  Technology for Transparency and Accountability, London: 
Transparency & Accountability Initiative, http://ict4peace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/global_mapping_of_technology_final.pdf  
(accessed 15 December 2015)
Bates, J. (2012) ‘ “This is What Modern Deregulation Looks 
Like”: Co-optation and Contestation in the Shaping of  the 
UK’s Open Government Data Initiative’, Journal of  Community 
Informatics 8.2, http://ci-journal.net/index.php/ciej/article/
view/845/916Retrieved (accessed 15 December 2015)
Brennan, K. (2015) The Uses and Abuses of  Buzzwords for Open Government, 
12 August, http://reboot.org/2015/08/12/uses-abuses-buzzwords-
open-government/ (accessed 15 December 2015)
Calland, R. (2010) ‘Review of  Impact and Effectiveness of  Transparency 
and Accountability Initiatives, Annex 3: Freedom of  Information’, 
prepared for the Transparency and Accountability Initiative 
workshop, Institute of  Development Studies, 14–15 October 2010, 
http://transparencyinitiative.theideabureau.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/impacts_annex3_final1.pdf  (accessed 
15 December 2015)
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 1–22 | 19
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Carothers, T. and Brechenmacher, S. (2014) ‘Accountability, 
Transparency, Participation, and Inclusion: A New Development 
Consensus?’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/20/accountability-
transparency-participation-and-inclusion-new-development-
consensus (accessed 15 December 2015)
Chandhoke, N. (2007) ‘Civil Society’, Development in Practice 17.4–5, 
www.jstor.org/stable/25548259?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
(accessed 15 December 2015)
Cornwall, A. (2010) ‘Introductory Overview: Buzzwords and 
Fozzwords: Deconstructing Development Discourse’, in A. Cornwall 
and D. Eade (eds), Deconstructing Development Discourse: Buzzwords and 
Fuzzwords, Rugby: Practical Action/Oxfam GB, www.guystanding.
com/files/documents/Deconstructing-development-buzzwords.pdf  
(accessed 11 December 2015)
Cornwall, A. and Brock, K. (2015) ‘What do Buzzwords do 
for Development Policy? A Critical Look at “Participation”, 
“Empowerment” and “Poverty Reduction”’, Third World 
Quarterly 26.7: 1043–60, www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/01436590500235603 (accessed 15 December 2015)
Cornwall, A. and Eade, D. (2010) Deconstructing Development Discourse: 
Buzzwords and Fuzzwords, Rugby: Practical Action/Oxfam,  
www.guystanding.com/files/documents/Deconstructing-
development-buzzwords.pdf  (accessed 15 December 2015)
Davies, T.G. and Bawa, Z.A. (2012) ‘The Promises and Perils of  Open 
Government Data (OGD)’, Journal of  Community Informatics 8.2,  
http://ci-journal.net/index.php/ciej/article/view/929/926 
(accessed 15 December 2015)
de Gramont, D. (2014) ‘Beyond Magic Bullets in Governance Reform’, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/11/04/beyond-magic-bullets-
in-governance-reform (accessed 15 December 2015)
Eade, D. (2010) ‘Preface’, in A. Cornwall and D. Eade (eds), Deconstructing 
Development Discourse: Buzzwords and Fuzzwords, Rugby: Practical Action/
Oxfam GB, www.guystanding.com/files/documents/Deconstructing-
development-buzzwords.pdf  (accessed 11 December 2015)
Fox, J. (2014) Social Accountability: What does the Evidence Really Say?, 
Global Partnership for Social Accountability Working Paper 1, 
Washington DC: World Bank, http://gpsaknowledge.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Social-Accountability-What-Does-
Evidence-Really-Say-GPSA-Working-Paper-1-with-Foreword.pdf  
(accessed 15 December 2015)
Fox, Jonathan (2007) ‘The Uncertain Relationship between 
Transparency and Accountability’, Development in Practice 17.4: 663–71, 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8c25c3z4#page-1 (accessed 
15 December 2015)
Gallie, W.B. (1956) ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of  the 
Aristotelian Society 56: 167–98, www.jstor.org/stable/4544562?seq=1#page_
scan_tab_contents (accessed 15 December 2015)
20 | McGee and Edwards Introduction: Opening Governance – Change, Continuity and Conceptual Ambiguity
Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’
Goetz, A. and Jenkins, R. (2005) ‘Introduction’, in A. Goetz and 
R. Jenkins (eds), Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for 
Human Development, New York NY: Palgrave Macmillan 
Gurstein, M.B. (2011) ‘Open Data: Empowering the Empowered or 
Effective Data Use for Everyone?’, First Monday 16.2,  
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3316/2764 (accessed 
15 December 2015)
Heusser, F. (2012) Understanding Open Government Data and Addressing 
its Impact, http://public.webfoundation.org/2012/04/ODRS/
OPENDATAPAPER_DRAFT_VERSION.pdf  (accessed 
15 December 2015)
Howell, J. and Lind, J. (2009) ‘Manufacturing Civil Society and the 
Limits of  Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society After 9/11 in 
Afghanistan’, European Journal of  Development Research 21: 718–36, 
www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/journal/v21/n5/abs/ejdr200940a.html 
(accessed 15 December 2015)
Khan, S. and Foti, J. (2015) Aligning Supply and Demand for Better 
Governance: Open Data in the Open Government Partnership, 
Washington DC: OGP Independent Reporting Mechanism, 
www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
IRMReport-OpenData.pdf  (accessed 15 December 2015
Lewis, D. (2002) ‘Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the 
Usefulness of  a Concept’, Development and Change 33: 569–86,  
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/108354/session7e.pdf  
(accessed 15 December 2015)
McAdam, D.; Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. (2001) Dynamics of  Contention, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
McGee, R. and Carlitz, R. (2013) Learning Study on ‘The Users’ in Technology 
for Transparency and Accountabilty Initiatives: Assumptions and Realities, Hivos 
Knowledge Programme, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/
handle/123456789/3179/IDS-UserLearningStudyonT4T&AIs.
pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 15 December 2015)
McGee, R. and Gaventa, J. (2010) ‘Review of  Impact and 
Effectiveness of  Transparency and Accountability Initiatives: 
Synthesis Report’, prepared for the Transparency and 
Accountability Initiative Workshop, Institute of  Development 
Studies, 14–15 October 2010, www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/
IETASynthesisReportMcGeeGaventaFinal28Oct2010.pdf  (accessed 
15 December 2015)
Peixoto, T. (2013) ‘The Uncertain Relationship between Open Data 
and Accountability: A Response to Yu and Robinson’s “The New 
Ambiguity of  Open Government” (No. ID 2264369)’, UCLA Law 
Review, www.uclalawreview.org/the-uncertain-relationship-between-
open-data-and-accountability-a-response-to-yu-and-robinsons-the-
new-ambiguity-of-open-government/ (accessed 15 December 2015)
Peixoto, T. and Fox, J. (2015) ‘When Does ICT-enabled Citizen Voice 
Lead to Government Responsiveness?’, Background Paper, 2016 
World Development Report, World Bank Digital Engagement 
Evaluation Team, unpublished
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 1–22 | 21
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Smith, M. and Reilly, K. (2013) Open Development: Networked Innovations in 
International Development, Cambridge MA: MIT Press,  www.idrc.ca/EN/
Resources/Publications/openebooks/541-1/index.html (accessed 
16 December 2015)
Smith, M.; Engler, N.J.; Christian, G.; Diga, K.; Rashid, A. and  
Flynn-Dapaah, K. (2008) ‘Open ICT4D: Working Draft’,  
http://web.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12271304441Open_ICT4D_
Draft.pdf  (accessed 10 December 2015)
Suk Kim, P.; Halligan, J.; Cho, N.; Oh, C.H. and Eikenberry, A.M. 
(2005) ‘Toward Participatory and Transparent Governance: Report 
on the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Govermment’, Public 
Administration Review 65.6: 646–54, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00494.x/abstract (accessed 
16 December 2015)
Westhorp, G.; Walker, D.W.; Rogers, P.; Overbeeke, N.; Ball, D. and 
Brice, G. (2014) Enhancing Community Accountability, Empowerment and 
Education Outcomes in Low and Middle-income Countries: A Realist Review, 
London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of  
Education, University of  London, http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/
outputs/SystematicReviews/Community-accountability-2014-
Westhorp-report.pdf  (accessed 16 December 2015)
von Lieres, B. and Piper, L. (2014) ‘Mediated Citizenship’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, www.palgrave.com/page/detail/mediated-citizenship-
bettina-von-lieres/?isb=9781137405302 (accessed 14 December 
2015)
Yu, H. and Robinson, D.G. (2012) ‘The New Ambiguity of  “Open 
Government” (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2012489)’, UCLA 
Law Review, www.uclalawreview.org/the-new-ambiguity-of-
%E2%80%9Copen-government%E2%80%9D/ (accessed 
15 December 2015)
This page is intentionally left blank
Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’
22 | McGee and Edwards Introduction: Opening Governance – Change, Continuity and Conceptual Ambiguity
© 2016 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.104
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0 
International licence, which permits downloading and sharing provided the original authors and source are credited – but 
the work is not used for commercial purposes. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 23–40; the Introduction is also  
recommended reading.
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
When Does ICT-Enabled Citizen 
Voice Lead to Government 
Responsiveness?
Tiago Peixoto and Jonathan Fox*
Abstract This article reviews evidence on the use of 23 information and 
communications technology (ICT) platforms to project citizen voice to 
improve public service delivery. This meta-analysis focuses on empirical 
studies of initiatives in the global South, highlighting both citizen 
uptake (‘yelp’) and the degree to which public service providers respond 
to expressions of citizen voice (‘teeth’). The conceptual framework 
distinguishes two roles played by ICT-enabled citizen voice: informing 
upwards accountability, and bolstering downwards accountability through 
either individual user feedback or collective civic action. This distinction 
between the ways in which ICT platforms mediate the relationship 
between citizens and service providers allows for a precise analytical 
focus on how different dimensions of such platforms contribute to public 
sector responsiveness. These cases suggest that while ICT platforms have 
been relevant in increasing policymakers’ and senior managers’ capacity to 
respond, most of them have yet to influence their willingness to do so.
1 Introduction
Around the world, civil society organisations (CSOs) and governments 
are experimenting with information and communications technology 
(ICT) platforms that try to encourage and project citizen voice, with the 
goal of  improving public service delivery. This meta-analysis focuses 
on empirical studies of  initiatives in the global South, highlighting both 
citizen uptake (‘yelp’) and the degree to which public service providers 
respond to expressions of  citizen voice (‘teeth’). The conceptual 
framework is informed by the key distinction between two distinct 
genres of  ICT-enabled citizen voice – aggregated individual assessments 
of  service provision and collective civic action. The first approach 
constitutes user feedback, providing precise information in real time to 
decision-makers. This allows policymakers and programme managers to 
identify and address service delivery problems – but at their discretion. 
Collective civic action, in contrast, can encourage service providers to 
become more publicly accountable – an approach that depends less 
exclusively on decision-makers’ discretion about whether or not to act 
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on the information embodied in feedback. This conceptual distinction 
between two different ways in which ICT platforms mediate the citizen–
service provider relationship allows for a more precise analytical focus 
on how different dimensions of  these ICT platforms contribute to 
public sector responsiveness.
This study begins with a conceptual framework intended to clarify the 
different links in the causal chain in between ICT-enabled opportunities 
to express voice (platforms) and institutional responses. In other words, 
how and why are these platforms supposed to leverage responses from 
service providers? The answers turn out not to be so obvious. Our 
approach was informed by a close review of  the available evidence, 
primarily quantitative, about experiences with 23 ICT platforms in 
17 countries.1 This focus on unpacking causal chains is informed by 
two factors. First, the broader literature on the drivers of  accountability 
increasingly emphasises using causal chains to address the analytical 
puzzle of  how to distinguish how and why citizen action may or may 
not lead to public sector response (Fox 2014; Grandvoinnet, Aslam 
and Raha 2015; Joshi 2014; Peixoto 2013). Second, analysis revealed 
that we do not see a generic type of  platform leading to a generic type 
of  response. Instead, we see key differences in the institutional (not 
technological) design of  the interface that may be relevant for voice, 
citizen action and institutional response. The evidence so far indicates 
that most of  the ICT platforms that manage to leverage responsiveness 
somehow directly involve government.
While ICT-enabled voice platforms vary widely across many dimensions, 
this analysis emphasises several differences that are hypothesised to 
influence both citizen uptake and institutional response. These include 
the degree of  public access to information about the expression of  voice 
– does the public see what the public says? Does the ICT platform 
document and disclose how the public sector responds? They also include 
institutional mechanisms for public sector response – do the agencies or 
organisations take specific offline actions to prompt service providers’ 
response? As a first step towards homing in on these variables, this article 
maps the 23 platforms studied in terms of  various empirical indicators 
of  these distinct dynamics. This exercise is followed by a discussion of  
propositions that may or may not link voice to institutional response.
Note that this study does not focus on two ways in which service delivery 
agencies use ICT that are very relevant for understanding their full 
array of  relationships with users. First, many public agencies are using 
mobile phones and social media to disseminate information efficiently. 
However, if  those interfaces are one-way (‘inside-out’, or ‘top-down’), 
then they do not ‘count’ as ICT-enabled citizen voice for the purposes 
of  this study. Second, agencies can use ICT for internal administrative 
reforms that can bolster their capacity to respond to citizen concerns 
– by reducing the discretionary power of  front-line providers through 
increasing the capacity of  managers to monitor service provider 
performance, as well as by helping consistently track whether and 
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how problems are being addressed. This study covers evidence of  
institutional response to ICT-enabled systems for users to exercise voice, 
rather than the broader set of  cases of  relevant e-government initiatives.
2 The conceptual map: unpacking digital engagement
The broader analytical context for this article involves three 
simultaneous trends in the literature on the role of  information in 
leveraging public accountability. First, the number and diversity of  
practitioner-led digital engagement for service delivery initiatives 
continues to grow, involving both effervescent experimentation and 
efforts to scale up. Experimentation with social accountability tools has 
been growing within the portfolios of  both large public and private aid 
donors for the past decade, and some involve ICT. For instance, many 
World Bank projects with ‘identifiable beneficiaries’ now include some 
kind of  feedback mechanism, and citizen engagement has become a 
policy framework which includes the use of  ICT (World Bank 2014a). 
Major private donors, such as the Omidyar Network and Google, are 
also making significant investments to encourage ‘civic technology’ – 
in both the global North and South. New donor partnerships are also 
encouraging experimentation with civic technology in very low-income 
countries, led most notably by Making All Voices Count.2
Second, while growing media coverage of  ICT-enabled voice platforms 
is often enthusiastic, social science research on the dynamics and impacts 
of  these initiatives lags far behind, and the limited existing evidence 
does not yet support unqualified optimism.3 This study is distinctive in 
that it draws on a recent round of  unusually comprehensive empirical 
studies that involve both large-scale surveys and access to government 
agency data. This new research suggests that the key dynamics that 
drive both voice and institutional response may be different from some 
of  the widely held impressions projected by the media, donors and 
platform developers. Take, for example, the case of  the Kenyan urban 
water agency’s MajiVoice (see also Welle, Williams and Pearce, this 
IDS Bulletin), a large-scale user-feedback system widely presented as an 
ICT-enabled voice platform. Recent surveys find significant evidence 
of  institutional response, grounded in an effective complaint tracking 
system – yet three quarters of  the complaints are filed in person, 21 per 
cent by phone and less than 3 per cent by Short Message Service (SMS) 
or online (Belcher and Abreu-Lopes 2016, forthcoming).
Third, the focus on the potential for citizen voice to improve public 
service delivery involves at least four distinct yet overlapping arenas 
of  practice – the open data movement, open government reforms, 
anti-corruption efforts and social accountability initiatives. In spite 
of  the apparent new policy consensus that all these good things 
go together, in practice, the limited synergy between these distinct 
approaches suggests that the whole is still not greater than the sum 
of  the parts (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). Most of  these 
governance reform approaches rely heavily on the potential power of  
information to stimulate voice, yet they assign information different 
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roles. There are several conceptual challenges involved in specifying 
the causal mechanisms that may link voice and institutional response 
– aside from the empirical questions involved (documenting uptake is 
more straightforward than institutional response). The first analytical 
challenge is to disentangle voice from responsiveness. Much of  the first 
wave of  research on ICT-enabled voice platforms focuses primarily 
on citizen uptake (e.g. Gigler and Bailur 2014), without clear evidence 
that the feedback loop actually closes. In practice, the concept of  the 
feedback loop is often used to imply that uptake (e.g. citizen usage 
of  crowd-sourced platforms to report feedback) necessarily leads to 
positive institutional responses. In other words, there is a high degree 
of  optimism embedded in the way the concept tends to be used. In 
contrast, the framework proposed here avoids this assumption by 
treating the degree of  institutional response as an open question.
The second conceptual challenge is to specify the relationship between 
the role of  ICT-enabled voice platforms and the broader question of  
the relationship between transparency and accountability. In spite of  the 
widely held view that ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’, the empirical 
literature on the relationship between transparency and accountability is 
far from clear (Fox 2007; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Peixoto 2013). The 
assumed causal mechanism is that transparency will inform and stimulate 
collective action, which in turn will provoke an appropriate institutional 
response (Brockmyer and Fox 2015; Fox 2014).4 In this model, both 
analysts and practitioners have only just begun to spell out the process 
behind that collective action (Fung, Graham and Weil 2007; Joshi 2014; 
Lieberman, Posner and Tsai 2014). In light of  widely held unrealistic 
expectations about the ‘power of  sunshine’, convincing propositions 
about the causal mechanisms involved need to specify how and why the 
availability of  an ICT platform (1) would motivate citizen action and  
(2) why the resulting user feedback would motivate improvements in 
service provision. After all, decision-makers’ lack of  information about 
problems is not the only cause of  low-quality service provision.
Third, the relationship between ICT-enabled voice platforms and the 
transparency/accountability question is complicated by the fact that, in 
practice, a significant subset of  those platforms does not publicly disclose 
the user feedback. Yet if  citizen voice is not made visible to other citizens, 
where does its leverage come from? Such feedback systems aggregate 
data – by asking citizens to share their assessments of  service provision – 
but if  the resulting information is not made public, then it cannot inform 
citizen action. In these systems, if  users’ input is going to influence 
service provision, voice must activate ‘teeth’ through a process other than 
public transparency – such as the use of  data dashboards that inform 
senior managers’ discretionary application of  administrative discipline.
These conceptual propositions suggest that it is relevant to distinguish 
explicitly between two different accountability pathways that link voice 
and ‘teeth’ – shorthand for institutional willingness and capacity to 
respond (Fox 2014). In downwards accountability relationships, service 
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providers are held accountable by citizen voice and action. The arrow 
of  answerability points downwards, insofar as it is driven by the 
potential political cost to policymakers of  not responding to a publicly 
visible concern. In contrast, in upwards accountability relationships, front-
line and middle-level service providers are held accountable to senior 
policymakers and programme managers, who use the user information 
to take administrative action. The arrow of  answerability points 
upwards. In this approach, the incentives for policymakers to act on 
user information are less clear. Clearly, both mechanisms can operate 
together, but they are empirically and analytically distinct (see Table 1).
Based on these conceptual propositions, this review of  23 ICT-enabled 
voice platforms distinguishes between two different types of  citizen 
voice, ‘user feedback’ and ‘civic action’. While these two approaches 
can overlap in practice, they are analytically distinct. Their common 
denominator is the use of  dedicated ICT platforms to solicit and collect 
feedback on public service delivery. The differences between them 
involve three dimensions: (1) whether the feedback provided is disclosed; 
(2) through which pathway individual or collective citizens’ preferences 
and views are expressed; and (3) whether these mechanisms tend to 
promote downwards or upwards accountability. Note that this analytical 
approach differs from the World Bank’s current policy framework, 
which considers user feedback to be a variant of  ‘citizen engagement’ 
(World Bank 2014a). The approach proposed here, in contrast, does not 
treat the adjectives ‘citizen’ and ‘civic’ as pure synonyms (though they 
overlap). We use citizen (as in ‘citizen voice’) to refer to individual,  
non-public actions, while civic refers to public, collective actions.5 The 
two approaches are potentially mutually reinforcing and in practice, 
some voice platforms combine them (see Figure 1).
With regard to the first dimension, we will assess cases in terms of  the 
extent to which the feedback provided by individuals is publicly disclosed 
or not, thus enabling citizens to potentially act to hold governments 
Table 1 How does voice trigger teeth? Upwards and downwards accountability
Primary causal mechanism
Voice pathway Upwards accountability Downwards accountability
Individual user feedback
From front-line service 
providers to managers and 
policymakers by identifying 
problems and triggering 
administrative action
Collective civic action
From public sector to 
society, by bringing external 
pressure to bear and raising 
the political cost of  
non-responsiveness
Source Authors’ own.
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accountable. Citizens’ capacity to hold governments accountable 
depends, among other things, on the accessibility of  publicly available 
relevant and actionable information (Fung, Graham and Weil 2007). 
In this respect, whether the feedback provided by citizens on service 
delivery is publicised or not is directly related to the extent to which 
citizens can hold governments accountable for their performance 
and actions. Thus, a first distinction between user feedback and civic 
engagement is that, while a growing number of  ICT platforms collect 
input from individuals, only user feedback that is made public counts 
here as civic engagement (in Figure 1, this is the area of  overlap between 
the two circles, involving both individual feedback and public disclosure).
For instance, in the case of  the Punjab Proactive Governance model, 
the government solicits feedback via mobile phones on the quality of  
services provided on a large scale, on an ongoing basis (Bhatti, Zall 
Kusek and Verheijen 2015). However, the feedback provided is not 
disclosed to the public, only to senior policymakers, as it is intended 
to inform internal administrative monitoring processes. This process 
does not contribute to citizens’ ability to act based on the feedback. In 
contrast, Uruguay’s Por Mi Barrio is a mobile and web-based platform 
that enables Montevideo’s citizens to report problems like vandalism 
and breakdowns of  public infrastructure. The problems reported, and 
the actions taken in response by government (e.g. repaired, or not), are 
displayed on a map on the public website. Not only is the government 
able to act on citizen reports, the publication of  the feedback makes it 
possible for citizens to hold governments accountable.
The second dimension that we use to categorise platforms assesses the 
mechanisms by which citizens’ views and preferences are expressed – 
either individually or collectively. Individualised mechanisms refer to 
those that do not involve collective action, yet the feedback provided by 
a single individual is expected to trigger a response, possibly through 
aggregation in order to identify problem areas in public service delivery. 
Undisclosed Public
Figure 1 Unpacking user feedback and civic action: difference and overlap
Source Authors’ own.
Individual Collective
Citizen  
Engagement
User feedback Civic action
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 23–40 | 29
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
This is the case, for instance, of  web-based citizen reporting initiatives 
such as Por Mi Barrio, FixMyStreet in Georgia and I Paid a Bribe in 
India. In these cases, each individual report of  very specific service issues 
needing attention is assumed to be enough to lead to a governmental 
response. In contrast, collective mechanisms refer to those in which 
it is the magnitude, nature and intensity of  the aggregation of  citizen 
concerns that is expected to trigger governmental action. Examples of  
platforms for collective voice include online petitions such as Change.
org and mobile and web-voting in Brazil’s state-wide Rio Grande do Sul 
participatory budgeting (PB) process. In both initiatives, it is the collective 
Box 1 Whose voices are they? 
Whose voices are expressing themselves on ICT-enabled 
governmental service delivery feedback platforms? What 
kinds of  bias may be involved? ICT platforms can potentially 
select for some kinds of  responses over others. This can 
happen in at least two distinct ways – differential access to 
communication of  feedback, and categorisation of  user input 
that pre-selects for certain categories. 
First, the subset of  citizens who engage with ICT systems 
may or may not represent the concerns of  those citizens 
who lack ICT access, such as rural women or people 
without access to formal education. This is the case with 
UR’s U-Reporters, one quarter of  whom are government 
employees (Mellon, Peixoto and Sjoberg 2015), and who 
under-represent the low-income, rural citizens who are most 
in need of  public services. Indeed, the whole notion of  user 
feedback suggests that the target group is limited to those 
citizens who ostensibly should have access but have problems 
in practice – such as those who have a water connection, but 
lack water. This implicit framing excludes those who are not 
included in water systems, clinics, schools or public security 
in the first place – and therefore not considered ‘users’. 
Second, as citizen concerns are input into government 
agency data systems for aggregation and transmission 
upwards to senior managers, administrative legibility requires 
them to be categorised into lists of  pre-existing categories, 
which may also select for some kinds of  citizen priorities 
to the exclusion of  others – as in the case of  issues that are 
priorities for low-income urban women, as Ranganathan 
found in her study of  e-redressal systems in Karnataka 
(2012). To sum up, the framing of  the main questions 
addressed in this study – whether or not ICT service delivery 
feedback platforms lead to uptake, and whether or not such 
voice in turn leads to service delivery response – does not 
address two relevant questions: whose voice is projected, and 
how inclusive the feedback agenda is.
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mobilisation around a cause or preference that is intended to trigger 
government responsiveness. The core of  the technological platforms that 
support these mechanisms lies in the reduction of  transaction costs for 
collective action that can address policy agenda-setting, in contrast to 
reacting to policy outputs. This collective dimension, we argue, is what 
gives the character of  ‘civic-ness’ to ICT-enabled voice platforms, insofar 
as they enable individuals to engage in collective action – or at least to 
address public concerns. In contrast to feedback systems that receive 
individual reactions to specific service delivery problems, ICT platforms 
that enable the public aggregation of  citizens’ views have more potential 
to constitute input into the setting of  broader policy priorities. This 
potential civic agenda-setting contribution goes beyond the conventional 
understanding of  feedback, in which the agendas that citizens are 
supposed to respond to are set from above (see Box 1).
Thus, our conceptual distinction can be summarised as follows: citizen 
feedback initiatives provide feedback from individual clients of  services. 
Where such feedback is not publicly disclosed, the causal pathway to 
governmental response is via upwards accountability, from front-line and 
mid-level public servants to senior managers and policymakers. Conversely, 
civic engagement refers to mechanisms where the feedback is publicly 
disclosed, which allows for collective action and downwards accountability 
to also take place. Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual model.
On the left side of  Figure 1 (light grey) feedback is individual and 
undisclosed, which we can describe as a typical case of  governmental 
user-feedback platforms. On the right side (dark grey), citizen voice is 
simultaneously collective and disclosed, meeting the two criteria for 
our definition of  civic engagement. At the intersection point, however, 
we find platforms that both collect individually specific feedback and 
make those inputs public (sometimes also reporting whether and how 
the government responds). This overlap involves the fact that, while 
individualised feedback mechanisms are not designed to spur online 
collective action within the platform itself, the fact that the feedback is 
publicised may inform and facilitate collective action – offline as well as 
online. This may be the case, for instance, when the sum of  individual 
feedback in a certain platform, such as FixMyStreet, reveals to the 
public the patterns of  failure in a certain service, or in certain locations. 
In this case, even though the platform is not specifically designed to 
support collective action, the disclosure of  evidence of  patterns of  
failure in a given service may support well-targeted collective action to 
address service delivery problems.
Figure 2 presents the diagram populated with the cases we analyse 
in this study. The platforms that generated a high degree of  tangible 
response from the service delivery agencies are indicated in black (7 of  
23). High responsiveness to citizen voice is measured here as tangible 
service delivery agency action, registered in more than half  of  cases. In 
eight cases, user uptake was high – though only three of  these were also 
among the eight cases of  high responsiveness.
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As shown in Figure 2, approximately a quarter of  the cases are found 
in the user-feedback category, another quarter in the civic action 
category, and 14 of  23 at the intersection between those two, called 
citizen engagement here. The cases in the user-feedback category are 
mostly web- and mobile-based systems for collecting citizen views on 
the provision of  services in a specific sector, such as electricity, water 
and health. Here the service provider plays either a passive or an active 
role in the collection of  feedback. In the first role, the citizen voluntarily 
initiates the contact to report an issue with public services via mobile- or 
web-based systems – sometimes in combination with offline, face-to-face 
citizen attention windows (as in the case of  MajiVoice in Kenya). One 
large-scale example in this category is Lapor, Indonesia’s complaints 
handling system, which allows citizens to submit their reports on issues 
ranging from teacher absenteeism to damaged roads through a number 
of  channels which include SMS, mobile apps and social media.
The user-feedback category also includes a second mechanism by 
which data is collected, which we call ‘proactive listening’ – also 
called ‘proactive feedback’ by its practitioners (Bhatti, Zall Kusek and 
Verheijen 2015; Masud 2015). Here, government service providers 
proactively reach out to citizens in order to gather feedback from them 
on the quality of  services received. This mechanism is best illustrated by 
Punjab’s Citizen Feedback Model, where a system generates SMS and 
calls to public service users in order to ask them about satisfaction with 
the services received and potential corruption incidents. The Punjab 
government has deployed this approach on an unprecedentedly massive 
scale, with more than 6 million outreach calls so far. Recent large-scale 
surveys of  service users have found that these outreach efforts actually 
reached and received responses from 15 per cent of  citizens called 
Figure 2 Mapping citizen voice platforms and degrees of institutional responsiveness
Source Authors’ own.
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(Bayern 2015; World Bank 2015). EDE Este, an electricity distribution 
company in the Dominican Republic, also does large-scale, proactive 
surveys of  its service users. The initiative combines a traditional 
complaints handling mechanism with proactive outreach to users. 
This online/mobile phone platform allows citizens to report problems 
with electricity services, ranging from malfunctioning connections to 
bribe requests by maintenance crews. Following the handling of  the 
complaint (e.g. re-connection of  electricity), the company proactively 
re-contacts a random sample of  users to gather feedback on the quality 
of  services provided. The feedback received is systematically used to 
inform sanctions (e.g. administrative procedures) and rewards (e.g. 
performance-related wage bonuses for company workers). Since its 
implementation in 2011, the initiative has recorded growing resolution 
rates of  reported issues, with close to 100 per cent of  the feedback 
provided indicating good or excellent levels of  satisfaction.6 The average 
of  instances of  disrespectful treatment of  clients registered at the 
beginning of  the project was drastically reduced, and reported cases of  
corruption fell by 70 per cent.
The majority of  platforms make their citizen feedback public (18 of  23). 
Out of  the five that do not disclose the feedback, two are governmental 
and three involve donor agencies in collaboration with governments. 
Conversely, all of  the CSO-driven initiatives publicise the input given 
by citizens. This finding makes particular sense if  one considers the 
directionality of  accountability relations. User-feedback initiatives (i.e. 
not disclosed) are more likely to be implemented by governments 
or donors, where service providers are held accountable to a higher 
authority (upwards accountability). Conversely, given that CSOs have 
few means to hold providers directly accountable, they rely essentially 
on downwards accountability mechanisms, where the driving force of  
institutional responsiveness – at least hypothetically – is the exposure of  
the behaviour of  service providers vis-à-vis citizens. No pattern seems 
to emerge when looking at disclosure of  feedback and institutional 
responsiveness, however. In user-feedback initiatives (where feedback is 
not disclosed and there is no collective action), the four cases are equally 
split between low and high levels of  institutional responsiveness. A 
similar pattern emerges when examining citizen engagement initiatives: 
public disclosure of  feedback does not seem to lead – per se – to 
increased responsiveness from providers.
In 14 cases, the provision of  input through the dedicated platform is 
complemented by some type of  offline action to prompt governments to 
respond and/or to monitor government responsiveness. This is the case, 
for instance, of  the Rio Grande do Sul PB process, in which citizens 
are periodically elected to monitor the implementation of  investments 
prioritised through a voting process (Spada et al. 2015). In MajiVoice, 
the responsiveness of  the water service agency is actively monitored 
by the members of  the Water Services Regulatory Board, which can 
trigger legal actions against service providers when they fail to meet 
pre-established quality standards (Belcher and Abreu-Lopes 2016, 
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forthcoming). Yet, offline action does not seem to ensure responsiveness 
by itself, as illustrated by the cases of  e-Chautari in Nepal and Barrios 
Digital in Bolivia. However, among the 14 cases, the evidence is 
insufficient to verify that the intensity and regularity of  these offline 
actions varies.
In the category of  civic action initiatives, where response involves online 
collective action, we find four different cases, with varying degrees of  
institutional responsiveness. The Rio Grande do Sul Digital PB process 
has a high level of  institutional responsiveness, while the online petition 
platform Change.org and the Brazilian initiative Pressure Pan both have 
medium levels. A possible explanation of  the different responsiveness 
levels is the difference in institutional design. Digital PB in Rio Grande 
do Sul is a governmental initiative mandated by state legislation. As 
such, all of  the citizen-generated social investment proposals that are 
approved through the participatory process are officially included in 
the state’s budget, with a number of  them effectively carried out by the 
state government.7 The other two initiatives are platforms that allow 
any citizen to initiate collective action to petition or exert pressure on 
the government to take an action towards any public agenda. This 
open-endedness means that the platforms can launch both some actions 
that trigger extensive uptake and mobilisations, and many that fail to 
generate follow-up. This potential for a large denominator, in terms of  
the total number of  initiatives, would affect the overall percentage of  
petitions that trigger responsiveness. Indeed, some data seems to suggest 
the importance of  mobilisation capacity: online petitions on  
Change.org are substantively more likely to be successful when 
sponsored by an organisation (World Bank 2015), and citizen 
campaigns through Pressure Pan are three times more likely to succeed 
when receiving mobilisation support from Pressure Pan’s staff. This 
evidence resonates with the proposition that the effectiveness of  digital 
technologies in social mobilisation depends on offline structures of  
organisation and influence (Fung, Gilman and Shkabatur 2013). Finally, 
we find the widely recognised case of  U-Report (UR) in Uganda, with 
low level of  institutional responsiveness, which we shall discuss later.
In terms of  the institutional actors that drive the voice initiatives, 12 are 
led by CSOs, six by governments, and five by donors. Out of  the seven 
initiatives with high levels of  responsiveness, four are government-led 
and three CSO-led. Civil society and governments seem equally capable 
of  creating platforms and processes that engender responsiveness. 
However, the three CSO high-response initiatives all share a common 
trait in that they involve partnerships with government. In other words, 
in all of  the cases of  high institutional responsiveness, the government 
is either leading the process or plays the role of  a partner. However, not 
all of  the initiatives involving government–CSO partnerships led to high 
levels of  institutional responsiveness, as illustrated by the cases of  I Paid 
a Bribe and Check My School, both of  which had low percentages 
of  issues raised by citizens that led to documented agency responses. 
Seen together, these findings seem to suggest that while partnership 
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with government is not a sufficient condition for the responsiveness 
of  CSO-led initiatives, it may well be an enabling one. Finally, while 
the initiatives showing medium and high degrees of  institutional 
responsiveness involve both CSO and government-driven efforts, we 
find no donor-driven platforms that led to institutional responsiveness. 
While we do not claim our sample to be representative and the results 
may be skewed due to the small number of  donor-driven cases analysed, 
these patterns suggest future research paths, focusing on the role that 
different drivers may play in institutional responsiveness.
When examining uptake, citizen use of  platforms (an output) should 
not be equated with institutional responsiveness (an outcome). This 
sample includes significant cases that combined high uptake with low 
responsiveness. The case of  UR, UNICEF’s social monitoring system for 
young Ugandans, provides compelling evidence for this point. Created 
in 2007, this SMS-based platform runs weekly polls with registered users 
on a broad range of  issues (e.g. child marriage, access to education). To 
inform public debate, the results of  the polls are widely disseminated 
through the project’s website and diverse mass media outlets, including 
a variety of  formats such as newspaper articles, radio shows and even 
a documentary broadcast on major Ugandan TV channels. Members 
of  Parliament (MPs) are UR’s main policy audience. Aligned with a 
vision of  real-time data collection to inform policymaking that goes 
beyond sending weekly newsletters with poll results to MPs, UNICEF 
also provides MPs with access to the platform to reach out to their 
audiences. The number of  registered users (U-Reporters) has grown 
steadily since its launch, recently reaching more than 299,000 (Bayern 
2015; World Bank 2015). UNICEF describes UR as a ‘“killer app” 
for communication towards achieving equitable outcomes for children 
and their families’ (UNICEF 2012). This enthusiastic view of  UR has 
resonated in development circles, with the free SMS-based platform 
currently being rolled out in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of  Congo, South Sudan, Nigeria and Mexico.
Uptake is not a problem for UR in terms of  numbers, and it leverages 
the potential of  mobile phones as a means to ‘listen at scale’. However, 
47 per cent of  UR participants have some university education and one 
quarter are government employees, raising questions about whose voices 
are being projected (see Box 1). Furthermore, until recently very little 
was known about the extent to which UR’s take-up was translated into 
any type of  institutional responsiveness. A new detailed evaluation of  
UR finds no systematic evidence of  UR affecting policy, let alone MPs’ 
behaviour in terms of  representation, legislation and oversight (Berdou 
and Abreu-Lopes 2015). UR emerges thus as a significant case that 
illustrates the need to separate uptake (as an output), from institutional 
responsiveness (as an outcome).
To conclude the discussion of  these empirical findings, one of  the most 
noticeable patterns is the existence of  numerous digital engagement 
initiatives that meet dead ends despite different pathways – at least in 
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the relatively short run. The majority of  the 23 cases studied led to low 
levels of  institutional responsiveness, with 11 reporting medium to high 
levels (defined conservatively as leading to at least 20 per cent response 
rates). Notably, the multiple dead ends do not seem to be motivated by 
the absence of  any one specific factor. None of  these variables appear to 
be a sufficient condition for institutional responsiveness, suggesting that 
none of  these factors can be considered as a ‘magic bullet’. The findings 
suggest multiple pathways to institutional responsiveness – involving the 
convergence of  multiple, mutually reinforcing factors. If  one factor does 
stand out, however, it is government involvement, insofar as four of  the 
six cases of  government-led voice platforms were associated with high 
rates of  service delivery responsiveness.
3 Conclusion
This study reviewed cases of  ICT-enabled voice platforms where evidence 
of  institutional response was available. As suggested in our introduction, 
in the ‘yelp’ feedback loop model, proponents tend to assume that user 
feedback to identify service delivery problems is sufficient to induce 
service providers to respond. This review of  the evidence from 23 
ICT-enabled platforms finds that this implicit market model, in which 
(individual) demands for good services produces its own supply, is not 
sufficient to leverage institutional response. That leaves open the question 
of  what determines the ‘supply’ of  institutional responsiveness, and how 
ICT-enabled voice platforms can make a difference.
The determinants of  service provider agency responsiveness to citizen 
feedback can be understood as involving both willingness and capacity. 
The first refers to intent and motivations, the second refers to the 
leverage provided by institutional tools to translate that into actual 
practices. In some cases, institutional design8 and a strong sense of  
commitment to organisational mission at the top encourage willingness 
to respond. In these cases, the key role of  ICT platforms is to bolster 
capacity to respond – as with MajiVoice’s water provision in Kenya. 
Some policymakers may come from professions with a strong sense 
of  mission, while others may be more concerned about the potential 
political risk associated with dissatisfied citizens. Systematic collection of  
feedback, if  it reveals both the depth and breadth of  citizen concern, can 
appeal to either set of  motivations – professional commitment to mission, 
or political risk aversion. These two sets of  motivations for responsiveness 
do not appear to be directly influenced by ICT voice platforms.
In contrast, the determinants of  senior manager capacity to respond 
to citizen voice are different. Platforms’ institutional and technical 
design features will determine the precision with which user problems 
are identified, which is crucial to identify which service providers 
are responsible. The cases studied suggest that it is crucial for user 
complaints to be routed to entities within the service providing agency 
that have some incentive and capacity to respond. Specifically, 
experiences with the most high-impact platforms, such as the Dominican 
electricity agency and MajiVoice in Kenya, suggest that direct links 
36 | Peixoto and Fox When Does ICT-Enabled Citizen Voice Lead to Government Responsiveness?
Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’
between governmental feedback reception systems and internal work 
order systems greatly increase policymakers’ capacity to determine 
whether and how complaints have been resolved, which appears to be 
a necessary condition for effective institutional response. Similarly, two 
of  the most successful CSO platforms – Por Mi Barrio in Uruguay and 
I Change My City in India – are connected to existing governmental 
service provider complaint systems. These are examples of  the 
institutional questions that play crucial roles as intervening variables 
that shape whether or not voice triggers teeth to act. The proposition 
that emerges here is that regardless of  their motivations, policymakers 
with a commitment to bolstering institutional responsiveness should in 
principle have an incentive to: (1) institute tracking systems that directly 
link complaints to institutional responses and (2) to publicly disclose both 
citizen feedback and data regarding institutional response – in order to 
both inform and validate subsequent citizen action, and to potentially 
‘name and shame’ non-performing units with their agency.
To conclude, the empirical evidence available so far about the degree 
to which voice can trigger teeth indicates that service delivery user 
feedback has so far been most relevant where it increases the capacity 
of  policymakers and senior managers to respond. It appears that 
dedicated ICT-enabled voice platforms – with a few exceptions – have 
yet to influence their willingness. Where senior managers are already 
committed to learning from feedback and using it to bolster their 
capacity to get agencies to respond, ICT platforms can make a big 
difference. In that sense, ICT can make a technical contribution to a 
policy problem that to some degree has already been addressed.
In summary, ICT platforms can bolster upwards accountability if  they 
link citizen voice to policymaker capacity to see and respond to service 
delivery problems. This matters when policymakers already care. Where 
the challenge is how to get policymakers to care in the first place, then 
the question is how ICT platforms can bolster downwards accountability 
by enabling the collective action needed to give citizen voice some bite.
Notes
* This article is a substantially abridged version of  a study originally 
prepared as a background paper for the 2016 World Development 
Report (Peixoto and Fox 2015). This longer version includes the 
full database of  cases studied, including the rationale for coding the 
cases and data sources for each case. Thanks very much to Brendan 
Halloran and Rosie McGee for their precise comments on an earlier 
version.
1 This also included an international platform, Change.org. The data 
analysis in that case referred to a total of  132 countries (World Bank 
2014b).
2 Making All Voices Count is supported by DFID, USAID, Sida and 
the Omidyar Network.
3 The current enthusiasm – among development stakeholders and the 
media – over the potential of  technology in citizen participation in the 
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developing world is reminiscent of  the wave of  optimism surrounding 
such initiatives in Europe over the past decade, despite the 
significantly less favourable conditions of  developing countries. Even 
in Europe, with generous funding and a more favourable institutional 
and technological context, most experiences present limited results at 
best (see, for instance, Prieto-Martín, de Marcos and Martínez 2011; 
Susha and Grönlund 2014; Diecker and Galan 2014).
4 Note that this widely assumed causal mechanism does not distinguish 
explicitly between two different kinds of  accountability – preventative 
(reforms that make future transgressions more transparent) and 
reactive (answerability and the possibility of  sanctions).
5 Note that this usage differs somewhat from the dichotomy between 
‘individual action = user/client/beneficiary’ and ‘collective action 
= citizen’. The terms as used here recognise that citizens can 
express voice as individuals, but suggests that for citizen action 
to be considered civic it should be public and collective (though 
possibly anonymous – as in the case of  voting). For a comprehensive 
discussion, see Cornwall (2002), among others.
6 Virgilio Reyes, summary of  statistics sent to author, personal 
communication, 17 November 2014.
7 We do not assess, however, levels of  budget execution.
8 In the case of  MajiVoice, for instance, degrees of  responsiveness 
can be explained by the modality of  contracts between government 
and service providers (renewable upon performance) as well as the 
creation of  an oversight structure to monitor government response. 
See Belcher and Abreu-Lopes (2016, forthcoming).
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ICTs Help Citizens Voice Concerns 
over Water – Or Do They?
Katharina Welle, Jennifer Williams and Joseph Pearce*
Abstract Information and communications technologies (ICTs) are widely 
seen as a new avenue for citizens to hold service providers and government 
to account. But if citizens live in rural Africa, Asia or Latin America, are 
they able and willing to report on service delivery failures? And are 
service providers or government officials willing to listen and respond? 
We explore these questions using an analysis of recent ICT reporting 
initiatives to improve rural water sustainability. The findings demonstrate 
that models where a service provider is committed to responsiveness and 
designs an in‑house fault‑reporting and maintenance system show greater 
responsiveness and accountability to users than crowdsourcing models 
where users are encouraged to report faults. This raises the question of 
whether ICT is transformative, or whether service improvement simply 
hinges on making service provision designs more accountable.
1 Introduction
A key challenge in the rural water supply sector is to render existing 
water services more sustainable for citizens. Current data suggest 
that across sub-Saharan Africa, over a third of  rural water supply 
systems are in disrepair. There have been many attempts to enhance 
sustainability through increased accountability. In the last decade, 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) have become 
more prominent as a way of  encouraging citizens to report on broken-
down water points, thereby increasing repair rates. While some of  these 
initiatives are well documented, there has not yet been a systematic 
analysis of  the potential role of  ICTs in enhancing service sustainability, 
or of  the specific factors that inhibit or facilitate such changes. This 
article, based on research funded under Making All Voices Count 
(MAVC)1 and carried out by WaterAid, the International Water and 
Sanitation Centre (IRC) and Itad, intends to contribute to closing 
this knowledge gap. We argue that ICTs do not necessarily increase 
accountability, but are rather a means to an end; whether accountability 
and sustainability are improved depends on who deploys ICTs, and how.
We review the literature on the potentials and pitfalls of  ICTs in 
improving the accountability of  service delivery in international 
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development, before presenting the specific context of  rural water 
supply, the problems of  making services more sustainable, and the 
current enthusiasm for using ICTs to achieve this. Our key findings are 
based on a comparative analysis of  eight ICT initiatives which shows 
what facilitates or inhibits successful repairs based on ICT reporting. 
These findings are complemented with in-depth analysis of  one case 
study, the Mobile Phones for Water (M4W) initiative in Uganda, which 
examines how a newly introduced ICT-based reporting system changed 
local accountability dynamics. We conclude that crowdsourcing may 
not be the most appropriate route to social accountability in rural 
water supply, that social accountability mechanisms are unlikely to 
address flaws in existing service delivery models, and that ICTs may 
be overrated as a ‘silver bullet’ for increasing responsiveness and 
accountability in service delivery. 
2 ICTs in the quest for improving social accountability in service 
delivery
In the area of  service delivery, the 2004 World Development Report 
Making Services Work for Poor People (World Bank 2003) has shaped 
the way we frame accountability relations between citizens, service 
providers and policymakers. It suggests two avenues for increasing 
accountability in service delivery: the ‘short route’ of  direct interaction 
between citizens and providers to improve services, and the ‘long route’ 
of  citizens putting pressure on policymakers who influence service 
delivery. In this context, the term ‘social accountability’ refers to ‘the 
set of  tools that citizens can use to influence the quality of  service 
delivery by holding providers accountable’ (Ringold et al. 2012: 7), and 
the responsiveness of  policymakers and providers towards citizens. It 
includes interventions to inform citizens about the services they are 
entitled to, and interventions to enable citizens to report and redress 
their grievances if  things go wrong.
The use of  ICTs has transformed communications. Between 2000 and 
2012, mobile phone penetration has grown rapidly across the world, 
with the highest growth rate –from 1 per cent to 54 per cent – registered 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the lowest penetration rate 
(GSMA 2012). This increase notwithstanding, mobile phone access 
varies widely between countries, and network connectivity remains 
problematic, particularly in remote, rural areas.
Scholars disagree over the potential for more accountable governance 
provided by new technological possibilities (Fung, Gilman and 
Shkabatur 2013). While technology-focused scientists highlight the 
transformative power of  new technologies for democracy, political 
scientists are more sceptical, drawing attention to underlying incentive 
structures and the role of  institutions in influencing how transformative 
ICT innovations can become in opening up existing social 
accountability mechanisms. Incremental models of  ICT engagement 
are seen as more likely to lead to transformative changes in politics 
(Fung et al. 2013). In a similar vein, scholars who investigate the role of  
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ICTs in the governance of  service delivery are cautious about equating 
technology with greater transparency and accountability (Avila et al. 
2010), and call for a better analysis of  the underlying factors affecting 
political changes (Bailur and Gigler 2014).
3 Social accountability in rural water supply
A key challenge in rural water supply is the number of  water points that 
quickly fall into disrepair. While access to water supply has increased 
considerably over the last 20 years, now covering 89 per cent of  the world 
population (WHO/UNICEF 2014), approximately one third of  rural 
water supply systems in sub-Saharan Africa are non-functional at any 
given moment (Foster 2013; Rural Water Supply Network 2009).2 The 
reasons for this are manifold (Harvey and Reed 2004; WaterAid 2011), 
but a key factor is the prevailing service delivery model of  community-
based management, under which most rural water supply infrastructure 
is provided by national governments, donor organisations and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), but subsequent management is the 
primary responsibility of  the users (Lockwood and Smits 2011).
The water sector, traditionally dominated by a focus on technical 
solutions, has witnessed growing concerns about governance as key 
to improving services (Plummer and Slaymaker 2007). While some 
early discussion of  water sector governance did not progress beyond 
establishing basic principles (Rogers and Hall 2003), other contributors 
explicitly drew attention to unpacking the politics of  service delivery 
(Cleaver and Franks 2008) and tabled the lack of  accountability and 
responsiveness to citizens (Tropp 2005) as a key obstacle. Increased 
attention to water sector governance is reflected in the growing use 
of  social accountability mechanisms3 to hold governments to account 
(Velleman 2010) and the introduction of  conceptual frameworks for 
analysing accountability relations and governance failures (Jacobsen 
et al. 2013; Plummer and Slaymaker 2007). Despite growing interest 
in social accountability tools, their impact is not yet well understood; 
Joshi’s (2013) review of  transparency and accountability across different 
service delivery sectors finds mixed success.
In the water sector, there is strong enthusiasm for using ICTs to facilitate 
a wide range of  service-related activities. Innovations range from using 
ICTs for inventories and infrastructure monitoring, to monitoring and 
reporting on service provision, billing and payment systems (CoWater 
International and University of  Cape Town iComms 2014); the potential 
for using ICTs to improve governance and accountability is also widely 
discussed (Dickinson and Bostoen 2013; Hutchings et al. 2012; Pearce, 
Dickinson and Welle 2015; Pearce, Welle and Dickinson 2013).
On the ground, ICTs are increasingly explored as an avenue for citizens 
to receive information about services and to report service delivery 
failures, using technologies including community radio, short message 
services (SMS), mobile-based calls, mobile phone applications, websites 
and interactive mapping. However, there are still technical barriers for 
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mobile network access in rural areas, meaning that mobile networks are 
periodically down, or that people need to travel to connect (Dickinson 
and Bostoen 2013). Furthermore, some caution that the political space 
provided for citizens to hold policymakers to account via ICTs may 
in reality be limited, and be strongly dependent on the wider political 
context (Wesselink, Hoppe and Lemmens 2015).
So what really is the potential of  ICTs for improving social 
accountability between citizens, service providers and policymakers? 
To help answer this question, we present findings from comparative 
analysis of  ICT-based reporting mechanisms in improving the 
sustainability of  rural water services, and a case study that examines 
how the introduction of  an ICT-based reporting system in Uganda 
affected social accountability dynamics between users, local handpump 
mechanics and government staff in Kabarole District.
4 Findings from comparing eight ICT initiatives
Our study compared eight ICT initiatives from an original list of  over 
50.4 The eight cases, summarised in Table 1, all aim at improving water 
service sustainability. Two (Sistema Informasaun Bee no Saneamentu 
(SIBS) in Timor-Leste and Re-imagining Reporting in Bolivia) target 
sector budgeting and planning rather than specific water scheme repairs, 
while three others cover urban rather than rural users. The scope of  the 
initiatives varies widely – from 50 water kiosks in one town, to a whole 
country. The initiatives also differ in their ICT-based reporting methods: 
while several rely predominantly on crowdsourcing – water users or their 
representatives sending failure reports – others rely on either the service 
provider, government or NGO staff collecting data on a regular basis.
Table 1 Key characteristics of ICT initiatives
Initiative Rural/urban
Crowdsourcing or led 
by government, NGO 
or service provider
Data collected 
periodically or related 
to specific incidents
Scope
M4W, Uganda Rural Crowdsourcing Specific incidents Eight districts
MajiVoice, Kenya Urban Crowdsourcing Specific incidents Two cities 
Maji Matone, Tanzania Rural Crowdsourcing Specific incidents Three districts
Next Drop, India Urban Crowdsourcing Specific incidents Three cities
SIBS, Timor-Leste Rural Government-led Periodically National
Re-imagining 
Reporting, Bolivia
Rural NGO-led Periodically Six municipalities
Human Sensor Web, 
Zanzibar
Urban Crowdsourcing Specific incidents
50 water kiosks in one 
town
Smart Handpumps, 
Kenya
Rural Service provider-led Periodically
66 handpumps in one 
district 
Source Welle et al. (2015).
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 41–54 | 45
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
We investigated three related outcomes that we saw as essential building 
blocks to achieving water service sustainability: successful ICT reporting, 
successful ICT report processing, and successful service improvements 
through water scheme repairs. Table 2 shows the patterns of  success 
(marked as ‘1’) and failure (marked as ‘0’) for each outcome across all 
eight initiatives. Below, we discuss some of  the key factors for success or 
failure that also provide insights on social accountability relations.5
The results for successful ICT reporting show that three of  the five 
initiatives based on crowdsourcing were not successful in reporting, and 
that only two crowdsourcing urban initiatives were judged successful 
in reporting. Key factors preventing successful reporting among the 
unsuccessful crowdsourcing initiatives included contextual factors 
such as poor internet connection and problems with charging phones, 
as well as factors directly linked to the design of  the initiative, such 
as citizens preferring alternative ways of  reporting a problem to the 
proposed mechanism of  sending a relatively costly SMS. In the case of  
the Human Sensor Web, which operated in the urban environment of  
Zanzibar town, mobile phone reception and charging phones was not a 
problem. Instead, the initiative was hampered by low levels of  trust and 
low expectation, based on previous experience, that the service provider 
would make improvements, which proved a disincentive to sending 
text messages (McCall, Martinez and Verplanke 2013). This was 
mirrored by supporting NGO Daraja’s analysis of  the reasons for the 
failure of  Maji Matone in Tanzania, which shows that low expectations 
and prevailing apathy – as well as worries over being identified when 
reporting failures – were key obstacles to sending mobile-based 
failure reports (Daraja 2012). All initiatives that were unsuccessful in 
ICT reporting experienced challenges with the ‘social design’ – the 
consideration of  social context when designing an ICT mechanism 
(Hutchings et al. 2012) – of  their crowdsourcing. While changing from 
Table 2 Scoring outcomes of the ICT initiatives
Smart 
Handpumps 
M4W Maji Matone MajiVoice SIBS
Re-imagining 
Reporting
Next Drop 
Human 
Sensor Web
Outcome 1: 
Successful ICT 
reporting
1 06 0 1 1 1 1 0
Outcome 2: 
Successful 
ICT report 
processing
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
Outcome 3: 
Successful 
service 
improvements
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
Source Welle et al. (2015).
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SMS to mobile-based calls would overcome some of  the social design 
challenges, lack of  trust, prevailing apathy and fear of  identification 
are harder to overcome, because they emanate from the wider cultural 
context in which these initiatives operate. Holding service providers or 
government to account via failure reports may not be appropriate in 
such contexts; instead of  being transformative, the use of  crowdsourcing 
as a reporting mechanism for rural water supply breakdowns may 
ultimately be counter-productive.
When comparing the results for successful ICT report processing, a 
key difference between the successful and unsuccessful initiatives was 
whether the operational costs were largely met by the service provider 
or government agency, or by a third party such as the NGO or research 
project supporting the initiative. We interpreted the incorporation of  
report processing costs by the provider or relevant government agency as 
a proxy indicator for the agency’s ownership of  the initiative. In relation 
to social accountability, this provides an indication of  the service provider 
or government agency’s commitment being responsive to citizens.
A high level of  service provider responsiveness is demonstrated in the 
model used by the Smart Handpump initiative: a mobile phone chip 
built into the handpump handle sends regular reports about the level of  
pumping activity to a local maintenance provider. As soon as the data 
show an unexpected downtime, the maintenance provider can follow up 
with the responsible water user committee. This reporting model places 
the onus for action on the maintenance provider rather than on citizens. 
Importantly, the initiative includes an innovative maintenance model 
that facilitates swift follow-up of  handpump breakdowns. The financial 
contributions from a number of  water points are clustered to provide 
a sufficient level of  funding, akin to an insurance where individual 
contributions are pooled to reduce individual risk. The maintenance 
provider can use these contributions to cover report processing and 
repair costs across the clustered water points (SSEE 2014).7
The achievement of  successful rural water supply repairs8 was linked 
to several of  the classic factors in rural water supply sustainability: 
availability of  sufficient funds, spare parts, access to a mechanic and 
clarity about operation and maintenance procedures among all actors 
(Harvey and Reed 2004; WaterAid 2011). For ICT initiatives that relied 
on the predominant sector model of  community-based management, 
these were contextual factors, whereas for initiatives that included a 
maintenance model, they were factors directly under their control. 
The four successful initiatives were Smart Handpumps, Maji Matone, 
MajiVoice and Next Drop. A potential reason for Maji Matone’s success 
in repairing schemes (two thirds of  all reported breakdowns were 
repaired) was the close follow-up by district water engineers, who received 
a copy of  each failure message. The other three successful initiatives – 
Smart Handpumps, MajiVoice and Next Drop – were also successful in 
ICT reporting and ICT report processing. The key characteristic that 
distinguishes these three initiatives from the rest is the leading role of  the 
(Endnotes)
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service provider in all three of  the outcome processes: ICT reporting, 
report processing and scheme repairs. This model relies on a high-level, 
demonstrated commitment to responsiveness from the service provider to 
its clients via better reporting and maintenance services. In comparison, 
the crowdsourcing initiatives – M4W, Maji Matone and Human Sensor 
Web (HSW) – all failed in successfully reporting failures via mobile 
phones. The social accountability model where citizens hold the service 
provider or policymaker to account via reporting water point breakdowns, 
service interruptions or poor quality, were not immediately successful. 
In the next section, we disentangle how ICT-based reporting impacted 
on accountability relations between water users, water user committees, 
handpump mechanics and district water offices for the case of  M4W in 
Kabarole District, Uganda.
5 ICT reporting and social accountability dynamics under M4W in 
Kabarole, Uganda
The M4W initiative aimed to increase the functionality of  rural 
drinking water supply through the reception of  timely information. If  a 
water supply system is broken down, a user sends a text message, which 
is forwarded to tell the relevant handpump mechanic to go to the site. 
The district water officer has access to the online database system and is 
responsible for keeping track of  reports and associated repairs. Once a 
repair is completed, the officer marks the report as closed on the online 
database. The pilot project ran in eight districts in Uganda between 
2011 and 2014 under a partnership between Triple-S, WaterAid, 
Makerere University and the Ministry of  Water and Environment. 
According to an IRC policy brief  (Abisa 2014) the M4W online 
database recorded 1,561 mobile phone-based failure reports between 
2011 and 2014, of  which 24 per cent resulted in repairs.9
The aim of  the MAVC follow-up study was to investigate further the 
dynamics between users, water user committees, handpump mechanics 
and the district water officer that resulted in breakdowns being reported 
either via M4W, or through alternative means. Specifically, we wanted 
to understand the willingness and ability of  citizens to report using 
M4W and the impact of  the M4W reporting system on accountability 
relationships between these different stakeholders. The research team 
visited eight water points with reported breakdowns; five of  them were 
reported through M4W (although only two reports could be found 
on the online database) and three were reported using alternative 
mechanisms. Our findings show similar results to an earlier research 
study of  M4W conducted in Lira District (McGee and Carlitz 2013).
5.1 Accountability between water fetchers and water user committees
Under M4W’s crowdsourcing reporting mechanism, any water fetcher 
or concerned citizen could, in theory, use their mobile phone to report a 
fault. But in practice this hardly happened. Instead, all four M4W reports 
that we investigated were made or initiated by a member of  the water 
user committee or a local political leader. One hurdle was that an SMS to 
the M4W system needed to contain the identification code of  the water 
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point, generally kept by the water user committee. Unique identification 
codes had originally been displayed on handpumps but many of  them 
quickly peeled off. In addition, three of  the eight visited communities 
had a strict process in place whereby individual water fetchers were not 
supposed to contact a handpump mechanic directly but to report to the 
water user committee, possibly reflecting a power imbalance between 
water fetchers and some committees that wish to maintain authority over 
reporting. In the other visited communities, water fetchers also generally 
preferred reporting to the committee for logistical reasons: water user 
committee members were more likely to have phones, were able to assess 
the water point breakdown further, could check about existing funds 
for repair and, based on this, call the handpump mechanic to negotiate 
about price. Our findings indicate that the M4W reporting system did not 
change the accountability relationships between water fetchers and their 
committees or introduce a new dynamic in the reporting process.
5.2 Accountability between water user committees and handpump mechanics
All water user committees visited reported good relationships with 
their handpump mechanics, and that there had been no problems in 
responding to breakdowns prior to the introduction of  M4W. The 
handpump mechanics were well known in the area, with several also 
holding local political leadership positions. Most water user committees 
preferred calling or visiting the handpump mechanic to sending an SMS 
via M4W, which they saw as introducing some insecurity and delay to 
getting a response. In comparison, calling or visiting the handpump 
mechanic enabled the committee chair to further explain the problem, 
get potential cost estimates and agree a time for a follow-up visit. This 
was confirmed by the fact that several water user committees followed 
up with phone calls to the mechanics after an SMS had been sent. One 
committee chairman also stated that he would not use M4W again in 
the future, even though he understood how it worked, because it was 
more costly to send an SMS, as well as lengthening the mechanic’s 
response time. From this perspective, the introduction of  a non-
instantaneous communication method between water user committees 
and handpump mechanics made communication between them less 
dependable, and did not aid accountability; it could also be argued that 
accountability relations between water user committees and handpump 
mechanics were already good, and did not need strengthening.
5.3 Accountability between water user committees and local government
Five of  the eight water user committees interviewed were aware that 
they could call on the sub-county government (and via this route, 
the district water officer) to hold the mechanic to account if  he did 
not respond, or if  the repair was beyond his capacity. However, due 
to limited resource availability for repair works at district level and a 
large backlog of  major repair works, the district water office needed 
to prioritise borehole rehabilitations that were part of  the district work 
plan, and thus did not have any capacity to spontaneously respond to 
major repair requests identified through the M4W reporting system. 
While the majority of  the interviewed committees assumed that the 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 41–54 | 49
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
sub-district government or district water office would be able to assist 
with major repairs following up on an M4W report, this was unlikely to 
be the case. It appears therefore that M4W did not facilitate a greater 
accountability relationship between the district water office and water 
user committees, as the budgeting process for water point repairs 
was not aligned with M4W. This was confirmed when examining the 
relationship between handpump mechanics and the district water office.
5.4 Accountability between handpump mechanics and the district water 
office
The handpump mechanics generally took the M4W system very 
seriously. Three out of  the four mechanics interviewed believed that the 
district water officer would follow up with them if  they did not respond 
quickly to an M4W report and mark the repair on the online database. 
This was confirmed by the handpump mechanics’ encouragement of  
water user committees to log any breakdown report on the database 
system via an M4W report, and three of  the four mechanics reporting 
that they had logged all completed repairs on the database. This strong 
accountability from the side of  the handpump mechanics needs to be 
seen in relation to the local political context. Several mechanics, while 
not employees of  the government, did hold local political leadership 
positions and/or were running as candidates for the upcoming elections; 
they were keen to demonstrate their value to the communities they 
served and to the district water office.
The district water officer, on his part, however, did not regularly 
check the M4W system to ensure that repairs were being made in 
response to M4W breakdown reports. For him, the ministry’s reporting 
requirements – paper-based, and not aligned with M4W – were 
paramount.10 At the same time, the district water officer also explained 
his reluctance to follow up M4W reports with handpump mechanics 
because of  the lack of  resources for fuel or allowances to support them 
in their work. So, while the responsiveness from the district water officer 
to the handpump mechanics based on M4W was weak, three out of  
the four interviewed handpump mechanics nonetheless felt that their 
accountability to the office had increased by using the M4W system. A 
hindrance to increasing accountability between handpump mechanics 
and the district water office was the lack of  integration with the 
government’s reporting and incentive system.
6 Conclusion
These findings indicate that crowdsourcing initiatives focused on 
supporting water fetchers and their representatives to hold service 
providers or policymakers to account, were not transformative. 
The comparative case study highlighted that ICT reporting via 
crowdsourcing in rural areas was hindered by contextual factors such as 
connectivity and mobile phone charging problems. But the success of  
these initiatives was also hindered by cultural barriers on the side of  the 
users, including fear of  identification and lack of  confidence that service 
providers or government would respond to reports.
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Closer investigation of  the M4W initiative also showed that the idea 
that any concerned citizen could send a water point failure report 
did not really take hold among water fetchers, and accountability 
relationships between water fetchers and user committees remained 
unchanged. If  anything, the M4W system made reporting to handpump 
mechanics more cumbersome, and might have alienated committees 
from mechanics, had existing relations not been strong.
The positive change that stands out is the increased feeling of  
accountability from the side of  the handpump mechanics. But this was 
not replicated by stronger responsiveness from the side of  the district 
water officer for whom the sector’s paper-based reporting system 
remained more important than M4W.
These findings are reflected by a growing body of  evidence from the 
sector which includes the Daraja blogs (2012), and more recently 
an action research project in Tanzania (see Box 1) which concluded 
that ‘public crowdsourcing in the context of  empowerment and 
accountability regarding public services is not a viable approach in 
Tanzania at the present time’ (Wesselink et al. 2015: 72).
The findings from our studies also show, albeit in different ways, 
that ICT initiatives focused on tools to hold government to account 
encountered a number of  obstacles that they could not overcome. In 
particular, the focus on the ICT-based reporting side did not manage 
Box 1 Findings from the Sensors, Empowerment, Accountability 
(SEMA) research project in Tanzania
In Tanzania, a research project led by the University of  
Twente developed an ICT-based failure report design where 
community water and sanitation committees would send 
water scheme status reports to district water offices, elected 
local councillors and civil society organisations. However, 
the sector government stakeholders at the other side of  the 
negotiation table argued that these reports provide technical 
information that was not appropriate for stakeholders 
outside the administrative structure. The Ministry of  
Water reportedly also considered that reports should be 
provided by village executive officers rather than user 
committees, in order to integrate reporting with the lowest 
governmental administrative structure. This small insight 
into the negotiation process between the project researchers 
and government officials highlights that the introduction of  
a mobile app as part of  an official reporting procedure is 
highly dependent on the wider political context. Introducing 
a reporting procedure with the potential to open up 
governance is subject to the political power holders who sit at 
the negotiation table. The mobile app itself  becomes a means 
to an end, rather than being transformative in itself.
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to overcome the lack of  responsiveness from the side of  the service 
provider or government. This lack of  responsiveness needs to be 
interpreted with the wider sector context in mind: the predominant 
rural service delivery model gives water users the main responsibility 
for operating and maintaining their systems. Any ICT initiatives that 
aim to improve rural water supply sustainability also need to tackle the 
accountability relationships that underpin the model of  community-
based management. This finding is significant in that it is potentially 
applicable to social accountability mechanisms in service delivery more 
widely.
Finally, the three ICT initiatives that were successful in ICT reporting, 
report processing and water scheme repairs, showed a substantial 
increase in the service provider’s commitment to being responsive to 
water users. Putting the two urban initiatives to one side, it is the Smart 
Handpump model that stands out as the most promising model in 
increasing rural water supply sustainability via ICT reporting. However, 
it is not the ICT mechanism that is key to the potential success of  this 
initiative. Instead, it is the innovative maintenance model linked to 
the ICT reporting mechanism that gives this initiative a potentially 
transformative character. This is an important lesson for the designers 
of  ICT-based social accountability mechanisms: putting the user’s 
reporting preferences at the centre of  the ICT design may be missing 
the point unless the wider design supports a more responsive service 
delivery model. In the case of  the Smart Handpump initiative, this was 
a social accountability mechanism where the service provider takes 
overall responsibility for receiving failure reports and for ensuing repairs 
or service improvements.
Notes
* The research on which this article is based was funded by the Research, 
Evidence and Learning Component of  Making All Voices Count.
1 Making All Voices Count is supported by DFID, USAID, Sida and 
the Omidyar Network.
2 Region-wide figures on sustainability are not available for other parts 
of  the world.
3 Popular tools include citizen and community score cards, and 
community and water point mapping.
4 Selection criteria: relevance of  objectives to improving water service 
sustainability; availability of  documentation or interview data on 
success and failure.
5 We cannot list here how we defined success and failure, and all the 
factors of  success and failure that were considered, but they are in 
the full report of  the research (Welle et al. 2015).
6 The M4W initiative was originally judged successful in ICT 
reporting because of  project documentation that 1,561 SMS were 
received between 2011 and 2014. However, our follow-up study 
showed that the actual number of  messages was substantially lower, 
and that some had been sent during training events. As a result, the 
outcome achievement was changed to ‘0’ in this report.
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7 The financial model was still being tested by the handpump initiative 
at the time of  writing.
8 Re-imagining Reporting and SIBS were excluded from this analysis 
because they aimed at improved budgeting and planning for rural 
water supply rather than specific rural water scheme repairs.
9 However, field research revealed some inconsistencies between 
reports logged on the online database and reports from the field.
10 Handpump mechanics are also required to submit paper-based 
reports of  completed repairs to the sub-county government every 
three months, leading to a duplication of  efforts. The paper-based 
reports are passed on to the district water office as part of  their 
reporting to the ministry.
References
Abisa, J. (2014) ‘Using Mobile Phones to Facilitate Local Monitoring 
and Improve Functionality of  Rural Water Points’, IRC Policy Brief 4, 
Kampala: International Water and Sanitation Centre,  
www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/2014_10_ts-uganda-pb_
mobiles4water.pdf  (accessed 10 October 2015)
Avila, R.; Feigenblatt, H.; Heacock, R. and Heller, N. (2010) Global 
Mapping of  Technology for Transparency and Accountability. New 
Technologies, London: Transparency and Accountability Initiative, 
http://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/global_
mapping_of_technology_final.pdf  (accessed 10 October 2015)
Bailur, S. and Gigler, B-S. (2014) ‘Introduction: The Potential for 
Empowerment through ICTs’, in B-S. Gigler and S. Bailur (eds), 
Closing the Feedback Loop. Can Technology Bridge the Accountability Gap?, 
Washington DC: World Bank
Cleaver, F. and Franks, T. (2008) ‘Distilling or Diluting? Negotiating the 
Water Research–Policy Interface’, Water Alternatives 1.1: 157–76
CoWater International and University of  Cape Town iComms (2014) 
‘Desk Review: Experience of  ICT Use in the Water and Sanitation 
Sector’, unpublished desk review
Daraja (2012) ‘Why did Maji Matone Fail? 3. Citizens Engagement, Risk 
and Apathy?’, Daraja Blog, http://blog.daraja.org/2012/02/why-did-
maji-matone-fail-3-citizens.html#more (accessed 3 September 2015)
Dickinson, N. and Bostoen, K. (2013) Using ICT for Monitoring Rural 
Water Services. From Data to Action, Triple-S Working Paper, The 
Hague: International Rescue Committee
Foster, T. (2013) ‘Predictors of  Sustainability for Community-managed 
Handpumps in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Uganda’, Environmental Science and Technology 47: 12037–46
Fung, A.; Gilman, H.R. and Shkabatur, J. (2013) ‘Six Models for the 
Internet + Politics’, International Studies Review 15: 30–47
GSMA (2012) Sub-Saharan Africa Mobile Observatory 2012, London: 
Global System for Mobile Association
Harvey, P. and Reed, B. (2004) Rural Water Supply in Africa. Building Blocks 
for Handpump Sustainability, Loughborough: Loughborough University 
Water Engineering and Development Centre
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 41–54 | 53
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Hutchings, M.T.; Dev, A.; Palaniappan, M.; Srinivasan, V.; 
Ramanathan, N.; Taylor, J. and Luu, P. (2012) mWASH: Mobile 
Phone Applications for the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Sector, Oakland 
CA: Pacific Institute, http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/21/2014/04/mwash.pdf  (accessed 5 October 2015)
Jacobsen, M.; Meyer, F.; Oia, I.; Reddy, P. and Tropp, H. (2013) User’s 
Guide on Assessing Water Governance, Oslo: UNDP Governance Centre
Joshi, A. (2013) ‘Do They Work? Assessing the Impact of  Transparency 
and Accountability Initiatives in Service Delivery’, Development Policy 
Review 31: 29–48
Lockwood, H. and Smits, S. (2011) Supporting Rural Water Supply: Moving 
Towards a Service Delivery Approach, Rugby: Practical Action Publishing
McCall, M.K.; Martinez, J. and Verplanke, J. (2013) ‘Shifting Boundaries of  
Volunteered Geographic Information Systems and Modalities: Learning 
from PGIS’, An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 14.3: 1–36
McGee, R. and Carlitz, R. (2013) Learning Study on ‘the Users’ in 
Technology for Transparency and Accountability Initiatives: Assumptions and 
Realities, Brighton: IDS
Pearce, J.; Dickinson, N. and Welle, K. (2015) ‘Technology, Data 
and People: Opportunities and Pitfalls of  using ICT to Monitor 
Sustainable WASH Services’, in T. Schoten and S. Smits (eds), From 
Infrastructure to Services. Trends in Monitoring Sustainable Water, Sanitation 
and Hygiene Services, Rugby: Practical Action Publishing
Pearce, J.; Welle, K. and Dickinson, N. (2013) ‘Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) for Monitoring Sustainable 
Service Delivery’, Conference Paper, The Hague: International 
Water and Sanitation Centre, www.ircwash.org/resources/
information-and-communication-technologies-icts-monitoring-
sustainable-service-delivery (accessed 10 October 2015)
Plummer, J. and Slaymaker, T. (2007) Rethinking Governance in Water Services, 
ODI Working Paper 284, London: Overseas Development Institute
Ringold, D.; Holla, A.; Koziol, M. and Srinivasan, S. (2012) Citizens and 
Service Delivery. Assessing the Use of  Social Accountability Approaches in 
Human Development, Washington DC: World Bank
Rogers, P. and Hall, A.W. (2003) Effective Water Governance, Stockholm: 
Global Water Partnership
Rural Water Supply Network (2009) Handpump Data, Selected Countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Rural Water Supply Network, www.rwsn.ch/
documentation/skatdocumentation.2009-03-09.7304634330/file 
(accessed 24 November 2012)
SSEE (2014) From Rights to Results in Rural Water Services – Evidence from 
Kyuso, Kenya, Smith School Water Programme Working Paper 1, 
Oxford: Smith School of  Enterprise and the Environment
Tropp, H. (2005) Developing Water Governance Capacities, Feature 
Article, UNDP Water Governance Facility, Stockholm: Stockholm 
International Water Institute
Velleman, Y. (2010) Social Accountability. Tools and Mechanisms for Improved 
Urban Water Services, Discussion Paper, London: WaterAid
WaterAid (2011) Sustainability Framework, London: WaterAid
54 | Welle et al. ICTs Help Citizens Voice Concerns over Water – Or Do They?
Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’
Welle, K.; Williams, J.; Pearce, J. and Befani, B. (2015) Testing the Waters: 
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of  the Factors Affecting Success in 
Rendering Water Services Sustainable Based on ICT Reporting, Brighton: 
Making All Voices Count
Wesselink, A.; Hoppe, R. and Lemmens, R. (2015) ‘Not Just a Tool. 
Taking Context into Account in the Development of  a Mobile App 
for Rural Water Supply in Tanzania’, Water Alternatives 8.2: 57–76
WHO/UNICEF (2014) Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply 
and Sanitation, www.wssinfo.org/data-estimates/tables/ (accessed 
6 October 2015)
World Bank (2003) Making Services Work for Poor People, Washington DC: 
World Bank
© 2016 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.106
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source 
are credited. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 55–68; the Introduction is also  
recommended reading.
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
When Does the State Listen?
Miguel Loureiro, Aalia Cassim, Terence Darko,  
Lucas Katera and Nyambura Salome*
Abstract In this article, we look at four cases of key historical policies in 
Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania to examine how states engage 
with citizen voices. The policies all took place in contexts of political 
change and major junctures of democratisation. We identify three kinds of 
moments when the state listens: hearing moments, when it engages with 
citizen voices but does not change the way it acts; consultation moments, 
when it engages with citizen voices through two-way dialogue, resulting 
in one-sided action; and concertation moments, when coalitions between 
reform-minded officials and politicians and organised citizen voices engage 
in two-way dialogue and action for accountable governance. Concertation 
moments occurred when there was a shared sense of urgency and a 
common goal across state and non-state actors, and despite different 
understandings of accountable governance. But concertation moments are 
also laborious and temporary, part of larger, ever-changing policy processes, 
and often states revert to consultation or hearing.
1 Introduction
The focus of  the Making All Voices Count (MAVC) programme1 is 
the narrowing of  the state–citizen communication gap. State–citizen 
communication is an important element of  social justice – the fair 
distribution of  opportunities, privileges and wealth within a society. 
Growing social inequalities, lack of  proper public services, and denial 
of  basic human rights all act to widen existing gaps between states 
and citizens. Key to bridging these gaps is ensuring not only that 
citizen voices are heard, but also that government has the capacity and 
incentive to listen and respond. Much of  the literature on accountability 
focuses on citizen voices, but there is a need to bring more of  the state 
back into the equation. Turning MAVC on its head, we chose to look 
at the state and see when and how it listens, to which actors; and why, 
at times, it chooses not to listen. In other words, we chose to look for 
instances of  accountable governance, when the state can be accountable 
and responsive to citizens’ voices.
We interviewed key actors across the state–citizen spectrum involved in 
landmark social justice policy processes across four countries – Ghana 
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(national health insurance), Kenya (digitalisation of  governance), South 
Africa (social protection) and Tanzania (primary education) – trying to 
trace moments in policy creation, revision and implementation when 
the state listened. We chose these cases as they happened at major 
junctures of  the democratisation process of  these four countries: the 
first democratic transfer of  power in Ghana; the first elections under 
the new Kenyan constitution, in the aftermath of  the ethnic electoral 
violence of  2007–08; the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 
South Africa; and the first multi-party elections in Tanzania.
We noticed some similarity in the conditions that made groups and 
individuals within the state more receptive to collaboration, even 
challenge, from civil actors. One was a common sense of  urgency, a sense 
of  public and political pressure to drastically change old policies, or come 
up with new ones. The other was the sense of  a common goal for an 
accountable, responsive state – even if  different actors understood this in 
different ways. What we noticed as we delved further into these four cases 
was that the state listened more at moments when actors from both within 
and outside the state met to discuss, collaborate, confront and act.2 We 
label these ‘concertation moments’, when state actors and citizen groups 
meet to go beyond dialogue and try to fix society; not to be confused with 
‘consultation moments’, when state actors listen to citizen groups and act, 
nor with ‘hearing moments’, when state actors hear but do not listen.
In the following section we explain further what we mean by 
concertation moments, before presenting the four case studies and 
analysing the outcomes of  the state listening or not to its citizens.
2 State responsiveness: hearing, listening, concerting
Behind many accountability interventions is the assumption that since 
information is power, citizens armed with information can make public 
officials more accountable, reducing corruption and mismanagement, and 
leading to more accountable, responsive and effective governance (Kosack 
and Fung 2014). But outcomes of  the causation chain which is assumed 
by this underlying hypothesis are rarely examined (McGee and Gaventa 
2011), and while there is significant work on accountability, relatively little 
of  it is theoretical or conceptual. Fox (2015: 353), however, proposes a 
series of  conceptual propositions to inform attempts to increase the impact 
of  social accountability strategies, emphasising the potential synergy 
between (citizen) voice and ‘teeth’, the state’s capacity to respond. We still 
know less about the teeth, and more about the voice. There is a need to 
bring more of  the state back into the equation, and not see it as a problem 
only (Coston 1998); it has the power to support as well as to impede 
social accountability (Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg 2015). Fox (2015) calls 
for boosting both public responsiveness and citizen engagement, and we 
concur with his argument that voice alone is not sufficient (Fox 2007).
There is a wide spectrum of  state responses to accountability (Blair 
2011), from opposition through indifference to accommodation; 
but we argue that governments also hear, and listen, and ‘concert’. 
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Concertation moments happen when there are coalitions between 
reform-minded public officials and organised and empowered 
constituents; they are what Fox (2007) calls the social foundations 
of  accountability. These moments go beyond political concertation 
– when political parties across the spectrum of  dialogue agree on 
a common goal; beyond social concertation – when employers and 
employees, mediated by the state, agree on common goals; and beyond 
corporatism. Concertation moments involve most of  the old actors 
present in these three sociopolitical organisational forms, but also new 
actors with new public expectations, ruly and unruly, at times using new 
forms of  engagement to ‘fix’ society, to ‘concert’ it through dialogue and 
public action. This happens when all key actors are brought together, 
building consensus through a series of  negotiations (Coston 1998) – not 
necessarily a common feat.
We further differentiate state responsiveness between hearing, listening 
and concerting. The state hears when it engages with citizens, but it 
does not change the way it acts, paying lip service to ‘openness’ and 
e-governance without changing low levels of  responsiveness. The state 
listens when it engages with citizen voices by consulting them – or 
arranging for some entity to consult them on its behalf  – in a two-sided 
dialogue, but one-sided action. Finally, concertation moments happen 
when state actors and citizen groups engage not only in a two-way 
dialogue, but also act together.
3 Case studies
Our case studies illustrate the circumstances under which concertation 
moments happen, where coalitions between organised and empowered 
constituents and reform-minded public officials attempt to concert society; 
but we also discuss processes where they fail to occur. In light of  Joshi and 
Houtzager’s (2012) observation that most studies on accountability do not 
look at the longer trajectory of  state–citizen relationships (they forget the 
history), nor at the networks that underpin specific social accountability 
initiatives (they forget the social), nor at activities outside the initiative that 
can influence outcomes (they forget the context), we try to touch on all 
these aspects as we describe our case studies.
3.1 Ghana: concertation and consultation for universal health care
Since the early 1990s, democracy in Ghana has consolidated. An array 
of  parties has contested six elections, although two – the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) – have 
dominated parliament and the presidency. Keeping these political actors 
in shape are an array of  active civil society organisations (CSOs) and a 
vibrant media. Ghana signed up to the Millennium Development Goals 
and adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper to access debt relief, 
which in turn had some influence on government actions regarding 
public goods. Democratic development, coupled with pressure from 
donor agencies, helped shape political transformation in the relationship 
between the state and its citizens.
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The health sector was affected by these changes. In the mid-1980s, as 
a result of  structural adjustment, Ghana introduced a payment system 
for health care at the point of  service (known as ‘cash-and-carry’). This 
excluded people from accessing health care if  they could not afford it. 
Within a decade, the ill-effects of  the system were widely felt, and the 
media carried frequent reports of  people dying for lack of  medical care, 
patients being refused entry to hospitals, and even stories of  babies and 
their mothers detained in health facilities, unable to pay. With the media 
and CSOs raising their voice on the woes of  the system, the lack of  
universal health care became a central point of  debate during the 2000 
general elections. Alongside the media and civil society were an array of  
actors that had piloted health insurance schemes, including bureaucrats 
from the Ministry of  Health (MoH) that had been involved in feasibility 
studies, faith-based groups that had started insurance schemes in private 
hospitals, and bilateral donors that had implemented community-based 
mutual health insurance schemes.
The NPP made the end of  cash-and-carry a rallying point of  their 
electoral campaign, which proved important in their electoral victory 
in 2000. Lacking a clear direction for the structure and financing of  the 
health insurance they aspired to implement, President Kufuor set up 
a task force to support and advise the MoH on the development of  a 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Members of  the task force 
were either considered to have some technical knowledge on the subject, 
or to be important stakeholders. Most were MoH bureaucrats, but there 
were also representatives from trade unions and the now-defunct Ghana 
Health Care company. Many of  these actors served as catalysts for the 
development of  NHIS by providing useful lessons for what became 
the structure of  health insurance. Two issues, though, were highly 
contentious within the task force: how the state should find the money 
to pay for the scheme, and whether it should be a centralised single-
payer social health insurance system or a decentralised community-
based health insurance system. The task force eventually settled on 
a hybrid arrangement that became the draft policy for wider public 
consultations, and the Minister of  Finance proposed using a portion of  
value-added tax and deductions from social security pensions. Unions 
protested these costing mechanisms until eventually the NPP – pressed 
for time to pass the NHIS law before the 2004 elections – allowed union 
members to enrol for free.
As the draft policy proceeded towards stakeholder consultations, the 
chair of  the task force and the Minister of  Health were both replaced. 
The new incumbents brought new people – other bureaucrats from 
within the MoH, and different ‘expert’ consultants – into the task 
force, and some of  the original members left because of  deviations 
from the agreed hybrid arrangement and political differences with 
the new members. According to the new chair, after listening to the 
views of  various stakeholder forums, the task force had to change the 
original policy draft. The NHIS Act was eventually passed into law 
and implementation begun in 2004 before the elections. The ruling 
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NPP party were returned again, and vigorously continued NHIS 
implementation of  the scheme with the gradual addition of  districts.
In 2006 the new Minister for Health suspended all services of  the scheme 
and commissioned a financial audit. This came as a result of  general 
complaints from the public and local board members of  the district 
health insurance schemes across the country concerning the operations 
of  scheme managers and start-up consultants (Agyepong and Adjei 
2008; NHIA 2008). The audit findings suggested some mismanagement 
in some districts and, as implementation continued, more challenges 
appeared (Gobah and Zhang 2011). The NDC promised to fix these 
problems and review the scheme to provide further coverage for basic 
care for all if  voted into power. When it won the 2008 elections, it 
appointed a new director to start the process of  resolving the challenges 
and eventual review of  the law. This director commissioned a consulting 
firm to examine the policy and legislative review of  the scheme and hold 
a series of  strategic meetings with several actors. They conducted three 
validation meetings across the country, to deliberate on and validate the 
legislative proposals. During the review, the NDC remained silent about 
NHIS funding arrangements, unable to fulfil one of  its electoral promises 
of  ensuring a one-time payment of  premiums for all. An array of  
CSOs, health-care practitioners, trade unions, faith-based organisations 
and academics are all demanding that the government deal with the 
challenges associated with the scheme. Barely a year before the next 
elections in 2016, the Minister of  Health has commissioned a(nother) 
seven-member technical committee to review the implementation of  the 
NHIS and recommend ways to improve the scheme.
3.2 Kenya: engaging the state through e-government
Kenya’s 2013 election was won by the Jubilee Alliance. Calling themselves 
throughout the campaign ‘the digital team’, and their opponents – the 
Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) – the ‘analogue’ team, 
they promised Kenyan youth, the majority of  both the electorate and the 
unemployed, that their digital revolution would boost employment and fight 
corruption. Yet many of  their information and communications technology 
(ICT)-related policies were already present before 2013: the Government of  
Kenya’s Vision 2030 had highlighted the critical role ICTs play in economic 
development, and aimed for them to generate 8 per cent of  gross domestic 
product (GDP); the development of  the Universal Service Fund Act, to 
universalise access to ICTs throughout the country and improve public 
goods; and the 2010 Constitution, which states that ICTs are to play a key 
role supporting service delivery, making civil servants’ actions transparent 
and accountable, and create jobs. Two years later, the government has 
a plethora of  e-government platforms including a website publicising 
what they do and an e-citizen platform. In addition to these initiatives, all 
ministries have some online information; county governments are shifting to 
digital; one-stop shops (Huduma centres) have opened for those who need 
individualised IT support; and there is an open data platform where census 
data and government reports are uploaded. Government leaders also make 
use of  social media platforms on a daily basis.
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While many Nairobi inhabitants – including students, entrepreneurs 
and professionals – use e-government services online, many others 
across the capital and beyond it are either not aware of  these platforms, 
or lack access to the internet and broadband connectivity. And even for 
those citizens who are able to access the government’s e-services, the 
experience is not always easy. For instance, much of  the online contact 
information provided on different ministry websites is inactive and the 
demand for services in Huduma centres is much greater than the supply.
E-platforms have not only the potential to provide citizens with access 
to public services and information, but also the spaces to enable and 
promote democratic engagement. Yet, only a minority of  Kenyans 
engage with a bureaucrat or a public official through an online 
platform. And although politicians are seen to listen more when citizens 
hold public demonstrations, public outrage in the social media has of  
late made them aware of  citizen demands. Indeed, there is a growing 
number of  young Kenyans who have taken up social media platforms 
to raise critical issues in the government, such as the (mis)use of  
government funds and corruption.
Within the state, it seems that bureaucrats and public officials are less 
enthusiastic about the use of  ICTs for citizen engagement. Their view is 
that citizens do not know how to engage: they use ICTs less for dialogue, 
and more for either complaints or demands. All they hear on their 
e-platforms are criticisms and opposition to their actions or behaviour. 
Bureaucrats – in a twisted understanding of  what demand-driven 
is – say that it is for the public to develop the interest of  e-platforms, 
because otherwise they would in future have no choice if  they wanted 
those services. They feel, having set up these platforms, that it is now 
the citizen’s responsibility to use them. Bureaucrats recognise that they 
have, at times, to listen to citizens, as this is an agenda spearheaded 
by the president. Yet, they often appear to listen to more powerful 
actors instead: the telecom industry (important partners in ICT project 
implementation), donor agencies (who support their initiatives), as 
well as unions and consumer associations. One of  the bureaucrats 
we interviewed observed that while citizens do not know what voice 
and mode to engage the government with, politicians do not help the 
situation, since they too do not know how to listen to their constituents.
Politicians interviewed refuted this point, arguing that they do know 
how to listen. In the words of  one MP, the problem is that ‘citizens do 
not know how to engage with their leaders’. Meant to be key actors in 
the new era of  e-governance, many politicians are fully and explicitly 
aware that most of  their constituents cannot access it, and need other 
forms of  engagement, such as barazas (public forums), if  they are to 
engage at all with their representatives. Politicians often also bear the 
brunt of  fierce personal criticism through e-governance spaces, and 
sometimes simply do not like to hear what citizens have to say. For 
instance, when a group of  youths formed a WhatsApp platform to 
engage with their local MP, so much of  the discussion was personal 
(Endnotes)
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criticism and negative feedback that the MP was put off from listening 
to their underlying, wider problems.
In Kenya, politicians and bureaucrats are interested in using ICTs to 
boost economic growth and get procedures in place to improve service 
delivery, but are less interested in using them to improve the larger 
processes of  governance. The shift from passive citizens accessing public 
services to that of  active citizens engaging the government requires 
a concerted effort on all parts. Yet, government’s measures to enable 
active citizen engagement fall short of  listening to citizens. When 
citizens are making themselves heard, government actors often do not 
listen because they do not like the sound of  what people are saying to 
them: that they have massive needs for very basic services, and that they 
do not like to see powerful government figures waste public funds while 
their needs go unsatisfied.
3.3 South Africa: when policy champions move away
One of  the largest-ever single collaborative efforts between South 
Africa’s Department of  Welfare and civil society was the restructuring 
of  the country’s social grant system. Social grants have always been part 
of  South Africa’s welfare system, dating as far back as the early 1900s. 
Under apartheid a state maintenance grant (SMG) was provided, but 
most of  the recipients were white. In the transition from apartheid to 
a democratic government, the Department of  Welfare drafted its 1997 
White Paper for Social Welfare, delineating a new vision for extending social 
welfare. It looked beyond merely keeping the poor above the poverty 
line towards a vision of  developing communities and empowering the 
poor to thrive, to weaken their dependence on government transfers. It 
acknowledges that the government cannot do away with poverty and 
income equality alone, and emphasised the need for civil society to 
facilitate much of  the change. State and civil society together made a 
strong case for replacing the SMG with the Child Support Grant (CSG), 
the first welfare tool to de-racialise the welfare system and support those 
in need.
The policy champions behind these changes were led by Francie Lund 
(Chair of  the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support, which 
assisted with the conceptualisation and implementation of  the CSG), 
Geraldine Fraser Moleketi (Minister of  Welfare), Leila Patel (Director 
General of  Welfare), and a host of  actors from the apartheid resistance 
movement, social workers’ associations, unions and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Both Lund and Patel had extensive experience 
in academia prior to their involvement with the Department of  
Welfare and were also trained as social workers earlier in their careers. 
Moleketi, on the other hand, had little knowledge of  welfare but was 
highly respected within the Tripartite Alliance (between the African 
National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party, and 
the Congress of  South African trade unions) that made up the ruling 
government in 1994.
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After the end of  apartheid, the mass unity that was needed to fight 
against an oppressive regime diverged, as did the interests of  the 
various actors involved in welfare. The champions involved in the 
conceptualisation and implementation of  progressive social grant 
policies left shortly after the White Paper was passed in 1997, leaving a 
gap in technical expertise in the Department of  Welfare.3 Their absence 
led to a gradual departure from the original vision and momentum. 
While policy champions are unlikely to stay in the tiers of  government 
over a number of  decades, ensuring the success of  a policy promoting 
developmental social welfare ideals would have required at least some 
actors prepared to maintain the original vision. Alternatively, new 
champions need to come up with new ideas on social change in welfare.
A shift towards developmental social welfare policy requires not only 
significant technical and managerial support, but also – most critically – 
an understanding of  the landscape of  welfare in South Africa. In 1994, 
the Department of  Welfare included a number of  technical experts who 
had both a foundation in theory as well as practical implementation 
through their social work background. They also consulted a number 
of  experts in the field to develop new welfare policies. While the 
administrative capacity and infrastructure of  the welfare system is 
well established today, technical expertise and innovation is limited. 
In addition, the window of  opportunity to change policy is unlike 
that which existed 20 years ago. South Africa’s social welfare system 
has produced a number of  positive outcomes through social grants, 
but there seems to be a lack of  urgency. Politics ultimately determine 
which services are funded, and social grants – seen as a ‘vote-catching’ 
tool – make the government unlikely to move resources away to other 
areas requiring funding. The critical success factors for policies such 
as the CSG being implemented include credible leadership, diverse 
practical expertise in the areas that drive change, strong administrative 
capacity, and the confidence of  politicians (Patel 2014). The DSD 
leadership today is far less consultative, academia works independently 
from government – often criticising government actions from afar – 
and NGOs have limited capacity to advocate change as they are often 
subcontracted to and financially dependent on the state through their 
service provision activities.
After the regime change in 1994, poverty levels in South Africa declined, 
mostly due to the impact of  the social grant system (Van der Berg 2010). 
Yet while social grants have moved individuals out of  poverty, inequality 
remains persistently high. When the champions of  the White Paper left, 
so too did their teams, and with that key advocates of  the developmental 
welfare model were lost. Policies such as the CSG had very detailed 
implementation plans, but welfare services overall were less detailed. 
Today, South Africa’s welfare budget favours social assistance in the form 
of  cash transfers. Over the past 20 years, policymakers have been unable 
– or unwilling – to shift from the notion of  poverty reduction to a vision 
of  inclusive growth that reduces income inequality.
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3.4 Tanzania: when the state does not like to listen
Since 1995, the year that Tanzania held its first multi-party elections, 
the government has come up with three policies for reaching universal 
primary education (UPE), one of  Tanzania’s aims since Independence. By 
the end of  the 1970s, the state – through a determined effort that involved 
allocating a serious proportion of  its national budget to education, 
increasing the number of  schools and teachers, making primary schooling 
compulsory and free – almost attained UPE. But it could not afford to 
sustain this effort and, with pressure from the international financial 
institutions (IFIs), from the early 1980s it decreased the overall percentage 
of  GDP allocated to education, shifted its educational policy towards cost-
sharing, and introduced enrolment fees (URT 1993).
Education was a contentious and highly debated topic in the run-up 
to the first multi-party elections. To revitalise the education sector, the 
government released its Education and Training Master Plan, a centrally-
planned policy with input from academics and donors. Although 
there was an expectation by CSOs that this policy would increase the 
participation of  citizens in making key decisions in the education sector, 
neither CSOs nor citizens were part of  the process of  formulating this 
policy. Government officials, including those who were in charge of  
the sector at the time, felt that the policy recognised the importance of  
expert views of  the problems facing the education sector, and that it 
clearly stated future directions and what was needed to take education 
in the planned direction. CSOs, though, were quick to highlight that the 
quality of  education remained poor because the government did not 
involve citizens and other education stakeholders in the sector.
The government could only afford to implement changes in primary 
education five years later, when through its Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper it became eligible for debt relief. With heavy involvement from 
donors and IFIs, channelled financially and ideologically through the 
Millennium Development Goals, the government created in 2001 
the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). This included an 
increase in teacher recruitment, investment for new buildings, the 
abolition of  school fees, and the empowerment of  school committees. 
Under PEDP, donors agreed to come together and fund education as 
one entity, rather than a myriad of  projects. But citizen involvement 
was limited to consultations, especially during the planning stages. 
As PEDP progressed, CSOs started flagging that drastic increases in 
the quantity of  teachers were coming at the expense of  quality: the 
newly-hired teachers had not been trained properly; students were not 
progressing to secondary education; and the focus on publicly-funded 
primary education was happening at the expense of  publicly-funded 
secondary education. Parents that could afford to shifted their children 
to the private sector, accelerating the creation of  a class-based two-tier 
education system (HakiElimu 2008).
While in the early 2000s the initial increase in school enrolments made 
citizens happy with the state of  education in Tanzania, by the end of  
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the decade there was a growing discontent. By 2008, PEDP was halted, 
and the government started a series of  consultations with different 
stakeholders, including many of  the CSOs that had been more vocal 
about changing the education and training policy. The 2014 Education 
and Training Policy Plan came out in 2014, but there was little sense that 
the comments of  those consulted were reflected in the final document. 
According to some who participated, they were called into certain 
meetings to provide inputs towards a new planned education and 
training policy, but few of  the things that they suggested were reflected in 
the final document. As the issue once more became a media discussion 
point in pre-election year, the president launched another consultation 
after the launch of  the report. It is not clear at this stage how, or whether, 
the final policy document could be revised to incorporate stakeholders’ 
comments, given that it has already been launched.
The relationship between the Tanzanian state and CSOs has been one 
of  ‘pointing hands’ at each other. Discussions with both government 
officers and CSOs working on education suggest that there is an 
antagonistic relationship between the state and CSOs. Government 
officials do not like to listen to CSOs because they feel that they know 
what the problems with education are, and that they know how to 
solve them. While acknowledging that CSOs have a positive role in 
highlighting some of  these problems, they are not happy with the fact 
that CSOs release their findings and critiques to the public through 
the media – with whom government officers and politicians also have 
an antagonistic relationship – rather than to government first. Public 
officials would prefer it if  CSOs identified research priorities with 
government departments responsible for education; if  research is done 
in collaboration with the government, they will own the findings and 
thus make implementation easier. The high number of  CSOs in the 
education sector puts forth a multitude of  proposals, with which the 
government has neither the time nor the capacity to deal. On the other 
side of  the equation citizens that attended public meetings state that 
they do not raise issues as they claim the government rarely listens to 
their voices, especially on policy (REPOA 2012). CSOs add to this view 
by saying that their voice is ‘out there’, but it never appears in official 
documents.
4 Voice, responsiveness and political competition
These cases all illustrate the limitations as well as the potential of  citizen 
engagement and of  the role of  changing coalitions within government. 
Across all cases, actors within and outside the state had a common sense 
of  urgency to make health care or education universal, to increase the 
access of  welfare to a previously marginalised population, or to use 
new technologies to fight corruption and create jobs. They also shared 
a sense of  aiming for a common goal, for an accountable responsive 
state, even if  different actors understood it differently. Each case 
happened during a political moment in each country’s recent history 
when citizens were also more assertive, willing to engage directly with 
government officers and politicians. These citizens made use of  the 
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political enabling environment to collectivise and coordinate citizen 
voice with reforms that could increase public sector responsiveness, 
what Fox (2015) calls a strategy for pro-accountability change. As seen 
elsewhere (Srinivasan 2014), increased citizen voice does not always 
translate into increased services; in vibrant democracies there needs to 
be a political competition for votes aligned with pressure from citizen 
groups for universal rather than targeted service provision. But while in 
all cases there was an increase in citizen voice and political competition, 
concertation moments emerged in some cases but not in others.
We can see concertation moments in the initial policy formulation in both 
the Ghanaian and South African cases, with task forces composed of  
reform-minded public officials and politicians together with empowered 
citizen groups, not only sitting together and discussing possibilities, but 
also acting together and drafting policies. Over time, there is a shift in 
Ghana when government changes, and the new ruling party opts to hire a 
consultancy firm and starts listening instead of  concerting.
In South Africa the situation goes a step further, when policy champions 
either go away or are co-opted by the state, and shift from being advocates 
to being those who deliver policy, and the state goes from concerting with 
citizen groups to hearing them. Although it had a short concertation 
moment, with a coalition government drafting a new constitution, 
Kenya’s case is punctuated by moments of  listening and hearing, where a 
lot of  concertation and consultation appears to be politics for show, rather 
than authentic engagement from the side of  the state. Finally, Tanzania 
is the only case where we do not see any concertation moments. The 
country has its listening and hearing moments, but most of  the time it 
seems the state firmly believes it knows how to run the show and does 
not need to engage with citizens, except to consult with them after the 
drafting of  policies. The Tanzanian case is also the only one of  these 
where there was no change in government, meaning the political actors 
were the same before and after the democratic shift.
5 Concluding remarks
There are few instances of  strong citizen voice making a significant 
difference in policy processes in sub-Saharan Africa. We looked 
at key historical policies across four countries at major junctures 
of  democratisation to see how actors within and outside the state 
interacted for accountable governance. We divided this interaction into 
three kinds of  moments: concertation, consultation and hearing. We see 
concertation moments as synergies between citizen voice and the state’s 
capacity to respond (Fox 2015), where coalitions bridge the state–society 
divide to attain some aspect of  accountable governance. We also noticed 
that political competition is an important element but that, like citizen 
voice, political competition alone is not sufficient to achieve accountable 
governance.
Concertation moments, though, are not permanent. For instance, in 
both Ghana and South Africa there was a concertation moment during 
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policy design, but it got lost during implementation. Concertation needs 
to be ongoing, and needs to be a process: a strategy more than a tactic 
(Fox 2015). Yet, as we see in our cases, many times state actors prefer 
consultation rather than concertation: they do not believe citizen voice 
is knowledgeable in ‘matters of  the state’, they do not like to hear what 
these voices are saying, or are simply practitioners of  politics for show. 
Yet they still ‘engage’ with these voices to claim legitimacy in national 
and international eyes, using even passive listening as a rubber stamp 
to authenticate policy processes with the mark of  ‘citizen participation’. 
This is why, when researching accountable governance, we need to 
differentiate between hearing, listening and concerting.
Notes
* The research on which this article is based was funded by the 
Research, Evidence and Learning Component of  Making All Voices 
Count.
1  Making All Voices Count is supported by DFID, USAID, Sida and 
the Omidyar Network.
2  In the sense intended by Arendt (1958).
3  Now known as the Department of  Social Development (DSD).
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‘You Have to Raise a Fist!’:  
Seeing and Speaking to the State 
in South Africa
Elizabeth Mills
Abstract Since joining the Open Governance Partnership in 2011, South 
Africa has been committed to addressing the ‘grand challenge’ of open 
governance through improving public services, creating safer communities 
and increasing accountability. This article contrasts this supranational 
commitment to open governance with accounts of citizens’ everyday 
engagement with the state at a micro-level. Based on a year of multi-sited 
ethnography, the article highlights the value of bringing people – in this 
case, HIV-positive citizens living in Khayelitsha, Cape Town – into focus 
through a series of visual participatory processes in which they share their 
experience of public service provision and engagement with the state. The 
article reflects, first, on how citizens ‘see’ the state in relation to service 
delivery and, second, on how they ‘speak’ to the state as members of civil 
society. It offers an understanding of how citizens themselves perceive 
‘open governance’ in their everyday lives.
1 Introduction: South Africa’s commitment to open government
Open government policies no longer refer to those that only 
promote accountability. New modes of  citizen engagement and 
new efficiencies in government services now share the spotlight with 
the older goal of  governmental accountability, which once had this 
felicitous phrase all to itself  (Yu and Robinson 2012: 202).
In 2015, South Africa became the co-chair of  the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP), an initiative launched in 2011 to encourage 
governments to become more open, accountable and responsive to 
citizens (see McGee and Edwards, this IDS Bulletin, and the OGP 
website).1 Growing from eight countries in 2011 to 66 countries in 
2015, the OGP has an ambitious international agenda that chimes 
with evolving political theory and policy approaches to technology, 
governance and citizenship. Eligibility to join the OGP is determined 
by a country’s performance in four key areas: fiscal transparency, access 
to information, public official asset disclosure and citizen engagement. 
Although eligible in principle, the extent to which South Africa’s 
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engagement in the OGP actually represents an ambitious national 
agenda for open governance remains far from clear.2
In 2013, following contested consultations with civil society organisations 
(CSOs),3 the South African government made a commitment to addressing 
the ‘grand challenge’ of  open governance by adopting an OGP Action 
Plan.4 Specifically, it made a commitment to strengthening public integrity 
by improving public services, creating safer communities, effectively 
managing public resources and increasing accountability (IRM 2013).5
While first coined in the 1950s, the concept of  ‘open governance’ has 
recently gained momentum in political theory and policy as a result 
of  shifts in technological innovation and the corresponding generation 
of  data; understanding the relationship between technology and open 
governance has gained importance in international political and policy 
discourse. As highlighted by McGee and Edwards (this IDS Bulletin), 
there is a risk of  burdening the term with diverse, even contradictory, 
theoretical and practical meanings.
International initiatives, like the OGP, lend themselves to a critique of  
the disjuncture between on one hand the conceptual and policy rhetoric 
of  ‘open governance’, and on the other, its practice (Mosse 2005). 
One could argue – and some have (Hill and Hupe 2002) – that global 
initiatives are valuable in themselves because they serve as a reflection 
of  an inevitably flawed national government’s visible commitment to 
move ‘in the right direction’. But there is a risk that solely highlighting 
the disjuncture between the rhetoric and practice of  ‘open governance’ 
at a macro-level, we not only miss the boat for learning how to make 
productive ‘open governance’ strategies work in difficult settings, but we 
might also be missing a key point – the people.
Based on 12 months of  multi-sited ethnographic research,6 this article 
proposes that there is value in bringing people – in this case, HIV-
positive citizens of  Khayelitsha in Cape Town, South Africa – into 
focus, and in understanding how citizens themselves perceive the limits 
and possibilities of  ‘open governance’ in their everyday lives.
This article cannot, and does not seek to, comment on South Africa’s 
performance in the OGP. Instead, it firstly links the centrality of  service 
delivery in South Africa’s vision of  ‘open governance’ in the OGP to the 
centrality of  service delivery in the overarching narrative through which 
citizens describe ‘seeing the state’ in the research. Service delivery is 
not the only aspect of  open governance, but in South Africa, it is a vital 
component in the effort to address the country’s stark socioeconomic 
inequalities.
Secondly, it contrasts the OGP’s statement that collaboration between 
governments and civil society is a key component of  ‘open governance’, 
with citizen narratives of  a strained relationship between state and civil 
society. The ethnographic research traces this tension at a micro-level 
in Khayelitsha, with a focus on ‘speaking to the state’. In doing so, the 
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findings offer reflections on governance linked to service delivery and civil 
society engagement, from people who have worked as activists for decades 
in a range of  CSOs spanning the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
2 Everyday citizens in Khayelitsha
The ethnography reported in more detail below reflects the value 
of  understanding ‘everyday citizenship’ as it is lived and embodied 
in the most quotidian sense (Cornwall, Robins and von Lieres 2011; 
Robins, Cornwall and von Lieres 2008), speaking to a more nuanced 
understanding of  particular contexts or states of  citizenship as they 
unfold across time and in very different spaces.
Rather than seeking a unified definition of  citizenship that covers 
all dimensions of  human action, entitlement and belonging, we 
are interested in the everyday, and often highly contingent and 
improvisational, negotiations and performances through which 
people define and pursue their desires and aspirations (Cornwall, 
Robins and von Lieres 2011: 8).
Cornwall and colleagues articulate two pertinent imaginaries – how 
citizens see the state (Corbridge 2005) and how states see citizens (Scott 
1999) – that generate the ‘mutually constitutive nature of  the citizen–
state relationship, and the extent to which different kinds of  states make 
different kinds of  citizenship possible’ (Cornwall, Robins and von Lieres 
2011: 8). There is very little research on governance and citizenship that 
explores the extent to which these imaginaries shape what it means to be 
a citizen. As such, this article draws on findings from visual participatory 
research with HIV-positive citizens living in Khayelitsha, to explore the 
ways in which they see and speak the South African state – the same one 
that has signed up to the OGP’s principles of  open governance.
Khayelitsha (‘new home’ in isiXhosa) is a semi-formal housing area that 
lies across 45km of  Cape Town’s Metropole district. Like the majority 
of  the people I worked with, most of  Khayelitsha’s residents have 
migrated from the Eastern Cape to access better health care, education 
and employment opportunities. The mix of  formal and informal 
housing makes it difficult to gauge the total population;7 the most 
recent reliable estimate, published by the City of  Cape Town in 2005, 
indicated that Khayelitsha’s population was 406,799 (DPLG 2005), of  
whom 45.6 per cent were aged between 15 and 34. More than half  
(57.4 per cent) lived in informal cardboard and corrugated iron homes, 
and nearly a third (30 per cent) in formal brick homes. A large majority 
(71.8 per cent) earned below the official Household Subsistence Level.8
Khayelitsha has long been a site of  political resistance. It was also the 
first place that antiretroviral (ARV) treatment was provided to South 
Africans through a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) trial in 2001 
(Robins 2005). My ethnographic research took place a decade after the 
MSF trial and South Africa’s historic struggle to access life-saving ARVs 
through the public health sector.9 It brings to the fore the precarious 
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nature of  everyday life for people living in Khayelitsha, linked to the 
absence of  vital state resources and public services, which reflect a far 
longer history of  structural violence and inequality. ‘Open governance’ 
could serve as a powerful counterpoint to the form of  ‘closed 
governance’ that was modelled during apartheid, but would require the 
state to put the principles it subscribes to as a member of  the OGP into 
practice in places like Khayelitsha.
Although South Africa joined the OGP in 2011, neither I nor many 
of  the people I worked with later in Khayelitsha knew about or used 
the term ‘open governance’. Our work cannot therefore be described 
as an ‘ethnography on open governance’. Instead, it reflects a series of  
ethnographic accounts of  citizens’ perceptions of  the state in their lives 
that speak to the main ‘commitments’ made by South Africa through 
the OGP.
3 Background to the ethnographic research
Over the course of  12 months in 2010 and 2011, I conducted multi-
sited ethnographic research in South Africa and Brazil.10 In this article, 
I reflect specifically on my engagement with a group of  women living in 
Khayelitsha who had, as activists, fought to access the life-saving ARV 
treatment that would enable them, and the almost 6 million other South 
Africans who were HIV-positive, to live a long life with HIV (NDOH 
2011). Together, between 2001 and 2009 they had engaged with the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) at the height of  the struggle for 
ARVs, calling for the democratically elected government to fulfil its 
constitutional contract with its citizens and ensure their right to life, and 
to health, through the provision of  these essential medicines (TAC 2010). 
When the TAC began in 1998, this struggle for ARVs represented a 
fundamental ‘opening out’ of  governance, in which citizens mobilised 
across the country to compel the post-apartheid state to provide better 
access to health resources and services (Chigwedere et al. 2008; Fassin 
2007; Robins 2005). Building on strategies – including songs and dances – 
of  the anti-apartheid era, TAC’s activist cadre called on the state to ‘listen’ 
to the needs of  its citizens in light of  the country’s hard-won democracy.
I drew on Susan Whyte’s (2009) approach to health research and her 
observation that comparative ethnography offers a way to move out from 
a narrow focus on health in order to anchor people’s lives in their social, 
economic and political relations (cf Whyte, Van der Geest and Hardon 
2002). A multi-sited approach to conducting ethnography enabled me 
to trace the networks that linked women’s experience of  health, and of  
life, to the broader politics of  service provision in post-apartheid South 
Africa, and to international policy dynamics that played a role in South 
Africa’s capacity to provide these services and resources to its citizens.
Using visual methods, like participatory photography, body mapping 
and participatory film, it became evident through the ethnography that 
the struggle for life in South Africa was not simply about the struggle 
for life-saving medicines. At that time, when South Africa had the 
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largest ARV programme in the world (NDOH 2011), I found that the 
struggle to live on ARVs was contingent on a broader set of  struggles 
including access to employment, education, water, safe toilets and 
electricity. While the core concerns of  the people I engaged with had 
opened out beyond access to medicines, the perception that the post-
apartheid government should ‘listen’ to the basic needs of  its citizens 
was still strongly emphasised. In fact, as I discuss below, the people I 
worked with in Khayelitsha suggested that because the government had 
been democratically elected, its leaders had a mandate to listen to civil 
society, and its members.
4 Seeing and speaking to the state
The first part of  the ethnography presented in this section reflects on 
how the people I worked with ‘saw the state’. Given the presence of  
historic socioeconomic inequality in Khayelitsha’s corrugated iron 
houses and under-staffed health centres, many ‘saw’ and ‘spoke to’ the 
state’s poor delivery of  basic services. This was evident through their 
participation in CSOs that were fighting for better service delivery, 
and through their narratives of  how the absence of  proper services 
fundamentally undermined their sense of  dignity and their hope 
for a responsive and accountable post-apartheid government. Their 
narratives reflect the struggles of  citizens and CSOs to hold the South 
African government to account in delivering basic services.
The second part of  the ethnography presented below describes a series 
of  snapshots of  citizen (dis)engagement, and outlines some of  the ways 
that citizens and CSOs ‘speak to the state’.
These accounts centre on the micro-level interactions between citizens 
and the state that I observed, and frame them in a larger concern with 
engaging with civil society actors in ensuring governments are truly ‘open’.
4.1 ‘When [President] Zuma came’: seeing the state
Walking through Khayelitsha one day, Yandisa pointed to the sandals 
on my feet and told me to wear tougher shoes. By way of  explanation, 
she pointed down to the ground we were standing on. It took me a bit of  
time before I saw the cables; they were camouflaged by sand and snaked 
along the gravel road. In some places the flex had been worn down by 
car tyres, the sun or people’s shoes, and tiny wires bundled out into the 
sand. My eyes adjusted to reading the sand and I learnt to discern the 
character of  the cables quickly enough to miss walking over the live 
wires; I also started wearing thick rubber-soled shoes. I was privileged 
to be able to purchase this degree of  safety. Most of  the people with 
whom I worked, however, were not. South Africa’s OGP commitment to 
promoting socioeconomic rights comes down to the very soles of  people’s 
feet, when the failure of  the state to provide essential services like safe 
electricity, becomes an everyday risk walking to and from one’s home.
Miriam, who lived two minutes’ walk from Yandisa’s home, told me 
about the neighbour who lived in the house between them. Her child 
had gone out in the middle of  a thunderstorm to collect water from 
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the tap shared by all of  Nkanini’s residents. On the way to the tap the 
child had stepped on one of  these worn-down cables, screaming in 
shock; when the mother ran out to pull him away, she was electrocuted. 
The neighbours rushed out to try and help her, but she really needed 
emergency medical attention and by the time the sluggish ambulance 
arrived, she had died. The government refused to sufficiently subsidise 
electricity costs through its national company, Eskom.
These accounts reflect the cost of  the state’s absence in the presence of  
these wires: electricity was too expensive for most people in Khayelitsha 
to afford and so some residents chose to pay people to siphon illegal 
electricity lines away from the neighbouring wealthier suburb into their 
homes. Illegal electricity, however, came at a cost that was experienced 
by everyone who was connected – often not by choice – along the 
winding routes that these lines followed across their roofs, along their 
roads, and sometimes under their feet.
The participatory photography processes I facilitated generated many 
photographs in which people saw the state in large piles of  rubbish that 
collected in the roads, and siphoned around people’s homes. Sibongile 
had, for example, taken a series of  photographs in which she had ‘seen 
the state’ in the open field just over the road from her home. Through 
these photographs she told me about President Zuma’s visit to her 
neighbourhood, as part of  the African National Congress’ (ANC) 
election campaign.
Over the course of  many photographs, I watched an unfolding picture 
in which two different imaginaries of  the state ran alongside each other. 
The first imaginary of  seeing the state was, quite literally, of  seeing 
President Zuma arriving to speak to a group of  supporters at the rally. 
In these photographs, we see, first, the supporters waiting for his arrival; 
this is followed by a set of  photographs of  bodyguards surrounding 
President Zuma as he walked to the stage to, eventually, address the 
assembled supporters. Sibongile watched this visit unfold with her two 
children, all watching this spectacle from a distance and recording it 
with her camera. She said, ‘These are the pictures I took when Zuma 
came. My street actually. He passed by my house. I was standing by the 
gate. It was kind of  like amazing, the president passing by my house. 
I couldn’t capture a full picture of  him, you know everyone coming to 
see the president.’ For Sibongile, who felt a tremendous distance and 
barrier between her and the state, this physical proximity was almost 
overwhelming – and yet the proximity was a mirage, an electoral 
gimmick, as her photographs of  rubbish went on to illustrate.
Her photographs captured another powerful picture of  the state and 
inadequate service delivery, as she pointed to the large open rubbish 
dump that featured in the foreground of  the photographs that she had 
taken documenting President Zuma’s visit. She explained to me that the 
municipality had stopped collecting rubbish from her neighbourhood, 
and so she and her neighbours had started piling their rubbish on this 
(Endnotes)
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site during the week. Each Saturday they would burn the rubbish in the 
morning, but on this day they had postponed the fire until President 
Zuma left because the smoke would have sullied the slick preparations. 
I asked Sibongile if  she was going to vote in the elections, and she said, 
quite strongly, ‘Yes, my grandmother fought hard for the ANC; I will 
only ever vote for them myself. But I don’t think they will do anything to 
make my life better.’
Sibongile’s concern with sanitation was reflected in the many photographs 
of  various kinds of  public toilets – sometimes broken, or locked – that 
were scattered around Khayelitsha. Yvonne took a photograph showing 
that each toilet has a lock on it. Even where public toilets had been 
constructed, therefore, many people were unable to use them if  they had 
not negotiated with their neighbours to claim – with a lock – a particular 
cubicle. The women I worked with were particularly concerned about 
their safety at night because of  the numerous accounts of  women who 
were raped when using the toilets. An interim measure, one that was 
still not acceptable but that was preferable to public toilets, were small 
portable toilets that had a detachable waste-carrier. Yandisa and Miriam 
each had one of  these toilets in their homes. Yandisa said, showing me 
the second photograph on the left hand side, that these toilets were an 
indication that, ‘This government does not want dignity for us.’
The OGP highlights dignity as one of  its core values. The above accounts 
suggest that the women with whom I worked ‘saw the state’ in its absence, 
in its failure to provide basic services, and therefore in its failure to 
meaningfully transform its citizens experience of  socioeconomic inequality. 
This inequality, experienced in the stench of  rotting rubbish and unserviced 
toilets, undermined any sense that the state respected the women’s dignity.
Yandisa’s sentiment that ‘the government does not want dignity for 
us’ was echoed by thousands of  other people a few months after my 
fieldwork, at a march in Khayelitsha that was organised by a CSO called 
the Social Justice Coalition. The march was held on Freedom Day – a 
day that marks South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994. On this 
day, in 2011, almost 2,500 people queued outside a set of  public toilets 
in Khayelitsha to draw attention to the government’s failure to provide 
basic services and explicitly link the struggle for freedom and democracy 
in 1994 with the struggle for basic rights and services in 2011. The role of  
civil society in holding governments accountable is foregrounded in the 
OGP’s mission statement, and it is also echoed in South Africa’s ‘grand 
vision’ of  service delivery. The following section on ‘speaking to the state’ 
turns to explore how South African citizens – and civil society more 
broadly – view the potential for engaging with the state around these core 
concerns linked to service delivery and the democratic governance.
4.2 ‘My vote must speak for me’: speaking to the state
In May, a week after the municipal elections, Thandeka and I were 
walking down Queen Victoria Street in central Cape Town. Not only 
did the name of  the street speak to the colonial legacy of  South Africa, 
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but the memorialised ‘Slegs Blankes/Whites Only’ bench that we passed 
outside the High Court was a reminder of  South Africa’s more recent 
history and the struggle for ARV treatment that had played out in that 
court room. When we met earlier that day, the first thing she did was to 
show me the indelible black stain on her thumbnail – a sign that she had 
voted. I asked her why she had chosen to vote. She replied, ‘I voted for 
my treatment.’
Thandeka’s stained thumb pointed to a set of  beliefs held by all of  the 
women with whom I worked in the core group. On the whole, they 
conceived voting as part of  an array of  citizen practices, like marches 
and civil disobedience campaigns, that were necessary to make the 
government listen. Throughout my fieldwork, when people – including 
those who had not been AIDS activists – spoke about why they were 
going to vote, the word most often used in their explanation was ‘voice’. 
For example, Witness said, ‘It is said that your vote is your voice.’ 
Bongiwe, similarly, said, ‘I vote so that I have the right to speak out; the 
right to voice out my opinion… My vote must speak for me.’
Khayelitsha’s streets offered a slightly different story. These stories, spray-
painted on walls or scrawled over posters near Khayelitsha’s Magistrate’s 
Court, reflected a disdain towards the electoral system and towards the 
leading party. One message encouraged people to boycott the elections 
and it had been pasted on the walls of  clinics, streets, taxi ranks and bus 
shelters. The locations of  these messages speak to the conjunction past 
and present, with messages written along a wall bordering a street named 
after one of  South Africa’s most prominent anti-apartheid activists, and 
the founder of  the Black Consciousness movement, Steve Biko. The 
frustration held in the graffiti on the walls also spoke to a sociospatial 
intersection: the history of  the struggle for democracy signified by Steve 
Biko’s name, and the presence of  an overburdened judicial system, 
ran along the walls where people had expressed their frustration with 
the failure of  the government to meet their needs, and provide the 
basic services that, in principle, are guaranteed in the constitution and 
reflected in South Africa’s OGP action plan.
Over time, but especially around the time of  the provincial elections, 
I heard how many of  the people I spent time with believed that 
voting would not generate positive change. Instead, they explained, 
voting was a matter of  principle, an assertion of  a hard-won right that 
extended beyond the struggle for ARVs to the struggle for democracy. 
For example, Nozuko said, ‘I vote because it is free to vote; before 
Black people never got the chance to vote. They were just decided 
for. For me it’s good to make a contribution by voting.’ Also looking 
towards a history in which voting was limited to the white population, 
Nomphuthumo said, ‘I am a South African citizen. Before [under 
apartheid] things were hard… Now where we stand, things are better.’
When we spoke about specific articulations of  ‘voice’ that were 
necessary to make the government listen, the people I spent time with in 
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Khayelitsha, including the former HIV activists, spoke about the role of  
civil society and collective public action through strikes and marches as 
mechanisms for ‘showing a fist’ to the government.
Ntombentsha is a 30-year-old HIV-positive woman who echoed the 
majority of  participants’ assertions on how to make the government 
listen when she said, ‘People strike, burn tyres, or go to parliament with 
posters… When people toyi toyi,11 the government ends up responding 
to them.’ Toyi toyi, as a way to express discontent in public spaces, 
echoes activist strategies under apartheid; when challenged by the 
apartheid police, the activists would argue that they were simply singing 
and dancing. Because the songs were predominantly sung in local 
languages and not in English, the apartheid police did not understand 
the political content and were unable to justify intervention. Toyi toying 
and amended protest songs were also characteristic of  the marches 
that the TAC organised to challenge the post-apartheid government, 
especially during the height of  the government’s AIDS denialism (see 
Robins 2010). Toyi toyi as a form of  collective action, and a way to speak 
to the state, sustained its anti-apartheid legacy in the marches I observed 
and participated in during my fieldwork. As Noncedo, a 47-year-old 
HIV-positive woman, notes, ‘In this time it’s like those old days… 
where people were burning tyres. You see, we are going back to the past 
because every time we want the government to listen we have to do 
action instead of  just talking, you need to show a fist!’
This section suggests that ‘voice’ itself  is highly nuanced. On the one 
hand, democracy has engendered tools through which people can 
articulate some of  their concerns. Under apartheid, public marches, 
for example, would have been banned. However, the struggle for 
services – and for the dignity that is tied into these services – suggests a 
distinction between having voice and being heard. As discussed above, 
many of  the people I worked with felt entirely unheard. At worst, this 
calls into question the depth and sincerity of  the government of  South 
Africa’s commitment to OGP values. At best, it shows what a very long 
hard journey it is going to be for South Africa to put those values into 
practice in a way that is experienced or even perceived by people like 
Bongiwe or Witness.
5 Conclusion
As South Africa takes on the leadership of  the OGP, the government 
has been dogged with allegations of  corruption, fiscal mismanagement 
and poor services. In July 2015 a group of  CSOs submitted an open 
letter to South Africa’s government representative on the OGP.12 They 
outlined numerous issues, including concerns about secret government 
surveillance of  activists, proposed censorship regulations, the Regulation 
of  Gatherings Act that seeks to limit the right to protest, and secrecy 
about large-scale state-funded procurement. The signatories said that if  
the government did not address their concerns by the time South Africa 
takes over as chair of  the OGP, they would launch an official complaint.
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This article suggests that these contemporary concerns around South 
Africa’s performance on the OGP reflect a longer history. The space 
of  Khayelitsha speaks to this history and the role that citizens have 
played to call for a more ‘open governance’ that addresses historic 
socioeconomic inequalities through effective service provision, and 
that pays attention to the concerns raised by citizens and CSOs about 
the absence of  these services. The ethnographic research offers a 
historical perspective on some of  the limits of  South Africa’s rhetorical 
commitment to ‘open governance’ at an international level.
By paying closer attention to the everyday experiences of  citizens 
in Khayelitsha as they saw and spoke to the state, this article seeks 
to push back against the danger of  dislocating ‘open governance’ 
policy language from people’s everyday encounters with the state, or 
its absence. In doing so, these historical ethnographic accounts offer 
three overarching observations, on service delivery and civil society 
engagement, that bear relevance to the present as South Africa prepares 
to take on the leadership of  the OGP in 2015.
First, the core concerns raised by citizens when ‘seeing the state’ centred 
on poor service delivery in Khayelitsha. In failing to provide services, 
the state is complicit in eroding citizens’ sense of  dignity. As a core value 
in the OGP, dignity is closely linked to the practice of  open governance. 
There is a striking dissonance, then, in South Africa signing up to this 
core value on the international stage, while denying so basic a degree of  
dignity to its citizens at a local level.
Second, the different articulations of  voice that emerged in the 
ethnographic accounts of  citizens ‘speaking to the state’ suggest that 
citizens, in their everyday lives, have an ambiguous relationship with 
the state. While many remained committed to voting in elections, they 
also expressed a sense of  dislocation from the state, embodied by the 
difficulties that they experienced in finding avenues to be ‘heard’ when 
communicating their everyday struggles through engaged action. These 
concerns speak to the limits of  South Africa’s rhetorical commitment 
to ‘open governance’ through meaningful engagement with civil society 
at an international level in the OGP, and its struggle to follow through 
on its own national policy commitments to ‘listen’ to its citizens at a 
domestic level. They also speak to the limits of  political parties as ways 
for representing citizens to the state.
Finally, the findings underpin the value of  shifting away from a narrow 
focus on the provision of  essential medicines to a recognition that health 
and wellbeing are connected to a broad array of  public services and 
resources (see Marsland 2012; Le Marcis 2012). Conversely, ill-health 
and ill-being, including a lack of  dignity, need to be understood as 
fundamentally linked to the myriad socioeconomic inequalities that 
shape most South African’s lives. Citizens’ accounts provide a set of  
micro-level observations on the direct implications of  the government’s 
attempts to follow through on the supranational principles of  ‘open 
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governance’ that it has committed to through the OGP and through its 
constitution and public policies at a domestic level.
The ethnographic accounts bring people’s lives into focus, moving 
beyond an analysis of  the disjuncture between supranational 
commitments on the OGP and domestic policy. They are a step towards 
a dialogue that advances constructive avenues to hold governments 
to account for implementing the principles of  ‘open governance’. It is 
dialogue – between states, citizens and civil society – that appears to 
be central to the framing of  the OGP, and this framing implies that 
these actors are required to collaborate with each other if  the principles 
of  open governance are to be positively advanced. In South Africa’s 
case, this might entail measures to ensure the state does a better job of  
listening to its citizens and its civil society; and in turn, it might mean 
that in order to be heard, citizens do not feel the need ‘to raise a fist’.
Notes
1 www.opengovpartnership.org.
2 Independent biannual progress reports are produced for each 
country by the OGP’s Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM). 
South Africa’s most recently published IRM report notes that of  
the eight commitments it made in its action plan, South Africa had 
only successfully fulfilled one – the commitment to set up an anti-
corruption forum and anti-corruption hotline.
3 CSOs challenged the extent to which the OGP was genuinely 
consultative, and claimed that they were given a very tight deadline 
to respond to calls for engagement and that the final action plan was 
largely shaped by internal government consultation (IRM 2013).
4 The OGP Action Plan also detailed eight commitments against a set 
of  targets to measure progress.
5 Specific measures included strengthening corruption-combating 
instruments and mechanisms for meaningful citizen engagement in 
service delivery improvement, and an accountability management 
framework for public servants.
6 Here, ‘multi-sited’ refers to fieldwork that works across scale, with 
women living in Khayelitsha, the activist organisation they had 
worked with, the actors and activists in Brazil to whom South Africa 
had looked during the struggle for antiretroviral drugs, and national 
and international policy actors who made decisions about these 
women’s ability to access basic services.
7 There are at least 22 residential sub-sections comprising older formal 
areas (with basic brick homes), as well as newer, informal areas.
8 http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=city-of-cape-town-
municipality.
9 This struggle was led by the Treatment Action Campaign, also 
initially based in Khayelitsha.
10 Ethics approval for this research was secured from the University of  
Sussex’s Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee. I conceptualise 
ethnography as co-constructed through the relationships I formed 
with people and institutions in the course of  my fieldwork. The 
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methods I used emerged from these relationships and I therefore 
refer to the people who form the core of  this ethnography as ‘the 
people I worked with’ and not as ‘participants’ or ‘respondents’.
11 A Southern African dance used in political protests in South Africa.
12 www.r2k.org.za/2015/07/27/is-the-sa-government-open/.
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The Right of Access to Information: 
Exploring Gender Inequities
Laura Neuman*
Abstract The right of access to information is a fundamental and universal 
right, necessary for economic empowerment and the fulfilment of other 
rights. However, the recent study discussed in this article demonstrates 
that women are not able to exercise this right with the same frequency, 
ease and rate of success as men. The article examines the issue of gender 
inequity in the exercise of the right of access to information by exploring 
the legislative framework underpinning the right for women, detailing the 
value of information for women, describing the principal obstacles that 
propagate information asymmetries, and exploring potential responses to 
advance a more universal right to information.
1 Introduction
In a society where the rights and potential of  women are constrained, 
no man can be truly free. He may have power, but he will not have 
freedom. 
Mary Robinson, Former President of  the Republic of  Ireland and United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Salokar and Volcansek 1996)
Access to information is a fundamental right enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights, and critical for the exercise of  other 
basic socioeconomic and political rights. Yet in many countries, full 
enjoyment of  the right of  access to information – and its myriad 
potential benefits – is limited in half  the population. This situation 
becomes even bleaker when considering poor or indigenous women, 
or those living in rural areas. Failure to engage in gender-sensitive 
policymaking, entrenched traditional cultural mores, and long-standing 
obstacles – such as illiteracy, household responsibilities, immobility, 
and lack of  awareness and capacity – have all played a role in creating 
gender asymmetries in the exercise of  the right to information. 
Paradoxically, while women may be least likely to demand and 
receive access to information, they are perhaps the most in need of  it. 
Information is a potent ingredient in assuring that the benefits of  open 
government are felt by all.
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This article seeks to explore the legislative framework underpinning 
the right of  access to information for women, detail the value of  
information for women, describe the principal obstacles that propagate 
gender inequities, and explore potential responses to advance a more 
universal right to information.
It is striking how little attention has been paid to the gendered 
dimensions of  the right of  access to information. Therefore, as the title 
suggests, this article and the studies recently conducted by the Carter 
Center and its partners are designed to be the beginning of  a discussion, 
creating the start of  a mosaic to which it is hoped that many others will 
contribute additional texture and details.
2 A web of adversity
Although some progress has been made since the Convention on the 
Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
was adopted 35 years ago, women around the world continue to lag 
behind men in terms of  power, wealth, education and opportunities. As 
we enter the second century of  celebrating International Women’s Day, 
gender equality remains a distant goal.
In many countries, especially in the global South, women continue 
to face the double burden of  income generation and caring for the 
family. The number of  female-headed households is increasing,1 partly 
as a result of  male out-migration from rural areas, and the effects of  
civil conflicts. In almost all countries, female-headed households are 
concentrated in the poorer social strata and often have a lower income 
than male-headed households (Chant 2003).
Half  the world’s working women – 600 million workers – are subject 
to vulnerable employment, trapped in insecure jobs, often outside the 
purview of  labour legislation (UNDP 2014). When women have paid 
employment, they earn on average between 10 and 30 per cent less than 
men for work of  equal value (Staszewska 2015). Economic opportunities 
for women remain limited. In Africa, 70 per cent of  agricultural 
workers are women, and they produce 60–80 per cent of  food for 
domestic consumption, while men grow more lucrative cash crops 
(Wakhungu 2010). Nevertheless, studies indicate that women invest 
up to 90 per cent of  their income into their families and communities; 
while for men the figure is 30–40 per cent (UNF 2012).
Girls are still less likely than boys to attend primary school, and for those 
that do attend, the dropout rate is higher (World Bank 2009) and this 
trend continues in secondary education. Globally, this has led to high 
female illiteracy rates – approximately two thirds of  illiterate people are 
women (FAO, IFAD and ILO 2010). In the area of  health, the situation 
is even more alarming. In developing regions, women’s risk of  dying 
from maternal causes is 14 times higher than in developed countries 
(WHO 2014), and women remain the fastest growing group of  adults 
infected with HIV through sexual intercourse (UNAIDS 2014). Lack of  
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access to basic care and medications, abhorrent gender-based violence 
and human trafficking complete this distressing picture.
Finally, in the areas of  participation and voice, women remain in the 
minority. There are only 18 female world leaders and only 22.5 per 
cent of  parliamentarians are women (Kent 2015). Quotas and political 
party systems remain at odds as women strive to find a place in electoral 
democracies but, as Goetz (1998: 247) observes, ‘mechanics of  participation 
– essentially a series of  highly technical and legalistic negotiations, and 
conversations between men… exclude the majority of  women’.
Women in many parts of  the world are faced with a web of  adversity. 
Although various tools are applied to addressing these myriad 
challenges, insufficient focus has been given to the powerful part that 
information can play. Genuine access to information can help women 
make more effective decisions about education, health care and 
agricultural production, participate more fully in public life, confront 
corrupt practices, and help bridge gender gaps.
Though recent years have witnessed a plethora of  research and 
programming related to voice, participation and empowerment of  
women, access to information has been an implied rather than explicitly 
identified core ingredient for success despite the inequities in women’s 
exercise of  the right. While a number of  the obstacles to the enjoyment 
of  the right to information detailed in this article are not unique to 
women, they affect them more, particularly if  they are in developing 
countries. Unfurling and examining gendered asymmetries will inform 
critical discussion of  the impediments facing women in their exercise of  
the right to information, and encourage effective solutions to be applied.
3 Legislative framework
Access to information is well-established as a fundamental human right 
under Article 19 of  the Declaration of  Human rights, which states that 
‘Everyone has the right to… seek, receive and impart information’. This 
same language is repeated in Article 19 of  the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the regional Human Rights Conventions 
also echo the right to information. In 2006, in the case of  Claude Reyes vs 
Chile, the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights found that Article 13 
of  the American Convention on Human Rights recognises a general 
right of  access to information, and that states must provide a system for 
exercising that right. The case was instrumental in cementing the notion 
that access to information is a fundamental human right.
The Council of  Europe, the Organization of  American States, and 
the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights have adopted 
clear statements and declarations on the right of  access to information. 
The more recent Open Government Declaration, part of  the Open 
Government Partnership, pledges to increase the availability of  
public information, ‘promoting increased access to information and 
disclosure about governmental activities at every level of  government’ 
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(OGP 2011). Finally, there are now over 100 countries around the 
world with a statutory right to information, and additional states with 
constitutional mandates or administrative provisions.
Complementing the body of  conventions, statutes and jurisprudence on 
the general right of  access to information are a number of  covenants 
and declarations that provide the beginnings of  a gender-sensitive 
mandate for the free flow of  public information. CEDAW was adopted 
in 1979, and has been ratified by 187 countries.2 CEDAW affirms 
principles of  fundamental human rights and equality for women, 
prohibiting discrimination and establishing an agenda for action. While 
CEDAW does not articulate a general right of  access to information for 
women, it does make specific mention of  women’s right to educational 
information on health, wellbeing and family planning (UN Women 
1979). Moreover, one could conjecture that the basic principles of  
CEDAW are themselves premised on the free flow of  information.
At the Third World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi in 1985, 
the delegates focused on equality, development and peace. The Nairobi 
Report (UN 1986) calls on states to establish governmental machinery 
for disseminating information to women on their rights and entitlements 
concerning health, education, markets and conflict, and ensuring that it 
reaches them.
The Platform for Action that emerged from the Fourth World Conference 
on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, aspires to advance key strategies to 
empower women and calls on states to remove continuing barriers. The 
Beijing Declaration commits governments to design, implement and 
monitor policies and programmes that are gender-sensitive and to ensure 
that a gender perspective is reflected in all policies and programmes (UN 
Women 1996). Notably, in Article 35, representative governments stated 
their determination to ‘ensure women’s equal access to… information’, 
and the Platform for Action is peppered with references to women’s 
needs for information, to increase productive capacity, access health and 
education rights, to engage in technological advances, and to effectively 
defend against human rights abuses.
Unfortunately, while the legal right of  access to information and the 
prohibition of  gender-related discriminatory policies and impacts may be 
well-established, claiming women’s right to information is another story.
4 Access to information and women’s economic empowerment and rights
A free flow of  information has been propagated as key to transparency 
and greater accountability, particularly vertical accountability between 
citizens and government. But for accountability to flourish, adequately 
developed mechanisms of  sanctions, access to justice, sustained media 
and civil society engagement and transparency measures (such as the right 
of  access to information) must also be present. Thus, whether as a means 
of  inducing democratic or social accountability or as the fulfilment of  a 
fundamental human right, access to information is essential.
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If  information is a cornerstone of  accountability, participation 
and citizen voice, then women are in great need of  it, not only as a 
theoretical right, but also as one that can be practically exercised and 
that leads to real transformation. With access to information, women 
would be afforded a new instrument to contribute to overcoming the 
gender disparities and traditional constraints that have historically kept 
them disempowered and disenfranchised.
Empowerment of  women can take many forms, and it is often described 
as social, economic or political. Social empowerment focuses on one’s 
place in society, and one’s power to change it, while political empowerment 
relates to equity of  representation in political institutions (Eyben, 
Kabeer and Cornwall 2008). Economic empowerment, on the other 
hand, largely concerns the issue of  resource and asset ownership and 
management. While access to information is relevant for all three forms 
of  empowerment, this article will focus on information for economic 
empowerment and the protection and promotion of  human rights.
There is growing consensus on the need to empower women economically 
in order to improve their local and global status. Through greater 
economic empowerment, women’s rights can be realised and broader 
development goals achieved (Government of  Canada 2014). According 
to the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), ‘economic 
empowerment is one of  the most powerful routes for women to achieve 
their potential and advance their rights… Discrimination against 
women is economically inefficient. National economies lose out when a 
substantial part of  the population cannot compete equitably or realise 
its full potential.’ Moreover, ‘women who are economically empowered 
contribute more to their families, societies and national economies. It has 
been shown that women invest extra income in their children, providing a 
route to sustainable development’ (Golla et al. 2011: 3).
Additionally, economic empowerment helps women to participate more 
fully in public life. As income and agency increases, women’s beliefs and 
understanding related to issues such as education, health, marriage, 
family, politics and the economy can deepen, enabling them to take more 
control of  their lives and make more informed decisions. Furthermore, 
economic empowerment helps to bridge gender gaps and shift power 
more closely toward equilibrium. And a meaningful right to ‘actionable’ 
information is critical for women’s economic empowerment.
With information, women can more effectively: engage educational 
opportunities for themselves and their children; understand and invoke 
their rights to land; and access capital and make informed decisions 
related to starting a business and farming. As Hillary Clinton, former 
US Secretary of  State, noted at the 2011 Asian-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Summit, ‘we need to correct the problem of  information 
asymmetry – making sure women are informed about opportunities for 
trade and orienting technical assistance programs so they serve women 
as well as men’ (Lemmon 2011).
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With more equitable access to information, a greater number of  women 
would be aware of  and be able to protect their other fundamental 
rights – to live free from violence, to make informed health decisions, 
and to advocate for the protection of  their labour rights (Carter Center 
2015). Greater information can also help both to reduce violence and 
to empower women to act when violated or abused. For example, in 
2013 the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Article XIX began a 
project to collect data on sexual violence against women in the metro 
system of  São Paulo, Brazil through access to information requests. 
When it published articles in major newspapers to bring attention to 
this violation of  women’s physical integrity, there was a spike of  almost 
200 per cent in the rates of  women who reported having experienced 
this type of  violence (Article XIX n.d.). While decisive actions are now 
required by authorities to remedy these violations, access to information 
played a crucial role in enabling women to come forward.
Table 1 Examples: economic empowerment themes 
Education
Are women able to access information on education policies and 
school budgets?
Are women able to access information on curriculum, staffing, 
materials and nutritional programmes?
Are women able to access information about scholarship and 
educational opportunities?
Are there vocational training programmes available to women?
Land
Are women able to access information on land policy?
Are women able to access information on their rights to own/
inherit land?
Are women able to access land titles?
Business
 
Are women able to access information on government procedures 
for starting a small business?
Are women able to access policies and procedures for licensing?
Are women able to access policies and procedures for government-
sponsored loans?
Are women able to access information relevant to their trade or 
market of interest?
Agriculture
 
Are women able to access information about prices?
Are women able to access information about government-
sponsored programmes for seeds and fertilizers?
Are women able to access information about water for irrigation 
and related water policies? 
Source Carter Center (2014).
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Sexual and reproductive health depends, at least in part, on behaviours 
that are affected by access to information. For instance, an in-depth 
study of  four countries in sub-Saharan Africa found that more than 
60 per cent of  adolescents did not have adequate information about 
how to prevent pregnancy and more than one third did not know where 
to get effective contraceptives. Young women are at a disproportionately 
higher risk for some sexually transmitted infections and globally there 
are almost twice as many young women than men living with HIV 
(Amnesty International 2014). Better access to information for women 
could have a positive impact on reducing transmission of  sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs) and increased agency around childbirth.
Finally, access to information can allow women to combat corrupt 
practices, thus supporting and benefiting from the principles of  open 
governance. Research has demonstrated that women are more vulnerable 
to, and impacted by, corrupt acts than men. From sexual exploitation in 
the form of  a bribe, to reduced access to decision-makers, to resources 
intended for poor women being skimmed away because of  lack of  
awareness, women are particularly impacted by corruption (Goetz 2008). 
Yet accountability systems also often replicate gender biases; ‘for women’, 
argue Goetz and Jenkins, ‘being at the margins of  political life has 
translated into being, in many contexts, invisible to accountability 
institutions’ (2004: 158). Without information, women are less effective 
in serving as watchdogs, holding government to account and influencing 
priorities and decision-making. In the cycle of  political accountability, 
there must be access to full and accurate information at each step of  the 
decision-making process or efforts to engage and influence will fail.
Despite the clear benefits of  access to information for women, the next 
section reports on a recent Carter Center study that demonstrated the 
significant legal, cultural and structural barriers that continue to exist 
to inhibit women’s exercise of  the right to information in Liberia and 
Guatemala.
5 Obstacles to women’s exercise of the right to information
In 2014 and 2015, the Carter Center and local partners conducted an 
innovative research study in Liberia and Guatemala3 to demonstrate the 
information asymmetry between men and women, identify obstacles 
that women face which may impede access to critical information, and 
determine women’s particular information needs for greater economic 
empowerment and protection of  rights. The study was designed to 
test the hypothesis that women are unable to exercise the fundamental 
right of  access to information with the same frequency, ease and rate of  
success as men, and to ascertain the primary obstacles women face in 
accessing information.
The multi-method research study reviewed secondary data, and collected 
primary data through interviews with community leaders, experts, 
public servants and ‘customers’ at public offices; and through non-
participant observation of  access-to-information practices in relevant 
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government ministries and agencies. Local researchers collected data 
from pre-defined locations, assuring a mix of  rural and urban and 
different tribes/indigenous peoples. The data sets were triangulated to 
develop preliminary findings, which were shared in the study locations 
for validation. This process allowed participants to discuss limitations and 
to consider follow-up questions based on the initial analysis of  the data, 
thereby contextualising the findings. All data sets were reviewed through a 
quality assurance process to ensure the validity and reliability of  the data 
for final analysis, and then analysed for existing and reoccurring patterns. 
The findings reflected the perceptions of  those interviewed and illustrated 
trends, but without statistical sampling may not be fully representative.
In advance of  the study, the lead researcher (Neuman) suggested 
that ‘the seven Cs’ (capacity, cash, childcare, confidence, control, 
consciousness and culture) are the most frequent challenges to women’s 
exercise of  the right to information (Carter Center 2012). Findings from 
Liberia and Guatemala confirmed this assertion, but with the important 
addition of  one ‘F’: fear.
5.1 Liberia
In Liberia, local researchers interviewed 541 men and women from four 
counties, and from the City of  Monrovia (Carter Center 2014). Those 
interviewed were asked whether women are able to exercise the right to 
information with the same facility (frequency, ease and rate of  success) 
as men. As depicted in Figure 1, 78 per cent of  male and female 
community leaders perceived that women do not access information at 
the same rate as men, 62 per cent of  the experts agreed, but 58 per cent 
of  the civil servants felt that there was no differential access.
Source Author’s own.
Figure 1 Are women able to access information with the same frequency, ease and 
rate of success as men in Liberia? 
100%
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Community leaders (n=75) Experts (n=60) Employees (n=177)
Yes No No answer/not sure
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In Bomi and Nimba counties, 100 and 93 per cent respectively of  the 
community leaders felt that women are not able to access information 
with the same facility as men. Only Lofa county had less than 50 per 
cent of  community leaders indicating a perceived inequity. However, 
during the validation exercise in Lofa, the 42 participants noted that 
these findings did not reflect the realities on the ground.
During the interviews, community leaders also were asked to think of  a 
time when they personally tried to access information at a government 
agency or authority’s office, and to reflect on the result. Many 
community leaders – 47 per cent – indicated that they encountered 
difficulties or did not receive the information they needed; 7 per cent 
received the information but encountered some difficulty or delay; and 
only 20 per cent were able to access the requested information.
With relation to the obstacles, community leaders were provided with a list 
of  18 potential barriers to consider and offered the opportunity to identify 
any additional barriers to women exercising their right to information. 
Participants were requested to consider each barrier individually and 
assess whether that barrier was a small one, that some women may be 
able to overcome, a large barrier that was nearly impossible to overcome, 
or not a barrier at all. Once the magnitude of  each barrier had been 
assessed, the community leaders were asked to select the three greatest 
barriers facing women in accessing information in their region.
When potential obstacles were mentioned, 87 per cent of  the 
community leaders indicated that confidence to make a request was a 
large barrier that is nearly impossible to overcome. Community leaders 
also felt that illiteracy (85 per cent) and that ‘not knowing where to go/
how to ask’ (77 per cent) were large barriers that are nearly impossible 
to overcome. On aggregate, the most frequently identified barriers 
facing women in the exercise of  their right to information across all five 
regions were illiteracy, fear of  asking, not knowing where to go, issues of  
time and responsibilities and lack of  mobility.
Expert respondents confirmed that lack of  education and the prevalence of  
illiteracy are major barriers to women in exercising the right to information. 
In addition, they felt that cultural and traditional practices, as well as lack 
of  awareness, were among the largest obstacles. Notably, 27 per cent of  
the expert respondents felt that women were largely disinterested or had 
an ‘inferiority complex’. This contradicted the responses from female 
community leaders and accounts from the validation exercises.
Perhaps the most striking evidence and narrative came from the 
non-participant observation, a source of  primary data, which included 
the in-country research team developing a list of  public agencies related 
to economic empowerment and rights. All site visits to the selected 
agencies took place within a four-week period, with multiple visits 
(three per agency) at various times of  the day and week. In-country 
researchers noted whether men or women were obtaining information, 
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and what barriers to access were observed. They witnessed women 
who were seeking information and services being derided, questioned, 
embarrassed and often just ignored.
5.2 Guatemala
In many respects, the Guatemala findings are similar to those in Liberia. 
Five departamentos and Guatemala City served as the research sites, 
with a total of  614 interviews conducted and 47 agencies observed. In 
Guatemala, the majority of  community leaders and experts perceived 
that women are not able to access information with the same frequency, 
ease or rate of  success as men. Paradoxically, the civil servants indicated 
that there was no differential access.
The study found overwhelmingly that women face great challenges 
and myriad barriers in accessing government-held information critical 
for economic empowerment and the protection and fulfilment of  
fundamental rights. Although, perhaps predictably, public employees 
were more hesitant to conclude that inequities or asymmetries exist in 
accessing publicly held information.
When community leaders were disaggregated by gender, more 
women than men indicated an asymmetry of  information flow. When 
Guatemala City and Chiquimula are removed from the aggregate 
– thus leaving the regions that are predominantly indigenous – the 
perception of  inequities is even more dramatic with more than 73 per 
cent of  the respondents feeling that women are not able to access 
information with the same facility as men. In the departamento of  Quiche, 
a highly indigenous area in the Western Highlands, almost 90 per cent 
of  the community leaders identified gender inequity. They noted that 
‘because of  a lack of  empowerment and because of  fear, women do not 
ask’ and ‘the culture of  machismo of  the husband and the [public] office 
run by men, if  a man comes in he is treated better’. These observations 
support the perception that women are not able to access information 
with the same facility as men.
Contrary to the findings in Liberia, when women in Guatemala are 
able to enter the public agency, they often experience success in getting 
information. However, the non-participant observation and validation 
exercises highlighted that those women who successfully solicit 
information in public agencies are generally either very well-connected 
politically, or accompanied by a man. Participants in the validation 
exercises emphasised that challenges to access may not lie primarily at 
the agency level. Indeed, interview responses suggest that many women 
face familial obstacles to leaving the home to seek information. This 
is not surprising in a country where 80 per cent of  the men feel that 
women should ask their permission to leave the house (Terán 2015).
When the 18 potential barriers were listed, 58 per cent of  the 
community leaders indicated that illiteracy is a large barrier which is 
nearly impossible to overcome. The community leaders also felt that 
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‘distance to the public office’ and ‘fear of  asking/fear of  reprisals’ were 
large barriers which are nearly impossible to overcome. With regard to 
fear, the validation participants across the six study locations were nearly 
unanimous that in many cases women fear both their families and the 
authorities. Elements of  discrimination, racism, machismo and trepidation 
born from the recent history of  civil war were reflected when community 
leaders noted ‘fear’ as a nearly impossible obstacle to overcome.
On aggregate, the most frequently identified barriers facing women 
in the exercise of  their right to information across all five regions 
were illiteracy, fear of  asking, not knowing where to go, issues of  time 
and responsibilities and lack of  mobility.
When ranking the critical challenges facing women, community leaders 
identified the following: poverty, inconvenient access/lack of  time, 
illiteracy, lack of  awareness of  the law, and machismo.
As with Liberia, the category ‘inconvenient access/lack of  time’ 
includes a number of  previously disaggregated but related obstacles, 
including too busy, lacking time to request information, lack of  access to 
transport, inability to access an agency because of  distance or because 
of  the burdens of  childcare or domestic responsibilities. The responses 
included in the composite category of  ‘poverty’ were those which cited 
problems such as lack of  money to pay for transportation, lack of  
money for food when travelling to make a request, lack of  money for 
childcare, and lack of  money to pay for photocopies. When reflecting 
further on poverty as an obstacle for women accessing information, 
researchers made several insightful observations based on their 
Figure 2 Are women able to access information with the same frequency, ease and 
rate of success as men in Guatemala?
Source Author’s own.
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interactions with study participants, including that often the lack of  
resources is not only monetary resources, but also the opportunity cost 
of  attempting to access information instead of  taking care of  another 
need perceived as more crucial for basic survival. Additionally, they 
observed that poverty is viewed as a systemic issue working in concert 
with the political status quo to impede empowerment of  women.
Overall, the findings from the women and access to information 
studies demonstrate the hypothesis that women are not able to access 
information with the same facility as men. Further, they confirm that 
the seven Cs, plus fear, do seem to be the main obstacles to women’s full 
exercise of  their right to information.
6 Potential solutions for advancing equity
In light of  the study’s findings, and with particular emphasis on the 
identified obstacles, there are a number of  creative responses that could 
effectively advance the right of  access to information for women. At the 
international level there are clear opportunities for raising awareness of  
the issue, such as explicitly including women’s right to information in the 
governance and human rights agenda, and encouraging governments 
to make gender-sensitive openness commitments. The Sustainable 
Development Goals have various targets focused on gender equity and 
governance, including access to information. This affords a unique 
opportunity to create indicators that combine these objectives and to 
develop relevant indicators to serve as a roadmap and evaluation tool.
Moreover, there are presently 66 country members in the Open 
Government Partnership (OGP), a voluntary compact to improve 
transparency, accountability and citizen participation. Many of  these 
countries are in the process of  either implementing their openness 
pledges or making new commitments. To date, less than a dozen 
commitments out of  the thousands made have specifically focused 
on the benefits of  improved governance and civil space for women. 
Through the OGP mechanism, partner countries could be supported 
to make gender-specific obligations, particularly related to access to 
information, to ensure women’s participation in national committees, 
and to review all of  their commitments through a gender-sensitive lens.
At the national level, governments should follow the spirit of  the access 
to information law in its ideal for universality, rather than just adhere to 
the letter of  the law. This could imply undertaking increased proactive 
publication, utilising mechanisms such as kiosks in the marketplaces where 
women gather, developing local information liaisons that disseminate 
information to women in their communities, and using community radio, to 
ensure that information reaches women without the need to invest time or 
travel long distances to access information. Review of  access to information 
statutes should be undertaken to safeguard against provisions that would 
unwittingly have a discriminatory impact on women – removing, for 
example, requirements to show an identification card, which many women 
around the world are not issued with, or to make a request in writing.
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In addition to disseminating information to women, public agencies 
should be encouraged to develop information that is meaningful to 
women, and to increase the amount of  data disaggregated by gender. 
Finally, civil society organisations (CSOs) with female constituencies 
must become more active in raising awareness about the value 
of  access to information for women, supporting solicitations, and 
developing protection mechanisms for requesters akin to a defence of  
human rights agenda.
With concerted efforts, governments and CSOs can reverse the 
information asymmetry and ensure that women are able to exercise 
their fundamental right to information with the same facility as men. 
When armed with the power of  information, women will benefit 
more fully from the values of  openness, accountability and meaningful 
participation, and will use the information for economic empowerment 
and the fulfilment and protection of  rights. A free flow of  information 
to women will transform lives.
Notes
* The research on which this article is based was funded by the Research, 
Evidence and Learning Component of  Making All Voices Count.
1 Rural households headed by women: sub-Saharan Africa, 31 per 
cent; Latin America and the Caribbean, 17 per cent; and Asia 14 per 
cent (FAO n.d.).
2 See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en.
3 The Liberia and Guatemala studies were completed in 2014 and 
2015 respectively. A third country study is ongoing in Bangladesh 
and will be completed in early 2016.
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Abstract How does a movement for social justice, whose members are 
mainly drawn from the lower economic strata of society, build and sustain 
its power in the face of co-option, and social and geographical division? 
Members of the Bunge La Mwananchi movement in Kenya explored this 
question using action research. The movement carves spaces for debate and 
activism in the urban public sphere accessible to the unrepresented masses. 
The authorities leave these spaces mostly unmolested, in part because 
co-option by politicians and civil society organisations is as effective at 
wrong-footing the movement as mass arrests and riot police would be. 
The research reminded the members that the movement’s power has 
always lain in its efforts to reach across internal divisions of ethnicity, 
gender, class and geography. As the research connected the debaters in one 
site with those in another, it demonstrated how communicative enquiry 
works to create solidarity within this most grass-roots of movements.
1 Introduction
I’m one of  the people who started Bunge La Mwananchi. We had numerous 
challenges from the then government. We were arrested many times but we did not 
give up. At some point, the movement had gone silent until in 2002 and in 2003, it 
was fully revived. We have not had a downtime in its operation since then. Kibaki’s 
government elected in 2002 gave us a lot of  hope in having a better country since 
it had taken in a number of  people from the movement. We felt that the citizen 
would be more powerful since there was support from the government. Bunge La 
Mwananchi started getting a name then. However, this was short-lived. Those we 
had set our hopes on were absorbed in the system and did not advance the course of  
the movement (Bunge La Mwananchi organiser).1
Gacheke Gachihi, a long-time organiser for Bunge2 La Mwananchi3 
(BLM), the People’s Parliament, describes it as a movement whose 
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aims are to bring about ‘a Kenya where citizens enjoy unfettered 
sovereignty to organise to free themselves from all forms of  oppression 
and domination’ (Gachihi 2014). It is a social movement4 that conducts 
its business in open parks, bus stands, markets, community centres and 
newspaper stands. A vocal grass-roots organisation, with no formal 
membership required, it is made up of  whoever chooses to be part of  
it. The majority of  its members come from the lower socioeconomic 
strata of  Kenyan society (Kimari and Rasmussen 2010). Its leaders 
(spokespeople, organisers, activists) emerge from within its membership. 
These are Eric Hoffer’s ‘articulate minority’, the men and women 
of  words whose eloquence, ideas, organising capabilities and energy 
drive them to lead discussions, mobilise action, plan campaigns, lead 
demonstrations and think up and deploy slogans with style and passion 
(Hoffer 1951: 104; Nasong’o 2007). It is a movement that offers its 
members a space not otherwise open to them to listen, exchange ideas, 
propose and act on public affairs. Formal civil society organisations 
(CSOs) – registered and funded by governments, foundations, charities 
and the private sector – do not appear to BLM members to offer such 
a space for the real participation of  the lower economic classes. The 
formal political system likewise does not invite them in on equal terms.
The people’s parliaments occupy spaces that are autonomous and open, 
carved out of  the intermediate geographies of  the official and private 
propertied city by the presence and commitment of  unrepresented people. 
This article looks at how the movement loses and gains power, as its men 
and women of  words are dragged outwards by the centrifugal effects of  
money and social division, and pulled inwards by their commitment.
The movement thrives on discussion; indeed it was founded in the face 
of  prohibitions on free speech about public affairs at a time when public 
talk, especially from low-paid formal and informal sector workers, 
unemployed, homeless, street workers and students was strongly 
repressed by the ruling Kenya African National Union regime. It grew 
in the streets of  Nairobi’s city centre in the early 1990s, emerging from 
street gatherings such as the ‘Kafiri Movement’ in Aga Khan Walk, at 
a time when President Moi’s hold on power was being challenged by 
rising social unrest (Murunga and Nasong’o 2007: 9). Activists on street 
corners began organising political education for Nairobi workers on 
themes of  African liberation. The movement itself  first appeared in the 
late nineties, carving out a physical space for public discussion on two 
facing benches in Jeevanjee Gardens, a public park in the centre of  the 
city, whose worn-out grassy squares, shady trees and time-worn statue 
of  Queen Victoria had just been saved from the developers’ bulldozers 
by public activists (Kimari and Rasmussen 2010). A few years later 
the space and the talk took on the name of  Bunge La Mwananchi, 
‘the People’s Parliament’, as debates in the park took place on two 
facing benches with a speaker between, modelled on African village 
parliaments (Gachihi 2014). Such parliaments are usually to be found 
under a tree whose shade defines a set of  procedural rules of  inclusion, 
debate and decision (Brocklesby, Hobley and Scott-Villiers 2010). The 
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name not only draws on Africa’s great past, but also characterises 
the movement’s appeal to an irony-appreciative section of  Kenya’s 
poorer and more radical-idealistic elements by referring to the present 
constitutional parliament at City Square in Nairobi.
By claiming to be a parliament for the people, the movement 
critiques the real parliament for not representing the ordinary 
Kenyan people, a critique that they act out in their daily practices 
(Kimari and Rasmussen 2010: 153).
Debates in the early days were enriched by older activists who had 
been in contact with the Mau Mau revolt of  the 1950s and, according 
to Gachihi at a research analysis session in Nairobi in July 2015, their 
presence ‘helped to shape the consciousness of  the young generations’ 
towards the rightfulness of  and necessity for oppressed classes to 
struggle for a fair share of  voice in building the nation. The street 
debates contributed to a massive change in national consciousness, and 
a change of  government in 2003. A coalition of  opposition parties, 
backed by many in civil society, took power.
While this heralded an opening of  the public sphere to many whose 
voices had once been silenced, the new government also absorbed many 
of  the men and women of  words who had once been activists (Murunga 
and Nasong’o 2007). Nevertheless, the Jeevanjee site continued to 
attract a daily gathering of  citizen debaters and new bunges (as they are 
called) claimed public spaces in Nairobi’s informal settlements – the 
slums of  Mathare, Kibera, Githurai and Huruma Kiamaiko – and 
in public spaces in the centres of  other cities and towns – Mombasa, 
Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru and Kakamega. Each one took on its own 
name: for example, Bunge Mashinani (the Grass-Roots Parliament) 
in the Mathare slums, or Bunge La Wamama Mashinani (the Grass-
Roots Women’s Parliament) in east Nairobi, or Bunge La Mwananchi 
Kaptembwo (the People’s Parliament at the bus station in the centre 
of  Nakuru town). The BLM movement offered the potential for 
broad public participation in political affairs. Nearly 30 years later, the 
movement is still alive and kicking.
2 Action research method
The article draws on the findings of  a short action research study carried 
out in Nairobi and Nakuru between May and July 2015. Led by two 
BLM long-time organisers, David ‘Cidi’ Otieno and Gacheke Gachihi, 
with support from action researchers Diana Muthoni Ndung’u and 
Nathaniel Kabala, and with some provocation from Patta Scott-Villiers at 
the Institute of  Development Studies, the team joined BLM activists in a 
number of  different sites for discussions about solidarities and fault lines in 
their movement. In Nairobi, we targeted Bunge La Mwananchi Jeevanjee, 
which is considered (by some) the epicentre of  Bunge La Mwananchi 
countrywide, Bunge Mashinani in Mathare and Bunge La Wamama 
Mashinani in Huruma Kiamaiko, both in the east of  Nairobi. In Nakuru 
County, the study focused on Bunge La Mwananchi Kaptembwo.
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We began by identifying issues among ourselves, drawing out the 
main concerns of  the two BLM organisers about movement growth 
and influence and setting them against theories of  civil society, social 
division and the public sphere. Then the Kenyan team members went 
out and listened to what BLM members were talking about in all the 
selected sites. We also conducted interviews with onlookers, passers-by 
and local business owners and workers. In the way of  action research, 
each day of  listening and interviewing leads to new understandings 
which in turn raises new questions. These we posed to active and 
passive members within the bunges in the study, in group discussions 
and one-on-one interviews. This, in turn, led to a larger debate which 
the BLM activists organised to bring together members of  Bunge La 
Mwananchi Jeevanjee and Bunge Mashinani in Mathare, to establish 
how the members of  the two bunges view and cooperate with each other, 
provide the space for renewal of  ties, and observe what could be learned 
from such an initiative.
3 Solidarity and political opportunity
BLM is a movement that prides itself  on its success in bridging the 
politicised tribal divides in the country. During the ethno-political 
bloodshed of  the post-election period of  2007/08, BLM members 
resisted politicians’ calls for division and engaged in the bunge parliaments 
side by side, reinforcing the movement’s sense of  identity and cohesion 
and emphasising its determination to tackle the real political issues of  the 
day, including inequality, unemployment and violence.
Today, Jeevanjee Gardens continues to be a space in which discussions 
on issues ranging from national and county politics to entertainment 
and sports are open to all-comers. Sometimes there is more than one 
grouping, each discussing different things, and at other times when there 
are burning issues, one large gathering forms the kikao or sitting.5 At this 
and the other bunge sites the discussions sometimes coalesce into action: 
deputations to local authorities or joining demonstrations organised by 
activists from within or without. Members like to see the sittings as a 
neutral space, where, unlike other street corner political spaces, anyone 
can come and discuss any issue without fear of  being victimised for 
party, tribe, class, gender, disability or ideology.
There are different bunges in the city but what we have at Jeevanjee is unique. 
When you go to City Hall, you need to be focused on one thing. You need to 
be supporting someone politically. It is the same with the bunge at Aga Khan 
Walk. Bunge La Mwananchi at Jeevanjee Gardens accommodates everyone 
across the political divide, social class and any other interest (Bunge Jeevanjee 
participant).6
The debates at Jeevanjee Gardens tend to be concerned with non-local, 
national or international issues. The park and its surrounding cafés 
and small restaurants are often the places where protest campaigns 
are discussed and coordinated, in liaison with national lobbying 
groups and other movements such as Pawa 254 (an activist hub that 
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does much of  its debating and organising online). The bunges in the 
informal settlements like Bunge Mashinani tend to debate and act on 
local issues. Many of  these issues, such as extra-judicial killings and 
rape, are addressed case by case, often with help from an activist with 
a high public profile called in from Jeevanjee or one of  the human 
rights organisations. Bunge La Wamama Mashinani, the women’s 
bunge, was formed so that its members could speak specifically about 
women’s issues, because they were not getting adequate airtime in the 
male-dominated spaces. Bunges in other towns in Kenya discuss national 
issues as well as local ones, but not being in the capital, they lead fewer 
national campaigns. Each of  these bunges has a different unwritten rule 
about its way of  operating, different capabilities for action and different 
powers to resist dissolution or co-option. The movement has done 
much to open a once closed public sphere to marginalised voices from 
the grass roots and it faces the difficulties of  channelling grass-roots 
decisions into political action with ever-renewed determination.
The ‘Unga Revolution’ in 2010 was a high point for BLM. It was a 
year of  intense debate and repeated protests at a time when the sharply 
rising price of  unga (maize meal) was a burning issue. The call came out 
from the grass roots and was picked up by the bunge at Jeevanjee, whose 
members and contacts in other campaigning groups helped organise 
demonstrations and media stunts with wide participation of  men and 
women from across Nairobi and other cities (Musembi and Scott-
Villiers 2015). People felt that the BLM movement achieved national 
influence then. Media coverage was strong and government appeared 
to be concerned for its image in relation to class, poverty and hunger. 
Analysing it, the discussion groups pointed out that people from all 
walks of  life were personally affected by the price rises. Unga is one of  
the most important staples in Kenya and the quadrupling of  the price 
of  the daily meal highlighted the rapidly rising cost of  living, even 
to those on higher incomes. Even the middle classes seemed to have 
woken up, albeit temporarily, to the callousness of  a political system 
that seemed unaffected by millions of  citizens with not enough money 
to eat. 2010 was the year of  the enactment of  Kenya’s new constitution 
and the country was in an ebullient mood; its people and politics had 
achieved something extraordinary. Middle and lower classes alike, 
working through or alongside the mobilising structures offered by BLM, 
and inspired by a new sense of  optimism and opportunity, combined 
their repertoires of  protest and campaigned for a right to reasonably 
priced food in a colourful outburst of  contention.7
The biggest moment for BLM is Unga Revolution. It happened in 2010 after 
a famine that struck most parts of  this country. We were concerned that the 
common people would not be able to afford food because the price was too high. 
It also came at a time when a chief  from Turkana had been sacked by the 
government for reporting that a number of  people from his location had died 
from hunger. The Unga Revolution was a success because of  the unity that was 
portrayed during the period. There were only a few people who were involved 
during the planning. When they agreed on the issue, it was taken to the different 
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neighbourhoods. The people there took up the issue and continued to mobilise 
their neighbours. They did not need to come to town. We decided to call it a 
revolution to get the government to listen since using the word ‘food’ would be 
too normal (Bunge La Mwananchi organiser).8
Other campaigns did not achieve the same degree of  cross-class, cross-
site solidarity. We heard of  several instances where issues like rape in 
the informal settlements were taken up by small coalitions of  local and 
Jeevanjee activists with local authorities, but the issues did not become 
the subject of  sustained protest. In analysing what could be learned 
from this, discussion participants suggested that when an issue does not 
reach across the divide between rich and poor, its power is diminished. 
BLM members’ efforts to tackle extra-judicial killings (young men in the 
slums shot by people in uniform) were at first similarly attenuated – the 
issues did not gain traction among members. The issue belongs only to 
people living in the rougher areas of  town; sometimes the victims are 
petty criminals, or random individuals whose cadavers are put on garish 
display labelled as gangsters caught in the act of  fleeing the scene of  
the crime. The media hints that these youth probably deserved their 
fate. It is no longer the year of  the new constitution and the political 
atmosphere has changed to one that is more fearful of  crime and 
terrorism, and less optimistic about justice. BLM organisers did have 
another card up their sleeves to strengthen solidarity – a card that we 
will return to in Section 5, when we consider how solidarity works in 
the face of  the centrifugal forces that threaten to atomise the movement 
into small knots of  people talking in isolated, rubbish-strewn urban 
nowheres.
4 Divisions: gender, class and geography
When the mobilising structure loses its articulation, the movement is 
unable to galvanise itself. We learned about how outside players divert 
debates and upset proposed activities. Members in the informal settlements 
explained instances where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) act 
specifically to reframe and reprioritise certain issues. It is common these 
days, according to Jeevanjee regulars, for powerful individuals who want 
to suppress the talk there on a particular issue to hand out cash to spoil the 
debates. They may introduce alternative issues or attract people away from 
the sittings with offers of  short-term employment. There are examples 
where demonstrations are planned, only for some members of  BLM to 
be paid to disrupt them. Police intimidation of  BLM members is not 
uncommon and many of  its most seasoned and courageous activists have 
had repeated spells in prison cells on unspecified charges.
The ability of  Jeevanjee and the other bunges to resist these divisive 
manoeuvres is a key factor in the power of  the movement. The bunges 
manage to resist tribalism (the naming of  tribe as a beneficiary or a 
threat), perhaps because it is embedded in the movement’s sense of  itself. 
However, on the other social divisions there is more difficulty. Although 
most members recognise the divisions arising from gender, class and 
geography, their management of  them has not always been so successful. 
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We will unpick these three problems in this section, before moving back to 
what the BLM people are doing when they are resisting divisiveness.
4.1 Gender
I come from a community where women are already marginalised. Amplifying 
their voice becomes even more difficult (Young woman, Mathare).9
A group of  women formed Bunge La Wamama Mashinani (the grass-
roots women’s bunge) in Mathare, because of  difficulties of  timing and 
location in the male-organised bunge, but also because the debates in 
the other bunges tended not to focus on issues they cared about. Men in 
Bunge Mashinani agreed that women did not normally show up in their 
discussions. Some attributed this to a culture where women do not sit on 
the same platforms as men. Some organisers there have tried to address 
the problem by sharing information between the men and the women in 
their different spaces:
Personally, issues in this community are at heart. I often go out and meet many 
women, and even their bunge [Bunge La Wamama Mashinani] and listen out to 
them. I then bring those issues to our bunge where we also discuss. At our bunge, 
we discuss issues affecting everyone. Here in Mathare, information flows very fast. 
Issues that affect women here reach us (Male Bunge Mashinani organiser).10
In Jeevanjee, there is similarly a gendered divide and, even though 
people are concerned, there are few initiatives to cross it: ‘Women 
are not interested in sitting for the discussions. There was a day some 
young women passed here and said that what we always discuss is 
politics. I think that is why women never come and their issues are not 
represented too.’
4.2 Class and ‘civil society’
In weighing up the relative problems caused by gender relations and 
those caused by co-option by donor-funded CSOs, women in Bunge 
La Wamama Mashinani concluded that they had begun to resolve the 
gender issue, but not the class co-option problem. While they felt that 
they could mobilise men in BLM to support them in their priorities, 
they felt powerless to deal with the CSOs, their money, their exclusive 
spaces and their sense of  superiority and pity.
We [women] do not have the aim of  getting money from the CSOs. They want 
to get funding from our work yet we are interested in amplifying the voices of  
the marginalised. They are using our voices for their own interests. We want to 
amplify women’s voices for all generations. We feel betrayed by them yet we look 
at them. We end up being threatened by the government. That is the reason why 
the men have started their own bunge and they are very active. They got tired 
of  being used by the CSOs. They want to amplify their own voices (Bunge La 
Wamama Mashinani).11
Our discussion groups decided that some of  the movement’s greatest 
difficulties at present revolve around issues of  money and class.
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You realise that in Kenya there are two tribes. The rich and the poor. This is by 
my definition. If  let’s say you are poor, you are used by the rich and they will do 
anything to ensure that you remain poor because they are mostly the ruling class. 
They will not allow you to join them. They shall employ you and give you a 
little just enough for your survival so that you do not die. When you raise your 
voice, they will want to help you only to a certain level (Bunge Jeevanjee).12
After almost two decades of  struggle for constitutional reforms that was 
largely led by what some BLM members describe as ‘middle-class’ civil 
society,13 Kenya adopted a new constitution billed as one of  the world’s 
most progressive. Despite commitments to wide-ranging economic and 
social rights for citizens, many BLM members point out that five years 
later, nothing has changed for the lower economic classes. The hoped-
for signs of  change to conditions of  poverty, marginalisation and rights 
abuse have yet to emerge. This has led to growing criticism, especially 
from younger members of  the movement, of  the performance of  CSOs. 
They want to know why, when the country has reported year-on-year 
economic growth, there is rising hunger, joblessness and insecurity. BLM 
members question whether CSOs are really on the side of  the grass 
roots at all.
While civil society in Kenya varies from local associations to large 
corporate NGOs and trades unions, BLM members are concerned that 
the civil society space related to the political public sphere has been 
colonised by middle-class leaders and ways of  doing business. ‘Middle 
class’, they explain, is about money and power. The middle classes are 
separated from grass-roots interests materially and socially. It is not 
uncommon for a talented grass-roots organiser to be tempted to join an 
established organisation as a salaried worker and so begin to move away 
from the grass roots. Members believe that this is one of  the reasons 
why, after 30 years of  effort, citizens at the grass roots are still left out of  
national debates. They note that their issues and perspectives hardly find 
their way into CSO discourses and they feel they are caricatured in CSO 
documents and campaign slogans as a way to gain funds and notoriety.
BLM is unusual in Kenya in that it is a movement that is accessible 
to and largely led by people who are politically and economically 
marginalised. People see people discussing in public spaces and they 
join in, or existing members invite them in, or they experience injustice 
and seek a space for activism. In Mathare, being a member of  Bunge 
Mashinani is a source of  strength in the face of  the provocations of  
slum life, but precarious incomes make sustained involvement difficult. 
Jeevanjee offers world-expanding discussions and sometimes protest, 
while also offering possibilities of  income, a chance to try out for political 
leadership, or a step up into paid lobbying positions. In all the sites, when 
a person gets money they might leave the movement and not return.
Bunge Mashinani has really empowered people here. I know my rights and 
can go to the police station and report in case anything happens to me… I can 
go and call a person from the carwash to come and listen. However, if  I do 
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not have money to give them, the next time I call them they will not come since 
they would have gotten some money if  they stayed at the carwash (Bunge 
Mashinani).14
People come to Jeevanjee to get skills and strategies so as to seek seats in the 
national and county government. It is the best place to sharpen your political 
skills since you are free to speak your mind. You also meet with others who 
challenge you (Bunge La Mwananchi).15
The men and women of  words who keep the movement linked and 
active also spin off into other activities. If  living in the slums means not 
getting heard then moving into politics or NGOs offers the possibility 
of  becoming an audible voice. A number of  BLM activists who have 
the ability to speak well have joined politics or become members of  
registered campaigning organisations. But many of  them appear to have 
ceased to speak for the grass roots.
We have these nominated members [who have joined politics] who are silent. We 
ask them what they have done since they were nominated to the county assembly 
and all they say is that they raise issues and bills to the county assembly. 
They however say that once their issues fail in the county assembly, they take 
them to the courts to look for solutions. This is not the way it should be. They 
should come back to us and tell us who stopped them and why (Young man, 
Nakuru).16
4.3 Geography
What is lost when a leader moves away from a bunge space? In their 
analysis the members concluded that solidarity was jeopardised, because 
communication across the bunge spaces diminished. It was natural for 
a single bunge to focus on its own affairs. So what keeps them part of  a 
single movement?
I came to know BLM when there was effective communication. Whenever 
there was an issue, it could be communicated to the grass roots. I used to go 
to Jeevanjee for meetings. With time, I realised that I could not afford to go to 
town every day. This was not only me… We started meeting here [in Mathare] 
and discussed mostly on the constitution… With time, though, we started 
discussing [local] issues which were affecting the members of  the community 
(Bunge Mashinani).17
People in Mashinani, Wamama and Kaptembwo all spoke of  the 
inaccessibility of  the bunge at Jeevanjee. Some said that they were not sure 
whether Bunge La Mwananchi still exists as a national phenomenon, 
others spoke of  being unable to reach organisers, while others spoke of  
lack of  knowledge regarding whom to approach for help with taking an 
issue forward. Nakuru members felt that Bunge Jeevanjee was acting as if  
it were at the top of  a hierarchy instead of  as one chapter among equals. In 
Mathare, Mashinani members explained their grievances against Jeevanjee:
There is no connection between Bunge Mashinani and Bunge Jeevanjee… 
We used to have support from Bunge La Mwananchi but now they do not come. 
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We do not have the backup that we need and the Member of  Parliament would 
easily bring his own people to take over our conversation. If  we had BLM 
there, he would be scared. I think they stopped coming because they used to have 
resources then and now they do not (Bunge Mashinani).18
The reaction in Jeevanjee to this criticism was mixed. They believed 
that issues that they discuss and take action on affect all marginalised 
people, but only after they reach Jeevanjee do the issues encompass a 
larger context. Some people from the margins felt that Bunge Jeevanjee 
was indeed superior to their ‘local’ bunge and ought to have been giving 
guidance. On the other hand, Bunge Jeevanjee members opined 
that the other bunges ought to carry out their activities independent 
of  Jeevanjee, only to ask for advice when they get stuck. The BLM 
members in the informal settlements and in the towns outside the 
capital feel abandoned by Bunge Jeevanjee because they are only 
contacted when Bunge Jeevanjee has activities that require numbers of  
people. When faced with issues, each bunge now finds its own ways of  
solving problems and they rarely involve one another.
5 The counter-manoeuvres
The movement lives on and is once again gaining strength. As the research 
findings became part of  the members’ discussions at each site, more 
and more people saw divisions in the movement (whether arising from 
co-option, loss of  key spokespeople to salaried jobs, or communication 
breakdowns) as interfering with their mission to confront social injustice. 
The discussions turned to asking what its active organisers were doing now. 
Otieno and Gachihi are doing action research. They have been working 
with bunge members from several sites across Nairobi to take a rigorous 
look at extra-judicial killings. In the process, the bunges have communicated 
to a new level. During the reflective action research with IDS on which this 
article is based, between one meeting and the next, members began to take 
action. Bunge Mashinani members came and spoke to Bunge Jeevanjee 
members and vice versa. These meetings concluded that the informal 
settlements are some of  the most important sites for people’s parliaments; 
the power base of  the movement. They agreed on activities that would 
strengthen bunges at the grass roots. Jeevanjee members agreed to spend 
more time at other bunge sites in Nairobi. Relations between Jeevanjee and 
Nakuru also took a step forward.
Since we had the debate with Bunge Jeevanjee, things have improved. They 
call us to attend meetings with people and institutions that are important to 
us. Now, we do not have to know someone in Bunge Jeevanjee in order to reach 
any organisation. I feel we have the right contacts right now. We have attended 
many forums, which have opened our eyes. I think the meetings that we had with 
Bunge Jeevanjee opened both our and their eyes (Bunge Mashinani).19
Rachael is an organiser in Mathare. In 2015 she has a job as a leader of  
a government programme in the settlement, organising young people to 
labour at digging drains and constructing sanitation infrastructure in the 
valley. She is still a leader of  BLM.
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Everyone still knows that I am an activist who likes stirring things when they 
are not right… I still advance the struggle even within [the programme I am 
leading]. I still go for demonstrations when they are called. In the struggle, you 
look at the situation and know how to react (Rachael, Mathare).20
People like Rachael leave the space of  BLM for other assignments. In her new 
position she has been able to meet new people. She fought for a social hall to be 
constructed. She has mobilised the community. In future she will come back and 
build the movement. It’s not everybody who leaves, but many, they have memory 
– they will continue the struggle in their new space (BLM organiser).21
These counter-manoeuvres help to clarify the positive mechanisms that 
link the will to speak on public issues to the will to resist the inevitable 
forces that will try to reconfigure this unmediated voice. We see how 
spaces which could be just messy corners owned by no one, are subtly 
returned to order and power by reminders of  what the movement’s 
name means: a space of  power that is not just anti-tribalism, but 
anti- any kind of  negative discrimination. We see how communication 
across lines of  social and geographic difference helps solidify a sense of  
a movement that has power, membership and scope. And we see that 
when an organiser moves out of  the space and into another, she can still 
be in the BLM space, if  she cares to be.
6 Conclusion
It may appear ironic that freedom of  speech undertaken in public 
spaces, the very purpose and performance of  the movement, is also 
its Achilles heel. It suggests that we need to do more to understand 
the processes by which unmediated public speech becomes influential; 
how it gains and loses power in movements for social justice. In our 
research together, members of  the Bunge La Mwananchi movement 
learned what Nancy Fraser has already pointed out in her article 
criticising Habermas’ ideal view of  the public sphere – that class, 
gender and geography have profound effects from the inside as well 
as from the outside. They affect who is involved in a discussion, which 
issues are taken up, under what umbrella and with what effect (Fraser 
1990). However, BLM activists counteract Fraser’s argument that 
declaring a space devoid of  social divisions ‘is not sufficient to make it 
so’ (1990: 60). When they act on declarations of  anti-tribalism, anti-
classism and anti-genderism, they remind the movement that this is 
its identity. By facilitating freedom of  speech, not just in the random 
interstices of  the city, but across these spaces, they build a tangible 
network of  communication between masses of  people and numerous 
places. When they manage to get members and supporters from the 
city centres to commit to connecting with and across the informal 
settlements, they are building a power to rival the formal institutions 
that try to ignore them.
Talk across class, gender and geography works easily at times of  
national inspiration, like it did in the year of  the new constitution and 
the Unga Revolution. As inspiration turns to realism and talk between 
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people in different positions turns to mistrust and misunderstanding, 
then so fluid a movement can move into danger. Yet just at the point 
when we think that we can understand the patterns of  voice and its 
susceptibility to co-option and division, we hear it rising again; using its 
own ability to connect by using questions, analysis and performance, to 
work out what might have been wrong and take steps towards renewal.
Notes
* The research on which this article is based was funded by the Research, 
Evidence and Learning Component of  Making All Voices Count.
1 Interview, Jeevanjee Gardens, 3 June 2015.
2 Bunge: parliament in Kiswahili, derived from the Ha language in 
Tanzania, meaning a place where elders discussed matters of  state 
(Mbaabu 1985).
3 Mwananchi: citizen; a politically charged word, its original meaning 
is ‘child of  the country/land’. Political leaders often wield the term 
to mean dutiful, innocent, common, ordinary or average person, but 
also to imply a racial or indigenous specificity, i.e. an African person 
(Hunter 2015).
4 We understand a social movement to be ‘a collective attempt to further 
a common interest or secure a common goal, through collective action 
outside the sphere of  established institutions’ (Giddens 1997: 511). 
The definition should encompass ‘the distinctions not only between 
community and class or popular and elite movements but also between 
organised and unorganised, spontaneous or anomic movements, and, as 
such, it is rooted in concrete African social processes’ (Nasong’o 2007: 20).
5 Kikao: a sitting under the shade of  trees.
6 Participant in a focus group discussion with BLM members, 
Jeevanjee Gardens, 19 May 2015.
7 The elements of  social movement theory used here are drawn from 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996).
8 Interview, Jeevanjee Gardens, 2 June 2015.
9 Interview with female human rights activist. Listening post at 
Mathare, 15 May 2015.
10 Interview with young man, focus group discussion with members of  
Bunge Mashinani, Mathare, 17 May 2015.
11 Interview with young woman, focus group discussion with Bunge La 
Wamama Mashinani, Mathare, 18 May 2015.
12 Focus group discussion with active Bunge La Mwananchi members, 
Jeevanjee Gardens, 19 May 2015.
13 Civil society is understood here in the way Nasong’o puts it: 
‘organised social life that is voluntary and self-perpetuating and 
though bound by a legal order, is beyond state control’ (2007: 24). 
The civil society role in pushing for and influencing the content 
of  the new constitution was substantial. After the first multi-party 
elections in 1992, which were won by the incumbent because the 
opposition was riven with division, the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission (a CSO) and 15 other organisations called for a push 
for constitutional reform – including of  the electoral commission, 
security, public order, powers of  the local administration, and 
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freedom of  assembly and speech (ibid). As more and more 
organisations joined in, the constitutional reform process gained 
momentum until, 18 years later, a new constitution was made law.
14 Young man at bunge debate in Mathare, 17 June 2015.
15 Interview with bunge organiser, Jeevanjee Gardens, 2 June 2015.
16 Interview with young man, Bunge Kaptembwo, Nakuru, 23 May 2015.
17 Young man at debate between BLM and Bunge Mashinani, 
Mathare, 17 June 2015.
18 Young man at debate between BLM and Bunge Mashinani, 
Mathare, 17 June 2015.
19 Interview, Bunge Mashinani, Mathare, 1 September 2015.
20 Interview, Mathare, 20 May 2015.
21 Analysis session, Gigiri, 29 May 2015.
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Test It and They Might Come: 
Improving the Uptake of Digital 
Tools in Transparency and 
Accountability Initiatives
Christopher Wilson and Indra de Lanerolle*
Abstract Information and communications technologies (ICTs) and data play 
an increasingly visible role in transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs). 
There has been little research on how the selection of ICT tools influences 
the success of these initiatives. This article reports on research into TAI tool 
selection processes in South Africa and Kenya. Findings suggest that in many 
cases, tools are chosen with only limited testing of their appropriateness for 
the intended users in the intended contexts, despite widespread recognition 
among practitioners, funders and researchers that this carries significant 
efficiency and sustainability risks. We conclude by suggesting a strategy for 
increasing investment and effort in tool selection, in order to conserve overall 
project resources and minimise the risk of failure.
1 Introduction
Information and communications technologies (ICTs) and data 
play an increasingly visible role in transparency and accountability 
(T&A) programming. This might involve using social media to track 
parliamentary performance, mobile phones to conduct satisfaction 
surveys on public service delivery, reporting websites to document 
corruption, or radio to promote and facilitate political debate. Here, 
such processes are referred to as Technology for Transparency and 
Accountability Initiatives (T4TAIs).
T4TAIs have received significant attention in both the academic 
literature, and the grey literature of  professional reports and 
programming guides (Ahmed, Scheepers and Stockdale 2014; Avila 
et al. 2010; Fox 2015; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Joshi 2013; McGee 
and Carlitz 2013; Slater 2014). This body of  work presents examples 
of  effective use of  technology in the service of  T&A objectives, but also 
raises concerns about the effectiveness and impact of  T4TAIs. Some 
of  the explanations for lack of  success include a failure to sufficiently 
understand the users of  technological tools (McGee and Carlitz 2013), 
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failure to account for contextual factors (Joshi 2013), and limited 
technical capacities or investment in project management (Slater 2014). 
The way that tool selection processes influence the success of  T4TAIs 
is seldom addressed. This article presents some initial findings from a 
research project which aims to help fill that gap.1
The process of  tool selection, and the dynamics influencing it, are 
important. Our research confirms that a very wide range of  tools are 
used by T4TAIs including: social media platforms; off-the-shelf  (OTS) 
software platforms such as Ushahidi or Frontline SMS, which can be 
applied in dramatically different contexts with little customisation; 
paid subscriptions to cloud services for managing data; hardware such 
as tablets for conducting surveys; or mobile apps and web interfaces 
which T4TAIs build or commission from the bottom up. The 
selection of  the right tool for the job influences the implementation of  
accountability programming, and its potential for influencing T&A. 
The complicated processes through which these tools are selected 
involve different types of  decisions (What kind of  tool? Build or buy? 
Open source or proprietary?) and different models of  decision-making 
(Top-down or bottom-up? With what degree of  research, consultation 
or preparation?). Understanding tool selection processes is important 
for understanding how T4TAIs function, and the conditions that are 
associated with positive programming outcomes.
To better understand these dynamics, surveys and interviews were 
conducted with T4TAIs in Kenya and South Africa during 2014 and 
2015. Findings suggest that in many cases, tools are chosen with only 
limited testing of  their appropriateness for the intended users in the 
intended contexts, despite widespread recognition among practitioners, 
funders and researchers that such an approach is prone to significant 
efficiency and sustainability risks.
‘Build it and they will come’ is an established trope for describing a 
failure to anticipate user needs and realities in software development 
(Markus and Keil 1994), which has also been applied to software and 
content in a development context (Hatakka 2009), as well as within the 
T&A context specifically (McGee 2013). We discuss findings relevant 
to this trope, first by discussing what shapes success and failure of  tool 
selection and tool driving projects. We continue by discussing uptake 
failure, which our research participants linked to project and tool 
selection failure. Finally, we discuss T4TAI strategies for mitigating 
uptake failure.
2 The process of tool selection
Study of  T4TAIs, and new media research in general, has been 
dominated by a proliferation of  case studies (see Fung, Gilman and 
Shkabatur 2010; Fox 2015; Ahmed et al. 2014; Avila et al. 2010; Gigler 
and Bailur 2014). These focus primarily either on whether ICT tools 
add value, or contextual and strategic components result in positive 
outcomes. However, the process through which ICT tools are chosen and 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 113–126 | 115
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
characteristics of  ‘successful’ tool selection processes have not received 
significant attention (Fox 2015; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Joshi 2013).
Within the broader field of  study considering philanthropic and 
social good initiatives, a handful of  case studies explore the influence 
of  specific factors on tool adoption (Merkel et al. 2007; TechSoup 
Global 2012; Zorn, Flanagin and Shoham 2011) and more consider 
technological diffusion rates and adoption dynamics within sectors 
(Kim 2014; Zorn et al. 2011; Hoehling 2013). There is also the ‘grey 
literature’: guidance produced by organisations for direct use by other 
organisations (Kwok 2014; Dederich, Hausman and Maxwell 2006; 
Denison 2008; Wakefield and Sklair 2011).
There does not appear to be any systematic study of  the processes 
through which T4TAIs select technological tools for their work. The 
recent Learning Study on the Users in Technology for Transparency and Accountability 
Initiatives (McGee and Carlitz 2013) suggests that many T4TAIs build 
their strategies around untested assumptions about tool users; when these 
assumptions do not hold true in implementation, project impact and 
sustainability are both affected. Understanding and improving processes 
of  tool selection could solve this problem. Tool selection is the opportune 
moment for strategic decisions that maximise tool adoption by users. 
McGee and Carlitz offer a number of  recommendations to improve 
the design of  T4TAI through better understanding of  user needs and 
practices. Their study does not, however, explore the context in which 
such decisions are made, or the competing factors that influence tool 
selection. We conducted surveys and interviews with T4TAIs in Kenya 
and South Africa as a first effort to fill this gap.
3 The study and its methods
An online landscaping survey, disseminated via email, was conducted 
from December 2014 to January 2015, assessing the characteristics 
and perceptions of  civil society organisations (CSOs) that actively 
use email and have a web presence. In Kenya, due to low responses, 
email distribution was supplemented by dissemination through 
the researchers’ own networks. The online survey comprised 
15–25 questions exploring: (a) CSO size, organisational structure, 
professionalisation and thematic focus; (b) how CSOs evaluate their own 
capacity and their enthusiasm for using technology in programming; 
and (c) the characteristics of  a self-identified project that had a 
technology component. Responses were received from 247 South 
African organisations and 40 Kenyan organisations. This information 
was used to inform segmentation for research on tool selection processes 
in T4TAIs, and provided a preliminary population from which to draw 
the sample for the subsequent research.
Between January and April 2015, 38 in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with representatives of  18 South African 
and 20 Kenyan T4TAIs that had recently selected or were currently 
selecting a tool for T&A programming. Interviews took the form of  
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open conversations, and interviewees were encouraged to present an 
organic narrative of  tool selection processes, which emphasised those 
details and factors they felt were most relevant, in order to capture the 
nuanced dynamics influencing tool selection. Interviewers used a code 
sheet with 28 key indicators, and asked supplementary questions to 
collect data on those indicators if  the respondent did not refer to them 
in their narrative unprompted. The indicators covered the respondent’s 
motivations for adopting technology, the processes through which tools 
were identified, selected and implemented, and their perspectives on the 
implications of  the selection process for the success of  the project.
Though the small sample size clearly limits the degree to which 
our findings can be generalised, we believe that they provide useful 
insights into the processes of  T4TAI tool selection and that, combined 
with insights from other literature and our own experience of  
T4TAI programming, they provide a sound basis for preliminary 
recommendations.
4 Findings
The research found that less than a quarter of  the initiatives described 
the tool they had chosen as a success. Common problems included 
the tool not working as expected, low uptake by users, more lengthy 
development or modification time than anticipated, and struggles with 
finding or managing technical partners.
Organisations lacked knowledge in key areas: many started with 
little information on what they needed their tool to do, or on which 
tool could do what they needed. Very few had detailed knowledge 
about how tools worked before they chose them; although some had 
conducted research, it did not focus on tool availability or user needs. 
When we asked respondents what they would do differently if  they 
ran the project again, one of  the most common responses was ‘know 
more about users or tools’. Below, we present our findings specifically 
in relation to the ‘build it and they will come’ phenomenon, which we 
found to be both common and significant in relation to outcomes of  
tool selection.
4.1 Success and failure in tool selection
To achieve a balanced assessment of  whether tool selection and 
subsequent project implementation were successful, we relied on 
respondents’ own definitions of  success, identified during interviews, 
and on researcher assessments based on these definitions. Respondents 
commonly described success and failure in terms of  achieving project 
targets or organisational objectives, and many did not clearly distinguish 
between the success of  selection processes and success of  projects.
Based on interviewees’ self-assessments and researcher assessments, cases 
were classified as either successful, partially successful, unsuccessful or – if  
the project was too new to make a judgement – inconclusive. Where our 
classification differed to that of  the respondent, it was usually because it 
was too early to tell, or there was no evidence of  user uptake.
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Very few tool selection outcomes were successful – by our analysis, only 
3 out of  18 in South Africa, and only 6 out of  20 in Kenya (hereafter 
we will present this as SA: 3/18, KE: 6/20). Even in cases where it was 
not possible to determine success (SA: 5/18, KE: 1/20), early evidence 
offered reasons to be concerned. Excluding such cases, successful tool 
selection was found in less than a quarter of  cases.
The prominence of  failed tool selection within the sample reinforces 
anecdotal evidence and suggestions in the literature that many 
organisations undertaking T4TAIs lack the capacities and resources 
to make strong tool selections, and that this has a negative impact on 
programming outcomes (Merkel et al. 2007; TechSoup Global 2012; 
Denison 2008; Fox 2015).
The most commonly described indicators of  successful tool selection, 
in order of  incidence, were the overall success of  the project the tool 
was part of, number of  people using the tool, people using the tool 
in the way intended, and user feedback. One of  the most common 
explanations of  project failure was uptake failure, where the tool’s 
intended users did not adopt or use it in the way, or to the degree, that 
the project anticipated. Other reasons reported included the chosen tool 
failing to work as expected or, in cases involving a bespoke tool, that the 
tool was not completed.
4.2 Uptake failure
Almost half  the cases experienced uptake failure (SA: 5/12, KE: 6/12). 
These included the production of  social media reporting systems which 
did not receive reports, SMS scoring platforms which did not receive 
SMS messages, mobile data collection tools which were deployed, but 
which did not meet the needs of  enumerators during deployment, 
and a data portal which did not attract users due to an unsuitable 
user interface. In another quarter of  cases (SA: 3/12, KE: 3/12) the 
organisation had little or no information regarding tool use. We classified 
the tool selection processes as unsuccessful in such cases, though this 
occasionally differed from respondents’ own views, as discussed below.
There were only two cases where the tool was not used at all. In one, 
the interviewee cited the complexity of  the task (developing a database 
query system for a large membership-based advocacy organisation) and 
the inability to find a suitable technical partner as primary reasons for 
complete uptake failure. In the other, the costs of  deploying the tool 
were beyond the resources of  the organisation.
4.3 Strategies to mitigate uptake failure: user research and trialling
Neither user research – here understood broadly as research conducted 
by T4TAIs on the people that they hope will use a tool – nor trialling 
– trying out tools with small groups prior to selection or deployment 
– were well-represented in our sample. Relatively few organisations 
conducted any form of  research on their intended tool users (SA: 9/18, 
KE: 6/20) and even fewer tested out tools prior to selecting or adopting 
them (SA: 5/18, KE: 3/20). Trialling and research were especially rare 
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in cases where targeted users were a broad public, a characteristic also 
associated with high rates of  uptake failure.
Our research offers some evidence that trialling and user research 
could be effective in preventing uptake failure. In both countries, those 
organisations that conducted user research were most likely to see their 
tools adopted. Prior experience of  using a tool in a project context was 
even more strongly correlated with uptake success. Respondents described 
acquiring such experience through the use of  tools in other programmes, 
or by testing and trialling tools. All but one organisation that trialled their 
tools succeeded, but of  those that did not trial, most failed.
4.4 User research and trialling in a project context
The tool selection narratives provided by respondents both reinforced 
and complicated this positive correlation between research/trialling and 
tool uptake.
Respondents generally recognised the value of  user research, and a lack 
of  knowledge about tools and tool users was a frequently mentioned 
reason for project failure. Many saw that user research would have 
improved tool selection and project processes, but felt they didn’t have 
the available human, financial or technical resources for research – or, 
indeed the time. As one respondent put it: ‘This was a fast project, there 
was no time for research. The whole project was really an experiment.’
Some organisations already had extensive knowledge of  and 
engagement with the communities of  users they were targeting, but did 
not recognise the value of  conducting additional, structured research. 
Less than half  the initiatives conducted user research prior to tool 
selection or deployment (SA: 9/18, KE: 6/20), though many thought, 
with hindsight, that it would have been beneficial. Lack of  general or 
specific research on tool users was regularly associated with uptake 
failure.
We found this perspective frequently repeated across the sample, 
despite dramatic variations in both the time and the resources that 
were invested in tool selection and implementation, and the degree 
of  complexity of  tool selection and implementation processes. This 
suggests that there is limited understanding about what structured user 
research is, or what value it can add.
Testing or trialling of  tools prior to selection or deployment was rare 
(SA: 5/18, KE: 3/20), but those who had done it had become very 
strong advocates for trialling, and viewed it as central to success. As one 
respondent put it: ‘You don’t know something is good until you see and 
try it.’ A few projects in the sample went through multiple iterations 
of  both tools and project modalities, and described early failures as 
important learning experiences, performing much the same function as 
trialling would have. Aside from these projects, however, there seemed 
to be little awareness of  how structured trialling could save some of  the 
time and money costs implied by project failure and restructuring.
(Endnotes)
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It is also worth distinguishing between projects that purchased or 
adopted an off-the-shelf  (OTS) tool (SA: 7/18, KE: 9/18), and projects 
that ‘built’, commissioned or developed bespoke tools (SA: 11/18, KE: 
8/16). Use of  OTS tools included the use of  social media to facilitate 
public discussions, use of  a popular instant messaging application 
for communication between citizen monitors in different parts of  the 
country, or the use of  content management systems to develop and 
deploy websites.
Among a few of  those who built their own tools, trialling occurred 
after initial builds and prior to deployment (SA: 3/7, KE: 1/8). Few of  
the OTS tools used were selected on the basis of  research or trialling 
(SA: 3/7, KE: 2/8), and none on the basis of  trialling more than one tool.
5 Discussion
Our overall finding that most tool selections were unsuccessful is 
clearly a matter of  concern for our respondents, their donors and other 
stakeholders, and for other practitioners in the field of  technology for 
transparency and accountability. Equally important is the perspective 
that uptake and project failure could have been avoided if  research and 
trialling had been deployed.
We also found that trialling was more strongly correlated with success 
than research, supporting the view that trialling is a good potential 
strategy for practitioners.
5.1 What makes trialling particularly useful?
Trialling is an approach widely used in many software innovation 
processes, and is particularly emphasised in user- or human-centred 
design approaches (see, for example, ISO 2010). There is a strong 
practical and economic case for trialling. Practically, it enables 
assumptions about a tool’s ease of  use, effectiveness and appropriateness 
to be tested before deployment, reducing risk of  failure, and 
helps determine whether a tool works for specific groups of  users. 
Economically, late discovery of  problems is usually more expensive to 
correct than early discovery.
Research using the diffusion of  innovations (DoI) model has 
demonstrated that individuals often use trialling as a strategy to offset 
risks in adoption (Rogers 1995).This research supports the idea that 
trialling is an effective decision-making strategy because it enables the 
decision-maker to ‘kick the tyres’ and see if  the tool does what they 
expect, but also because it enables the decision-maker to discover how 
the tool works in ‘the real world’. This discovery is important because 
it aids understanding and addresses the usefulness, appropriateness and 
effectiveness of  the tool, particularly when the decision-maker has not 
clearly articulated to themselves what exactly they expect. Surfacing 
issues in this way is difficult using other methods.
Respondents reported a number of  discoveries about their intended 
users following a tool’s selection that highlight how effective trialling 
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would have been. In one case, the organisation had extensive knowledge 
of  its intended community of  users, but it was only after deployment 
that they discovered that their target users in the area where the project 
was being deployed did not use their choice of  media at all; trialling 
would have surfaced this issue quickly. Another respondent reported 
that it was only when the developer and the organisation deploying the 
technology went to the deployment location together that the developer 
realised that the tool would need to store data offline until mobile 
networks became available. This provides an example of  a trial strategy 
surfacing something that the deploying organisation had not anticipated 
would be critical to the tool design and selection.
It could be argued that since many T4TAIs are described as pilots, that 
this is a form of  trialling. We would argue though that these pilots do 
not qualify as trials in themselves because, as we have reported above, 
there is little systematic gathering of  feedback from users to identify how 
– if  the ‘pilot’ was to be the basis of  further intervention – a tool should 
be modified or an alternative found.
5.2 Why do organisations trial so rarely?
In many cases, the organisations we interviewed did not choose a tool 
at all. Sometimes, a tool had already been selected by donors or foreign 
partners before our respondent became involved in the project. More 
often, they sought technical partners to work with at an early stage, and 
these partners took on all or most of  the responsibility for identifying 
or building tools. As one respondent explained, their chosen partner 
dictated the choice of  tool: ‘To be honest – in terms of  technology – we 
weren’t really choosing at all.’2
Time and resource constraints were also frequently mentioned. Many 
respondents reported that projects involving technologies had taken 
much longer than they had expected, hoped or planned for. Trialling 
takes time, and as launch dates approach, initiatives may choose to skip 
this step to save time, even though they recognise its value. In some 
cases, trialling was simply not possible. One respondent explained that 
they had to order the equipment they needed online, and could not try 
it out prior to purchase.
It is also worth noting that the degree of  resources, time and effort 
invested varied greatly among the research participants. Some projects 
were completed in a matter of  weeks, with limited resources and little 
formal planning, while other initiatives involved substantial budgets, 
the hiring of  additional dedicated staff and multi-year plans. With two 
exceptions, the cases which involved building tools from scratch were 
those which required the most substantial resources. Overall, there was 
not a clear relationship between resources deployed and success.
For some organisations, such constraints make trialling challenging, even 
sometimes unfeasible. However, we suggest two broader explanations 
relating to the organisations implementing T4TAIs that could help to 
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account for the lack of  trialling and user research. These speak less 
to constraints, but rather to deeper questions of  how organisations 
approach tool selection, and their understanding of  the relationship 
between technology choices and user engagement.
5.3 Proxy errors and unknown unknowns
One explanation may be that T4TAI project managers regard 
themselves as reasonable proxies for their users. Rather than go into 
the field to anticipate user needs, they looked in the mirror. A number 
of  respondents reported that though they did not conduct trials with 
potential users, they did try out the tool themselves.
We believe this is likely to be problematic for T&A work, and perhaps 
particularly for tool designers and project managers in developing 
country contexts. A software developer at an elite university near Boston 
who aimed to develop a social platform for American students may have 
been able to use themselves as a test case with great success, and might 
have had a lot in common with their intended users. A manager in an 
organisation based in an African capital city aiming to improve citizens’ 
ability to hold their local government to account in a rural area may 
have much less in common with their intended community of  users. 
Though our research did not include interviews with project managers 
based in developed countries that were selecting and developing tools 
for use in developing countries, it would be reasonable to assume that 
they may be even further removed.
In our research sample, there were many dimensions to this lack of  
commonality, from the relatively obvious questions of  class, education 
and access to power and technology, to less obvious factors such as 
daily routines, cultures and attitudes. In South Africa, with its history 
of  apartheid and very high Gini coefficient, these differences may be 
particularly acute.
We suggest that a related explanation may be that some managers and 
organisations may suffer from a problem of  ‘unknown unknowns’. 
We noticed that those organisations that conducted research and 
trialling were often those that already had quite extensive knowledge 
of  how their targeted users currently use technologies. It could be that 
those who had less knowledge of  their intended users also had less 
understanding of  the importance of  this knowledge gap. Conducting 
trialling or user research does not require much technical knowledge or 
skill, but the advantages of  doing so may not be immediately obvious. 
Project managers tasked with selecting and implementing tools may not 
be able to realistically forecast the costs of  research or trialling when 
buying, adapting or building a tool – or the costs of  uptake failure.
The decision of  whether to buy or build tools was critical for the 
participants in our research. Few respondents identified their organisations 
as ‘tech’, or described them as ‘innovative’ in their use of  technology – and 
most stated that they had very limited technical knowledge or skills. But 
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most organisations also chose to build or commission the development of  
bespoke tools, rather than buying or adopting OTS tools. More surprising 
is that few of  those who opted for ‘build’ over ‘buy’ conducted research on 
or trialled available existing tools before undertaking the challenging and 
complex task of  creating a new tool.
On the face of  it, this is unexpected. Developing new digital tools is 
a risky endeavour, even if  tool selection and implementation involves 
little investment of  time and resources, and even in well-resourced 
organisations (Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt 2005). A common approach to 
managing this risk is iterative and ‘adaptive design’ (Highsmith 2013), 
which involves budgeting and planning for an iterative cycle of  versions 
that will succeed over time through testing. We encountered only one 
case of  this approach in our research.
A number of  respondents clearly recognised the value of  iterative 
development. They had clear and detailed views on the shortcomings 
of  the tools they had built or commissioned, but lacked the capacity, 
authority, financial resources or time to invest in further development.
6 Conclusion
We believe that the sample size in this study is large enough to represent 
a substantial portion of  T4TAIs present in Kenya and South Africa. 
The samples included a diverse range of  organisations – including both 
long-standing T&A organisations and tech-focused innovators – and the 
initiatives described by respondents cover a broad range of  technologies. 
This research was in any case designed to bring issues and insights to 
the surface, rather than to test firm hypotheses. Our conclusions are 
therefore tentative. Further research exploring these organisations in 
greater depth, or applying comparable methods in other countries, 
would be useful to confirm or question our conclusions, and to produce 
additional insights.
In regard to the ‘build it and they will come’ phenomenon, our research 
supports earlier research findings. Avila et al. (2010), McGee and Carlitz 
(2013) and others have highlighted the need for better understanding 
of  users if  tools are to be used appropriately and successfully in T&A 
projects. We also note, however, the relevance of  trialling strategies to 
mitigate the risk of  uptake failure, and offer two common explanations 
for why T4TAIs fail to learn about users before selecting and deploying 
technological tools. Proxy errors, in which project managers or teams 
assume that they are themselves reasonable proxies for the target 
users of  T4TAI tools, and lack of  knowledge about the risks and costs 
associated with not understanding users, are especially common. These 
explanations highlight entry points for supporting more strategic tool 
selection and implementation by T4TAIs.
McGee and Carlitz recommend that ‘in both design and implementation 
phases, actors involved in T4TAIs need to gather more information 
about potential and actual users’ (2013: 30). Our research supports this 
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recommendation and also suggests the need for a further focus within 
the T4TAI community (both researchers and practitioners) on the user, 
in particular on trialling. We suggest two basic approaches that could be 
tested by practitioners in the field and evaluated by researchers.
1  Test first. Trialling during project planning helps understand 
the limitations of  tools in context, and identify obstacles to user 
uptake. It takes a variety of  forms. A commitment to documenting 
trialling methods could lead to shared learning across initiatives and 
organisations to develop best practice.
2  Find or buy before building. A systematic focus on identifying and 
trialling existing OTS technologies before building or commissioning 
the development of  bespoke tools could lead to less tool selection 
failures and better use of  limited resources. The risks of  failure may 
be lower for initiatives employing OTS tools, and the costs of  failure 
for strategies that purchase or adopt OTS tools are much lower than 
the costs of  failure for bespoke tool development. Identifying and 
testing available OTS may require some kind of  research, but our 
findings suggest that reaching out to existing networks or conducting 
simple web searches could be sufficient to identify potential OTS 
tools for many T4TAIs.
Together, these approaches suggest a strategy of  increasing investment 
and effort in tool selection, in order to conserve overall project resources 
and minimise the risk of  failure. According to such a strategy, T4TAIs 
should investigate and test tools before adopting them, and attempt to 
adopt OTS tools before developing bespoke tools. Such an approach 
also implies a handful of  simple rules of  thumb that T4TAIs can apply 
to strengthen tool selection processes and project impact.
 l Investigate what’s already available. Reaching out to peers, 
identifying existing initiatives with similar objectives, finding 
international email groups or simply searching the internet can be 
effective ways to find tools that are ready to use or purchase.
 l Compare multiple tools. Trialling two or three tools and choosing 
the best can be an effective means of  identifying hidden challenges to 
implementation.
 l Earlier is better. Conduct research and trialling early in tool 
selection processes.
 l Expect to fail. Uptake and project failure were very common 
among the T4TAIs we surveyed. Some learned from initial failure 
and improved their tools and projects in subsequent iterations, but 
allowing for such iteration requires planning and budgeting.
Lastly, lack of  awareness among respondents regarding appropriate tool 
selection strategies and resources suggests a communication problem 
between T4TAI researchers and practitioners. As McGee and Carlitz 
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(2013) point out, though technology for transparency and accountability is 
a relatively new field or sub-field, evidence suggests that existing research 
is having insufficient impact on practice. Collaborative efforts such as 
the Transparency and Accountability Initiative, Research4Development, 
Making All Voices Count and the GovLab have taken preliminary steps 
to address this gap between research and practice in guides and online 
resources.3 Such efforts should be supported and critically reviewed to 
determine their effectiveness in bridging this gap. More focused specific 
efforts (such as the Framework for Tool Selection being developed from 
the research reported here) should also be evaluated.
Our research also suggests that local networks may have a profound 
influence on tool selection practices, but that in Kenya and South Africa 
at least, they are not as well developed as some might suspect, both 
in terms of  capacities and connectedness. Donors, practitioners and 
researchers all have different roles to play in supporting the development 
of  such networks, which can have an immediate impact on the resources 
available to T4TAIs for tool selection processes.
More directly, our research has confirmed the importance of  user 
research for successful tool selection processes and suggested that 
trialling strategies can be especially important. We have also suggested 
a handful of  heuristics that T4TAIs can implement during the tool 
selection process, and which merit careful assessment by researchers and 
evaluators. We believe that this can make a significant contribution to 
systematic learning around failure and success of  tools in the service of  
T&A programming.
Notes
*  The research on which this article is based was funded by the Research, 
Evidence and Learning Component of  Making All Voices Count.
1 The research project was conducted by the authors with Sasha 
Kinney and Tom Walker.
2 Cape Town, South Africa, April 2015.
3 See www.transparency-initiative.org/, http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/,  
www.makingallvoicescount.org/ and http://thegovlab.org/, 
respectively.
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The Dark Side of Digital Politics: 
Understanding the Algorithmic 
Manufacturing of Consent and the 
Hindering of Online Dissidence
Emiliano Treré
Abstract Various strands of literature on civic engagement, ‘big data’ and 
open government view digital technologies as the key to easier government 
accountability and citizens’ empowerment, and the solution to many of the 
problems of contemporary democracies. Drawing on a critical analysis of 
contemporary Mexican social and political phenomena, and on a two-year-
long ethnography with the #YoSoy132 networked movement, this article 
demonstrates that digital tools have been successfully deployed by Mexican 
parties and governments in order to manufacture consent, sabotage 
dissidence, threaten activists, and gather personal data without citizens’ 
agreement. These new algorithmic strategies, it is contended, clearly 
show that there is nothing inherently democratic in digital communication 
technologies, and that citizens and activists have to struggle against 
increasingly sophisticated techniques of control and repression that exploit 
the very mechanisms that many consider to be emancipatory technologies.
1 Introduction: coming to terms with techno-optimism within digital 
democratic participation
There is a shared tendency in different strands of  the literature on civic 
engagement, digital activism and protest movements – as well as in 
reflections on the possibilities afforded by open/‘big’ data for increasing 
democratic participation – to view digital technology as the key to 
easier government accountability, and the panacea that can easily solve 
the various issues that plague the worn apparatus of  contemporary 
public institutions. For instance, in recent years the literature on social 
movements and digital media technologies has often reduced diverse 
complex socio-technical configurations and cultural contexts to simple, 
easy-to-understand Twitter or Facebook ‘revolutions’. At the same 
time, the technological developments enabling the publication of  Open 
Data and the tools and capacities to engage with it have been at the 
forefront of  techno-optimism in the transparency and accountability 
field. These developments hold the potential for making vast amounts 
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of  government data – including budget and procurement information 
– widely available to huge numbers of  citizens, who, as the hypothesis 
goes, will then be able to easily analyse and use the data to hold 
governments to account. However, various authors have started to 
unravel the ambiguities, promises and perils of  the open government 
phenomenon (Davies and Bawa 2012; Yu and Robinson 2012).
Meanwhile, the ‘big data’ phenomenon has gained remarkable 
momentum across a wide range of  industries and fields, as well as 
academia. Like many ‘buzzwords’ that have entered the contemporary 
debate, ‘big data’ refers to a plethora of  interconnected social, economic 
and technological phenomena, with reflections about the benefits and 
challenges of  analysing ‘massive quantities of  information produced by 
and about people, things and their interactions’ (Boyd and Crawford 
2012: 1) at their centre. The potential of  large-scale data-gathering 
has been praised for its unprecedented revolutionary possibilities, 
which could include a decisive improvement in the ways citizens and 
governments interact.
Diverse voices have begun to question uncritical views of  these 
phenomena, for example providing more nuanced reflections on the 
pitfalls and threats of  ‘big data’ (Boyd and Crawford 2012; Couldry 
and Powell 2014; Crawford, Gray and Miltner 2014; Tufekci 2014). 
These authors contend that ‘big data’ is not merely a technological 
issue, but first and foremost a ‘mythology’ (Mosco 2014), an emerging 
world view that has to be interrogated, and critically engaged with, not 
incontrovertibly accepted and applauded. Thus, understanding ‘big 
data’ means exploring the consequences of  the computational turn 
across multiple disciplines, and through the alterations it creates in the 
spheres of  epistemology, ontology and ethics. It also means examining 
the limitations, errors and biases in the gathering and interpretation of  
these massive quantities of  information, as well as access to it. In sum, it 
means untangling the processes at the core of  our ‘algorithmic culture’ 
(Hallinan and Striphas 2014).
Other critical voices that tackle the limits, risks and threats of  digital 
communication technologies in relation to democratic processes 
have emerged (Fuchs 2014; Dean 2005). Even so, most accounts of  
experiences and case studies related to the use and appropriation 
of  digital technology in relation to civic engagement still put much 
emphasis on the use of  online platforms to simply ‘fix’ feedback loops, 
allowing citizens to provide feedback on public services, and the 
predominant mood remains optimistic about the potential opportunities 
that technology can offer for citizens to hold governments to account. 
One of  the key lessons of  the Making All Voices Count programme1 
is precisely that the issue of  accountability should be framed as a 
complex political problem, rather than a technical one. But, as has been 
shown in recent studies (Morozov 2013; Treré and Barranquero 2013), 
accountability has often been seen as a matter of  simply ‘finding the 
right technological problem-solving tool’. Furthermore, the controversial 
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question of  obtaining government responsiveness has been usually 
treated in technology studies as a linear and straightforward procedure 
(McGee 2014), rather than as a process that entails dealing strategically 
with power relations that influence which voices will be heard, thus 
constituting a delicate dance between mechanisms that promote citizens’ 
voice and efforts to change government behaviours. However, the voice 
of  citizens does not speak in a vacuum, but rather within the boundaries 
and the limitations of  contemporary neoliberalism, that systematically 
denies and undermines it (Couldry 2010).
Much of  the current focus neglects the ways in which governments can 
and do use digital technology to survey and undermine citizens’ attempts 
to hold them accountable. Instead, something that the recent National 
Security Agency–Snowden scandal made clear is that these technologies 
are used more to spy on us and limit our freedom, than to provide us 
with useful tools to improve the functioning of  democratic institutions.
This article will try to counteract the techno-optimistic bias by providing 
and examining some examples that clearly illustrate the various 
complications emerging from the deployment of  digital technologies by 
governments and parties, and appropriations by citizens and activists. 
The article will draw on a critical analysis of  various contemporary 
Mexican social and political phenomena, and on a two-year-long 
multimodal ethnography that relies on the triangulation of  different 
methodologies: 50 individual interviews with activists of  #YoSoy132; 
four group interviews with protesters from Mexico City, Guadalajara 
and Querétaro; several short periods of  participant observation during 
2012 and 2013; and a qualitative content analysis of  digital media and 
online platforms. Based on the exploration of  the Mexican resistance 
scenario, this article will clearly show that digital platforms can be used 
by government and parties in order to create consent online, control 
and monitor citizens’ activities, and undermine dissent on social media 
platforms. It also shows that the appropriation of  digital communication 
technologies by activists, far from being a linear and unproblematic 
practice, is instead afflicted by everyday frictions, conflicts and struggles.
The article begins by describing the context of  the 2012 Mexican 
elections and the ectivism phenomenon. It goes on to explore the 
algorithmic manufacturing of  consent and undermining of  dissent, 
focusing on the emergence of  the #YoSoy132 movement and the perils 
of  its digital media practices, in particular the so-called ‘Cossío case’. 
Finally, it outlines some broader considerations for the study of  digital 
politics and sketches future scenarios.
2 The 2012 Mexican elections
During the run-up to the 2012 Mexican general elections, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) – which governed for 70 years, 
prior to the election of  the National Action Party (PAN) in 2000 – led in 
several polls. The PRI candidate was a young and attractive man, whose 
image dominated the media: Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN). As documented 
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by various investigative journalists (Tuckman 2012; Villamil 2010), for 
six years the Mexican media titan Televisa had crafted EPN’s candidacy, 
at the same time as delegitimising his left-wing opponent Manuel López 
Obrador. The Mexican telecracy – the media television duopoly Televisa-
TvAzteca, which controls 99 per cent of  the market (Huerta-Wong 
and Gómez García 2013) – has been described as a ‘wild power’ (Trejo 
Delarbre 2004), capable of  a powerful impact on political decisions. 
Before 2012, Mexican politicians had never considered politics through 
digital technologies to be a priority, relying instead on the powerful 
media propaganda apparatus provided by television as their main 
channel for campaigning (Espino Sánchez 2012).
2.1 The ectivism phenomenon
The 2012 elections witnessed what some saw as an explosion of  digital 
politics, with politicians embracing social media to spread their messages 
and to engage in dialogue with citizens. But they mostly considered online 
spaces as sites for both the premeditated construction of  consensus and the 
artificial, algorithmic construction of  consent, rather than environments for 
reinforcing democracy through dialogue, participation and transparency.
Octavio Islas has framed this behaviour as ‘authoritarian engineering’ 
(Islas 2015: 1), the adoption by Mexican politicians of  dirty online 
strategies which reveal their incapacity and refusal to develop political 
campaigns that can build a trustworthy base of  sympathisers and 
followers in cyberspace, and the very opposite of  citizen participation. 
A video posted on YouTube the day before the second presidential 
debate, The Truth of  Peña Nieto on Twitter,2 revealed the existence of  
organised groups of  so-called PRI ectivistas (‘ectivists’), dedicated to 
tweeting according to the instructions of  EPN’s campaign leaders, and 
trying to counteract, isolate or sabotage criticisms of  PRI from civil 
society actors or other citizens. The film shows a campaign operator 
telling ectivists how to overturn hashtags negative to the campaign.
The ectivist phenomenon is controversial. The network was formed 
in December 2009, and ectivist leaders have always claimed to be 
nothing more than a network of  independent young volunteers and PRI 
supporters.3 But, as the online video shows, and as other researchers have 
demonstrated (Figueiras 2012), the organisation of  an estimated 100,000 
ectivists (Islas 2015) was used systematically during the PRI campaign 
to successfully spread and situate Peña Nieto’s image on digital media 
platforms. In particular, the network was ‘activated’ during periods when 
Peña Nieto’s public image suffered, for instance after his speech at the 
Guadalajara International Book Fair, when he was unable to accurately 
name three books that had influenced his life, and when the #YoSoy132 
movement emerged. In order to counteract embarrassments and 
negative public image, Peña Nieto’s media team intensified the directed 
online activities of  the ectivists. Although one of  Peña Nieto’s campaign 
managers (who later became Secretary of  Education) acknowledged4 
in May 2012 that 20,000 ectivists were tweeting without receiving 
any monetary compensation, many thousands of  others were hired, 
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revealing the possibilities for impacting, distorting and manufacturing 
public opinion within digital environments that institutional parties with 
immense financial resources like the PRI have at their disposal.
2.2 The algorithmic manufacturing of consent
The use of  digital strategies in Mexican electoral politics dates to the 
2011 elections for the Governor of  the State of  Mexico, but the 2012 
general election saw them refined and broadened. Studies of  the social 
media strategies of  Mexican politicians during the 2012 campaign find 
that intensified use of  digital technologies did not correspond to an 
increase in democratic participation or dialogue between candidates and 
voters, but was instead constituted by a massive deployment of  strategies 
including: the creation of  false universes of  followers; the use of  software 
robots (bots)5 to automatically generate tweets; and the hiring of  trolls 
(people who tweet in favour of  a candidate, and against their opponent); 
and ghost followers (empty accounts that boost a candidate’s followers). 
By employing these strategies, candidates discarded the possibility of  
using digital technologies to include voters’ feedback in their decisions, or 
incorporate democratic visions into their ways of  doing politics (Ricaurte 
Quijano 2013). An article on the phenomenon in the MIT Technology 
Review (Orcutt 2012) discusses dangers of  ‘large-scale political 
spamming’, and the need to develop countermeasures to prevent the 
expansion of  this phenomenon to other political scenarios.
3 The algorithmic undermining of dissent
The algorithmic construction of  consent goes hand-in-hand with the 
undermining of  critical voices. As carefully documented by several 
bloggers,6 EPN critics mobilising for the #MarchaAntiEPN (March 
against Peña Nieto) on Twitter were systematically attacked and blocked 
online. As Verkamp and Gupta (2013) demonstrate, dissident voices 
were ‘drowned’ on various occasions by orchestrated bot attacks. Since 
2012, political activists and civil society organisations have denounced 
the dangers of  these attacks, arguing that they criminalise protest and 
segregate dissident voices,7 pointing out the need to act immediately to 
prevent more serious future threats. Unfortunately, political strategies 
that rely on digital technologies to artificially boost consensus have 
been enhanced in the years since the election, up to the point where 
they have become an essential component of  the government’s modus 
operandi, used repeatedly during 2013.8
One case is particularly illuminating, described by philosopher Carlos 
Soto Morfín as a clear example of  techno-authoritarianism.9 A study, 
commissioned by the news programme of  a liberal Mexican journalist 
and carried out by social network and data-mining agency Mesura, 
exposed the massive use of  bots to build an illusion of  online support for a 
controversial energy reform (Aristegui Noticias 2012). Mesura documented 
the systematic deployment of  bots to tweet and re-tweet in support of  the 
reform, discovering that the time gap between the sending of  a supportive 
original message and its re-tweeting was too short to be accomplished by 
a human being. Morfín, one of  the authors of  the study, concludes by 
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warning about the risks to which citizens are exposed in an era when the 
importance of  digital politics is growing day by day, and when those in 
power have no ethical problems with manipulating public perception.
On 26 September 2014, a group of  students departed the Ayotzinapa 
Rural Teachers’ College for a protest in the city of  Iguala, about 130km 
away. They never arrived. Exactly what happened remains unknown, 
but we do know that at least three students were killed and another 43 
remain missing. The Mexican government’s official version is that the 
students were killed after being handed over to the Guerreros Unidos cartel 
on the orders of  the mayor of  Iguala, but investigations conducted 
by the Mexican critical magazine Proceso and the US publication The 
Intercept portrayed a darker picture of  government complacency. After 
the event, several activists and citizens started to protest on social media, 
and the Twitter hashtag #YaMeCanse (I am tired) – which expressed 
the feeling of  not being able to take any more violence or permanent 
insecurity – soon became the core for mobilising and spreading 
information. But journalist Erin Gallagher, who covers protests for 
the online magazine Revolution News10 soon noticed something atypical 
in the search results for the #YaMeCanse hashtags: that they were 
flooded with tweets including the hashtag but no other content apart 
from random punctuation marks. The accounts that were tweeting 
this kind of  empty content were bots: they lacked followers, and were 
tweeting automatically. The noise they created made it difficult for 
citizens to share information using #YaMeCanse, and the hashtag 
consequently dropped out of  Twitter’s trending topics. Mexican blogger 
and data-mining analyst Alberto Escorcia has discovered a reliable way 
of  detecting bot accounts by examining the number of  connections a 
Twitter account has with other users, and has been documenting the use 
of  bots in Mexico to sabotage protests by preventing information from 
spreading, and to send death threats to specific activists. For example, 
since February 2015, anthropologist, activist and blogger Rossana 
Reguillo has received regular death threats on various social media 
platforms.11 Particularly harsh attacks via Twitter lasted more than two 
months, and data-mining analysis of  the Twitter campaign showed that 
bots and trolls were responsible for the majority of  the attacks.
4 Another social media is possible? The #YoSoy132 movement
In the run-up to the 2012 elections, EPN’s path to the presidency 
seemed unstoppable. But on 11 May, something unsettled his image as 
the only available option for Mexico. He arrived at the private, religious 
IberoAmerican University in Mexico City to give a lecture, an event 
that PRI expected to run in an uncomplicated way. However, during the 
candidate’s presentation, several students began to question him about 
police repression and the killings that occurred when he was Governor of  
the State of  Mexico. When EPN justified those violent repressions, tensions 
rose, and he had to leave the university surrounded by a security cordon.
Immediately after the event, PRI politicians described the students as 
violent, intolerant fascist thugs, going so far as to deny that they were 
(Endnotes)
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students. At the same time, the Mexican telecracy and the newspaper 
chain Organización Editorial Mexicana presented versions of  the event 
which portrayed EPN as a hero who had survived a boycott organised 
by the Left. This biased coverage led 131 IberoAmerican students to 
publish a video on YouTube12 in which they displayed their student 
credentials and read their out their names to the camera. This powerful 
act of  reclaimed identity marked the start of  the #YoSoy132 movement, 
when the phrase ‘131 students from Ibero’ quickly became one of  the 
trending topics on Twitter in Mexico, and other students began to join 
the protest, stating ‘I am 132’. This led to the creation of  the hashtag 
that went on to identify the whole movement. While the dirty digital 
strategies of  institutional politics were dominating cyberspace, these 
students proved to the world that digital technologies could be used also 
to spread critical voices, mobilise support, organise protests and foster 
collective identification processes.
5 The digital perils of a networked movement
The celebratory literature that has developed around the #YoSoy132 
movement proclaims the role of  social media in the development of  
a ‘fifth state’ and in the birth of  a ‘Mexican spring’ (Islas and Arribas 
2012), and frames digital technologies as a powerful media alternative 
to the Mexican telecracy (Andión Gamboa 2013). My research depicts 
a different scenario, where everyday frictions and struggles, issues of  
exploitation, dataveillance and control – together with constant attempts 
at delegitimisation – continuously plague protesters’ use of  digital 
technologies. Activists’ social media communications are constantly 
afflicted by clashes, struggles and discord. These divergences come to 
manifest themselves in terms of  daily interactions as activists express 
concern and discomfort with integrating social media into protest 
practices. Issues of  ephemerality and weak ties seep through movement 
interactions by raising questions of  authority and belonging, played out 
in terms of  conflicts over who has access to digital media, and what can 
be posted on social media platforms in the name of  any given protest. 
These are illustrated by the Cossío case, in which a web platform was 
used to infiltrate the movement, gather data on activists and post two 
videos to try to undermine the reputation of  #YoSoy132.
5.1 The Cossío case: web surveillance and video aggressions
In May 2012, a man named Manuel Cossío offered #YoSoy132 activists 
his digital expertise and a fully functional web portal, YoSoy132.mx. 
Only ten days after the emergence of  #YoSoy132, Cossío entered the 
movement through one of  its most prominent student activists, Saúl 
Alvídrez. While Alvídrez and other activists had already acquired the 
YoSoy132.com and the YoSoy132.com.mx domains, it was the YoSoy132.mx 
registered by Cossío that was finally adopted, thanks to Cossío’s rhetorical 
skills in selling the movement his ‘valuable, ready-to-go product’13 during 
various assemblies and meetings. Announced as the official page of  the 
movement by various activists on their Twitter feeds and Facebook pages, 
this professional-looking website, fully integrated with possibilities for 
access and interactions with other platforms like Google and Facebook, 
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was extensively adopted for debate, organisation, content spreading, and 
especially for the archiving of  contributors’ data. But, after a month of  
intense use of  the website, something strange occurred. On 18 June, two 
YouTube videos appeared on the home page of  the #YoSoy132 portal 
and in the YouTube account ‘Yo Soy’.14
In the first video, we see in the background the fixed image of  the face 
of  Saúl Alvídrez, at the same time as we hear his voice and see yellow 
subtitles that report his words. The audio, clearly recorded without his 
consent, appears as a combination of  various of  Alvídrez’ informal 
talks, in which a #YoSoy132 student speaks about the movement and 
relations with Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (the leader of  the Left), 
and other leftist figures, especially a collective of  directors, investigative 
journalists and other critical intellectuals named ‘México, Ahora o 
Nunca’ (‘Mexico, Now or Never’).
The second video is entitled La Verdad nos Hará Libres (‘Truth Will Set 
us Free’) – a biblical quote, the motto of  the IberoAmerican University, 
which was adopted as one of  the principal slogans of  the movement. 
Manuel Cossío speaks to the camera, reading a text where he expresses 
his profound disappointment on discovering that many leaders of  
the #YoSoy132 movement had been co-opted by left-wing politicians 
affiliated with the Party of  the Democratic Revolution, such as Marcelo 
Ebrard, López Obrador and Alejandro Encinas.
Both of  these online attempts at delegitimisation were the creation 
of  Manuel Cossío Ramos, owner and manager of  the YoSoy132.mx 
website. According to an inquiry carried out by the online investigative 
journalism website Contralínea in June 2013,15 Cossío was an agent of  
the Mexican Secret Service, the Centre of  National Watch and Security, 
whose mission was to infiltrate the movement, steal data through the 
use of  the Web platform, and destabilise the power balances within 
#YoSoy132 before the elections. Activists of  the movement, flooded 
with activities, internal struggles and frictions, and having to deal with 
organisational challenges in the immediate days after the eruption of  
#YoSoy132, trusted Cossío and fell into the government’s ‘digital trap’.
The two videos caused controversy and conflict: Alvídrez had to leave 
the movement and the Mexican telecracy took advantage of  the event 
to insinuate that the videos represented clear proof  that the Mexican 
movement had been manipulated from the beginning by the intellectuals 
of  the Left. #YoSoy132 activists eventually realised that the platform was 
intended as a way to monitor, control and profile them and decided to 
migrate to another platform, yosoy132media.mx. This migration and the 
dangers related to the use of  the other so-called ‘apocryphal web pages’ 
were officially announced on Facebook and spread through multiple 
Twitter accounts in order to inform citizens about the real intentions of  
Cossío and the nature of  the fake portal; other users and supporters from 
the Mexican blogosphere also retweeted the information.
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According to the Contralínea website, the platform was able to steal 
the information of  more than 70,000 citizens with yet unexplored 
consequences for the Mexican resistance. But we still do not have 
clear figures and data on the scope and the results of  this operation of  
sabotage and surveillance by the Mexican government, and we almost 
surely never will. The mechanisms of  this kind of  digital warfare remain 
opaque, secret and very difficult to decode. What this example clearly 
shows is the extent to which political control can use the technological 
platform through which opposition is carried out, stealing data and 
monitoring protest activities, controlling the information flowing 
through the platform, and exploiting it to compromise and destabilise 
the reputation of  the movement. The same digital communication 
technologies that allow engaged citizens to organise, spread alternative 
information, and make the government accountable have been easily 
infiltrated and used against them.
6 Conclusions: the limits and future horizons of data activism
In contrast to celebratory accounts that in various disciplines and 
fields have conceived the increasing use of  digital technologies as a 
way to make governments accountable, and solve most of  the issues 
that plague contemporary political systems, this article, based on an 
exploration of  social and political experiences of  the Mexican context, 
has demonstrated that digital tools have been successfully deployed by 
parties and governments to manufacture consent, sabotage dissidence, 
threaten activists, and gather information without citizens’ consent.
Nowadays, institutions and parties cannot only count on the traditional 
channels of  propaganda, such as the powerful and biased mainstream 
media apparatus, but can also use their vast financial resources in order 
to hire crowds of  sympathisers that can boost their image on digital 
platforms, deploy armies of  bots and trolls that can be activated to 
sabotage dissent and hinder critical voices on social media, and infiltrate 
movements with imposter techies who can use websites to steal sensible 
activists’ data.
Against these powerful strategies, activists have few digital weapons at 
their disposal, above all because they cannot count on huge economic 
resources. However, as we have seen throughout the article, some of  
them have started to use their technological skills in social network 
analysis and data-mining techniques in order to unmask and denounce 
these dirty strategies on various radical media outlets. Perhaps we can 
conceive of  these tactics as ‘counterprotocol practices’ (Galloway and 
Thacker 2007) that use the same advanced technological tools that 
the powerful deploy to control us in order to make their strategies 
visible and accountable. This form of  ‘data activism’ (Milan 2015) can 
empower citizens and activists in their quest for truth and accountability, 
but given the unbalanced distribution of  power, these attempts remain 
feeble and seldom influence public opinion at the international level, or 
the effective counteraction of  such dirty schemes.
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Before singing the praises of  digital communication technologies to 
make democratic institutions more accountable and reliable, we should 
recognise, understand and try to overcome the plethora of  dangers 
and risks that are associated with them in the arena of  digital politics. 
The algorithmic construction of  consent and the artificial sabotage 
of  dissent demonstrate that there is nothing inherently democratic in 
digital technologies. In order to guarantee that a plurality of  critical 
voices is represented and can be heard, citizens have to struggle against 
increasingly sophisticated techniques of  control and repression that 
successfully exploit the very mechanisms that many consider to be 
emancipatory technologies.
Notes
1 Making All Voices Count is supported by DFID, USAID, Sida and 
the Omidyar Network.
2 www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcy5uT4TygA.
3 http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2012/05/18/quienes-son-los-
ectivistas-y-por-que-apoyan-a-pena-nieto.
4 www.sinembargo.mx/09-05-2012/228938.
5 A ‘social bot’ refers to a ‘computer algorithm that automatically 
produces content and interacts with humans on social media, trying 
to emulate and possibly alter their behaviour’ (Ferrara et al. 2015: 
1–2). Some are benign, but many are designed for the purpose of  
harmfully manipulating social media discourse, for instance by 
artificially inflating the support of  a candidate during the elections.
6 In Spanish, www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-blog-
invitado/2011/11/23/haz-patria-caza-un-bot/#axzz2pexR2Ru3; 
in English: http://thisisfusion.tumblr.com/post/22718557022/
twittergate-mexico-pri-twitter-scandal.
7 www.sinembargo.mx/opinion/07-01-2014/20465.
8 See the following websites for a detailed list of  cases where bots  
were systematically deployed in the Mexican context in the last few  
years: www.sinembargo.mx/opinion/07-01-2014/20465;  
http://loquesigue.tv/.
9 The expression techno-authoritarianism has been adopted in other 
contexts to refer broadly to uses of  digital technologies that reinforce 
hierarchies, and leadership while pretending to enhance participatory 
democracy (Treré and Barassi 2015).
10 http://revolution-news.com/.
11 http://revolution-news.com/mexico-bot-campaign-of-death-threats-
against-blogger-rossana-reguillo/.
12 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7XbocXsFkI.
13 Research interview with Laura, 11 April 2013.
14 www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj2HipB5a1c&list=UUg-
S9Qre98WT9kDEb4hixKw and www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UmuFHcyHSaA.
15 http://contralinea.info/archivo-revista/index.php/2013/09/08/
yosoy-infiltrado/. These findings were anticipated by articles on the 
critical blog SinEmbargo and by the magazine Proceso, and further 
analysed on the Revolución 3.0 blog.
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